Dr. Timothy B. Smith

But I think it does have a larger impact later in the war because, as you say, nobody really ever replaces him. in a way that everybody takes the new commander to be the head and shoulders above everybody else. In fact, what they wind up doing is promoting one of the corps commanders from Shallow above the rest of them, which institutes a lot of jealousy. And that's Braxton Bragg, of course.

And the three main enemies that Bragg later has are the three other corps commanders at Shallow that didn't get the promotion. So Beauregard being one of them, right? Well, Beauregard is the second in command, and he's got a whole lot of other issues with Jefferson Davis. They don't like each other. And so when Beauregard gives up Corinth after Shallow, that basically ruins it for him.

And the three main enemies that Bragg later has are the three other corps commanders at Shallow that didn't get the promotion. So Beauregard being one of them, right? Well, Beauregard is the second in command, and he's got a whole lot of other issues with Jefferson Davis. They don't like each other. And so when Beauregard gives up Corinth after Shallow, that basically ruins it for him.

And the three main enemies that Bragg later has are the three other corps commanders at Shallow that didn't get the promotion. So Beauregard being one of them, right? Well, Beauregard is the second in command, and he's got a whole lot of other issues with Jefferson Davis. They don't like each other. And so when Beauregard gives up Corinth after Shallow, that basically ruins it for him.

Beauregard will never hold a major army command the rest of the war. So there's more than just military ability involved here. There's politics, there's personality, a lot of things involved.

Beauregard will never hold a major army command the rest of the war. So there's more than just military ability involved here. There's politics, there's personality, a lot of things involved.

Beauregard will never hold a major army command the rest of the war. So there's more than just military ability involved here. There's politics, there's personality, a lot of things involved.

Yes, Buell and Wallace combined will provide Grant with about 24,000 fresh troops. And when I say fresh, that means not engaged the day before. And they have marched a long way the day before. So they're not totally fresh, but they weren't engaged the day before. The Confederates, on the other hand, get one regiment of reinforcements. 47th Tennessee, that's 741 men.

Yes, Buell and Wallace combined will provide Grant with about 24,000 fresh troops. And when I say fresh, that means not engaged the day before. And they have marched a long way the day before. So they're not totally fresh, but they weren't engaged the day before. The Confederates, on the other hand, get one regiment of reinforcements. 47th Tennessee, that's 741 men.

Yes, Buell and Wallace combined will provide Grant with about 24,000 fresh troops. And when I say fresh, that means not engaged the day before. And they have marched a long way the day before. So they're not totally fresh, but they weren't engaged the day before. The Confederates, on the other hand, get one regiment of reinforcements. 47th Tennessee, that's 741 men.

So 741 men on one side, 24,000 on the other side. You can see which way this thing is going. And it's not a hard decision then for Grant to decide, yeah, we're going to stay here and we're going to fight it out. That certainly helps. But even if you compare this with other commanders, I often think if George McClellan had been in command of the Union Army here, what would he have done?

So 741 men on one side, 24,000 on the other side. You can see which way this thing is going. And it's not a hard decision then for Grant to decide, yeah, we're going to stay here and we're going to fight it out. That certainly helps. But even if you compare this with other commanders, I often think if George McClellan had been in command of the Union Army here, what would he have done?

So 741 men on one side, 24,000 on the other side. You can see which way this thing is going. And it's not a hard decision then for Grant to decide, yeah, we're going to stay here and we're going to fight it out. That certainly helps. But even if you compare this with other commanders, I often think if George McClellan had been in command of the Union Army here, what would he have done?

Given what he did at the peninsula and other places, you know, and the failure to pursue at Antietam, I'm not sure what he would have gotten out of there. Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, you know, would Hooker have fallen back? And again, people are counseling Grant to do this. But Grant said, no, we're going to stick and fight it out. And that's where he wins the battle.

Given what he did at the peninsula and other places, you know, and the failure to pursue at Antietam, I'm not sure what he would have gotten out of there. Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, you know, would Hooker have fallen back? And again, people are counseling Grant to do this. But Grant said, no, we're going to stick and fight it out. And that's where he wins the battle.

Given what he did at the peninsula and other places, you know, and the failure to pursue at Antietam, I'm not sure what he would have gotten out of there. Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, you know, would Hooker have fallen back? And again, people are counseling Grant to do this. But Grant said, no, we're going to stick and fight it out. And that's where he wins the battle.

He could have still thrown it away during the night.

He could have still thrown it away during the night.

He could have still thrown it away during the night.

That last line of defense at Shiloh, there's some 50 pieces of artillery in the first third of a mile inland from the river. And you've got the two gunboats, Tyler and Lexington, in the river itself firing up Dill Branch Ravine. The area is so strong. And this is one of the key things for battlefield preservation. And the federal government did it a long time ago in the 1890s.