Dr. Marcel Dirsus

Also, no guarantees, I suppose. Yeah, I got really obsessed with the topic of succession because I think it's really one of the defining weaknesses of dictatorships or non-democratic systems of government in general, right? And we don't talk about it enough. And one of the things that I looked at was the European Middle Ages, around the year 1000.

The way that succession worked is that you were the king, and if you lost power, it would go to your brother. And for many reasons, that was quite a bad system. And the primary weakness that is inherent to this system is that the age difference between the king and his brother tends to be quite small.

The way that succession worked is that you were the king, and if you lost power, it would go to your brother. And for many reasons, that was quite a bad system. And the primary weakness that is inherent to this system is that the age difference between the king and his brother tends to be quite small.

The way that succession worked is that you were the king, and if you lost power, it would go to your brother. And for many reasons, that was quite a bad system. And the primary weakness that is inherent to this system is that the age difference between the king and his brother tends to be quite small.

So if the brother wants to be king, as a lot of them did want, they would have a massive incentive to kill that brother. the king. And they did. So a lot of those kings got killed. And one alternative that they thought about in the Middle Ages was to basically give money from the king to the youngest child of the king. Because if you do that, you maximize that age difference, right?

So if the brother wants to be king, as a lot of them did want, they would have a massive incentive to kill that brother. the king. And they did. So a lot of those kings got killed. And one alternative that they thought about in the Middle Ages was to basically give money from the king to the youngest child of the king. Because if you do that, you maximize that age difference, right?

So if the brother wants to be king, as a lot of them did want, they would have a massive incentive to kill that brother. the king. And they did. So a lot of those kings got killed. And one alternative that they thought about in the Middle Ages was to basically give money from the king to the youngest child of the king. Because if you do that, you maximize that age difference, right?

If you have a five-year-old and you're 50, that five-year-old can afford to wait. There's no reason why the five-year-old or the 15-year-old would have to take you out. So they thought, okay, that might offer some degree of stability. But it doesn't.

If you have a five-year-old and you're 50, that five-year-old can afford to wait. There's no reason why the five-year-old or the 15-year-old would have to take you out. So they thought, okay, that might offer some degree of stability. But it doesn't.

If you have a five-year-old and you're 50, that five-year-old can afford to wait. There's no reason why the five-year-old or the 15-year-old would have to take you out. So they thought, okay, that might offer some degree of stability. But it doesn't.

Because the problem with that is that when the successor is too young, that successor cannot credibly signal to the other regime elites, so the people at the court or nowadays the oligarchs or the generals and so forth, that they're going to keep the system itself stable. No. My son is five. I don't trust him with a pair of scissors. They're not going to do that. So they have no allies.

Because the problem with that is that when the successor is too young, that successor cannot credibly signal to the other regime elites, so the people at the court or nowadays the oligarchs or the generals and so forth, that they're going to keep the system itself stable. No. My son is five. I don't trust him with a pair of scissors. They're not going to do that. So they have no allies.

Because the problem with that is that when the successor is too young, that successor cannot credibly signal to the other regime elites, so the people at the court or nowadays the oligarchs or the generals and so forth, that they're going to keep the system itself stable. No. My son is five. I don't trust him with a pair of scissors. They're not going to do that. So they have no allies.

They have no alliance. They can't make that promise credibly. And of course, the regime elites, they don't necessarily care about the king or they don't care about necessarily about the dictator. They care about the system as such because the system is what gives them money and what gives them power.

They have no alliance. They can't make that promise credibly. And of course, the regime elites, they don't necessarily care about the king or they don't care about necessarily about the dictator. They care about the system as such because the system is what gives them money and what gives them power.

They have no alliance. They can't make that promise credibly. And of course, the regime elites, they don't necessarily care about the king or they don't care about necessarily about the dictator. They care about the system as such because the system is what gives them money and what gives them power.

So the sweet spot that they ultimately settled on was to take the eldest son because the eldest son still had a big age gap, but was more likely to be able to signal credibly that the system would be kept alive, let's say like a 20-year-old. And this massively increased the survival rate of monarchs that switched to the system of granting power to the eldest son. Massive, massive.

So the sweet spot that they ultimately settled on was to take the eldest son because the eldest son still had a big age gap, but was more likely to be able to signal credibly that the system would be kept alive, let's say like a 20-year-old. And this massively increased the survival rate of monarchs that switched to the system of granting power to the eldest son. Massive, massive.

So the sweet spot that they ultimately settled on was to take the eldest son because the eldest son still had a big age gap, but was more likely to be able to signal credibly that the system would be kept alive, let's say like a 20-year-old. And this massively increased the survival rate of monarchs that switched to the system of granting power to the eldest son. Massive, massive.

They were twice as likely to survive in power. And now you say, okay, that's kings, queens, whatever. That's the Middle Ages. But that same mechanism is still at play. Regime elites still care about the continuation of the regime. So if you look at something like Syria... and you look at the way that succession worked with the Assads, you have the same mechanism at play, right?