Antony Blinken

Let's take an example. Let's take a concrete example. Let's talk about China for a minute. I think President Trump was right during his first administration in identifying some of the challenges posed by China. No country has the capacity that China does to reshape to its own will and designs the international system that we and many others put in place after the Second World War.

It has the military power, the economic power, the diplomatic power to do that in ways that no other country does. And we also know that many of the practices it's engaged in have been grossly unfair to our workers, to our companies, undercutting them, driving them out of business. So I think he was right in identifying that problem.

It has the military power, the economic power, the diplomatic power to do that in ways that no other country does. And we also know that many of the practices it's engaged in have been grossly unfair to our workers, to our companies, undercutting them, driving them out of business. So I think he was right in identifying that problem.

Where I would disagree with the approach he took and where I would commend to him the approach that we pursued is we're so much more effective in dealing with the challenges posed by China when we're working closely with other countries.

Where I would disagree with the approach he took and where I would commend to him the approach that we pursued is we're so much more effective in dealing with the challenges posed by China when we're working closely with other countries.

So if you're trying to take on the China problem, but at the same time, you're taking actions that in one way or another alienate allies and partners, you're likely to be less effective in dealing with China. When we took office, the European Union was on the verge of signing a major trade agreement with China. They were hedging. They weren't sure if they could count on the United States.

So if you're trying to take on the China problem, but at the same time, you're taking actions that in one way or another alienate allies and partners, you're likely to be less effective in dealing with China. When we took office, the European Union was on the verge of signing a major trade agreement with China. They were hedging. They weren't sure if they could count on the United States.

We'd had real challenges in the relationships in the preceding four years, and they were hedging toward China. So were many other countries. We were really on the decline when it came dealing with China diplomatically and economically. We've reversed that. And so I think the difference is the way we've approached it is we've sought to bring other countries in to dealing with this challenge.

We'd had real challenges in the relationships in the preceding four years, and they were hedging toward China. So were many other countries. We were really on the decline when it came dealing with China diplomatically and economically. We've reversed that. And so I think the difference is the way we've approached it is we've sought to bring other countries in to dealing with this challenge.

When we're dealing with China's economic practices that we don't like and we're doing it alone, we're 20% of world GDP. When we aligned Europeans, key allies and partners in the Asia Pacific, we're suddenly 40, 50, 60% of world GDP, something that China can't ignore.

When we're dealing with China's economic practices that we don't like and we're doing it alone, we're 20% of world GDP. When we aligned Europeans, key allies and partners in the Asia Pacific, we're suddenly 40, 50, 60% of world GDP, something that China can't ignore.

And again and again, what I've seen over these last four years is a convergence in the approach taken to China with Europe and with Asia that we've not seen before. And I know it's succeeding because every time I meet with my Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, the foreign minister, he inevitably spends 30, 40 minutes, 60 minutes complaining about everything we've done.

And again and again, what I've seen over these last four years is a convergence in the approach taken to China with Europe and with Asia that we've not seen before. And I know it's succeeding because every time I meet with my Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, the foreign minister, he inevitably spends 30, 40 minutes, 60 minutes complaining about everything we've done.

to align other countries to build this convergence in dealing with things that we don't like that China's pursuing. So to me, that is the proof point that we're much better off through diplomacy.

to align other countries to build this convergence in dealing with things that we don't like that China's pursuing. So to me, that is the proof point that we're much better off through diplomacy.

Look, tariffs have their place.

Look, tariffs have their place.

And I think when they're strategically focused, then they can be a very effective and important tool. Look, the jury's out on exactly what the incoming administration does. We'll see. All I'm saying is I think there is a strategic utility, but they should be not, in my judgment at least,

And I think when they're strategically focused, then they can be a very effective and important tool. Look, the jury's out on exactly what the incoming administration does. We'll see. All I'm saying is I think there is a strategic utility, but they should be not, in my judgment at least,

When you do them across the board, then the people who usually pay the price are consumers because it's a tax that gets passed along to them because the producers of whatever the product is have to raise their prices because it's suddenly a lot more expensive to do business.