Michael Morrell

Michael, let's go back.

You mentioned Al-Qaeda.

We talked about your time there around 9-11.

But back to that.

period right after 9-11.

I just wonder how quickly you felt Iraq coming onto the agenda or being placed on the agenda.

Because when you look back now at some of the memoirs, you do hear that Paul Wolfowitz and some of the others were immediately trying to draw a connection between Iraq and 9-11.

Some people a direct connection with al-Qaeda and the attack, and some people just saying, we should do this now and take out Saddam now.

I mean, I just wonder how quickly you felt that happening and why did you think it was happening?

But it was, you know, the idea he had the weapons of mass destruction at this point

was based on a kind of analytic assumption of past behavior and past activity.

I guess that's what's so interesting is when you look at the British side as well, they didn't really have fresh sources, or there were some, and I'm sure we'll come to maybe some of them, but a lot of it was layers of assumption which had been built up over time, weren't they?

Probably somewhere.

Someone's faxing.

We'll explain it to the kids.