Mouin Rabbani
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I think the problem with your statement is that if you go back and listen to it, the first part of it is war is hell, civilians die. It's a fact of life. And you state that in a very factual matter. Then when you start talking about Hamas, all of a sudden you've discovered morality, and you've discovered condemnation, and you've discovered intent, and you are unfortunately far from alone in this.
I think the problem with your statement is that if you go back and listen to it, the first part of it is war is hell, civilians die. It's a fact of life. And you state that in a very factual matter. Then when you start talking about Hamas, all of a sudden you've discovered morality, and you've discovered condemnation, and you've discovered intent, and you are unfortunately far from alone in this.
Even the Amnesty International in 2008 and in 2014 and even today will continue to say that it's like the types of attacksβ I don't think you'll find anyone who will deny that Hamas has targeted civilians. Sure. You gave the example ofβ But there's a differenceβ Of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. I mean, facts are facts.
Even the Amnesty International in 2008 and in 2014 and even today will continue to say that it's like the types of attacksβ I don't think you'll find anyone who will deny that Hamas has targeted civilians. Sure. You gave the example ofβ But there's a differenceβ Of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. I mean, facts are facts.
Yeah, but the idea that Israel is not in the business of intentionally targeting civilians, I know that's what we're supposed to believe. But the historical record stands very clearly.
Yeah, but the idea that Israel is not in the business of intentionally targeting civilians, I know that's what we're supposed to believe. But the historical record stands very clearly.
I'd just like to make... The way you characterized it, I think the best example of that I've come across during this specific conflict is John Kirby, the White House spokesman. I've named him Tears Tossed Her Own for a very good reason. When he's talking about Palestinian civilian deaths, war is hell, it's a fact of life, get used to it.
I'd just like to make... The way you characterized it, I think the best example of that I've come across during this specific conflict is John Kirby, the White House spokesman. I've named him Tears Tossed Her Own for a very good reason. When he's talking about Palestinian civilian deaths, war is hell, it's a fact of life, get used to it.
When he was confronted with Israeli civilian deaths on October 7th, he literally broke down in tears.
When he was confronted with Israeli civilian deaths on October 7th, he literally broke down in tears.
He understood that. No, that's what he tried to make us understand.
He understood that. No, that's what he tried to make us understand.
I'm willing to grant you. You don't have to pursue it. Allow me to finish. I don't know anything about this. I'd like to hear it.
I'm willing to grant you. You don't have to pursue it. Allow me to finish. I don't know anything about this. I'd like to hear it.
He didn't say they're a waste of time. I'd like to respond to what you were saying. I think the question that we're trying to answer... I think you don't understand Israel.
He didn't say they're a waste of time. I'd like to respond to what you were saying. I think the question that we're trying to answer... I think you don't understand Israel.
Now it works. I think we're all agreed that Palestinians have deliberately targeted civilians. whether we're talking about Hamas and Islamic Jihad today or previously... I prefer the word murdered and raped rather than targeted.
Now it works. I think we're all agreed that Palestinians have deliberately targeted civilians. whether we're talking about Hamas and Islamic Jihad today or previously... I prefer the word murdered and raped rather than targeted.
I'm not talking about... I'm talking about this now. Yeah, but I'm trying to answer his question. Historically, there is substantial evidence that Palestinians have targeted civilians, whether it's been incidental or systematic is a different discussion. I don't want to get into that now. For some reason, there seems to be a huge debate about whether
I'm not talking about... I'm talking about this now. Yeah, but I'm trying to answer his question. Historically, there is substantial evidence that Palestinians have targeted civilians, whether it's been incidental or systematic is a different discussion. I don't want to get into that now. For some reason, there seems to be a huge debate about whether
any Israeli has ever sunk so low as to target a civilian.
any Israeli has ever sunk so low as to target a civilian.
If I understand you correctly, you're basically making the claim that that none of these attacks could have happened without going through an entire chain of command.
If I understand you correctly, you're basically making the claim that that none of these attacks could have happened without going through an entire chain of command.
My understanding of the Israeli military, and you could perhaps, you've served in it, you would know better, It's actually a fairly chaotic organization.
My understanding of the Israeli military, and you could perhaps, you've served in it, you would know better, It's actually a fairly chaotic organization.
Well, my understanding of the Israeli military is that it's quite chaotic and there's also a lot of testimonies from Israel, but be that as it may, okay, I'm prepared to accept both of your contentions that it's a highly organized and disciplined force. Air Force under any scenario is going to be more organized than the other branches. And you're saying such a strike would have been inconceivable.
Well, my understanding of the Israeli military is that it's quite chaotic and there's also a lot of testimonies from Israel, but be that as it may, okay, I'm prepared to accept both of your contentions that it's a highly organized and disciplined force. Air Force under any scenario is going to be more organized than the other branches. And you're saying such a strike would have been inconceivable.
Your basic claim is that it would be fair to assume that such a strike could have only been carried out with multiple levels of authorization and signing off. Okay, let's accept that for the sake of argument. We have now seen... Incident after incident after incident after incident where entire families are vaporized in single strikes.
Your basic claim is that it would be fair to assume that such a strike could have only been carried out with multiple levels of authorization and signing off. Okay, let's accept that for the sake of argument. We have now seen... Incident after incident after incident after incident where entire families are vaporized in single strikes.
Family members.
Family members.
Why do I have to prove a negative?
Why do I have to prove a negative?
You know,
You know,
30,000 is a small number. You consider 30,000 a small number?
30,000 is a small number. You consider 30,000 a small number?
12,000 children is only...
12,000 children is only...
Is there a genocide going on in Gaza? Well, in several years, we will have a definitive response to that question. What has happened thus far is that on the 29th of December, the Republic of South Africa instituted proceedings against Israel pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Is there a genocide going on in Gaza? Well, in several years, we will have a definitive response to that question. What has happened thus far is that on the 29th of December, the Republic of South Africa instituted proceedings against Israel pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
South Africa basically accused Israel of perpetrating genocide in the Gaza Strip. On the 26th of January, the court issued its initial ruling. The court at this stage is not making a determination on whether Israel has or has not committed genocide. So just as it has not found Israel guilty, it certainly also hasn't found Israel innocent.
South Africa basically accused Israel of perpetrating genocide in the Gaza Strip. On the 26th of January, the court issued its initial ruling. The court at this stage is not making a determination on whether Israel has or has not committed genocide. So just as it has not found Israel guilty, it certainly also hasn't found Israel innocent.
What the court had to do at this stage was take one of two decisions. Either South Africa's case was the equivalent of a frivolous lawsuit and dismiss it and close the proceedings, or it had to determine that South Africa presented a plausible case that Israel was violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention and that it would on that basis hold a full hearing. Now, a lot of people
What the court had to do at this stage was take one of two decisions. Either South Africa's case was the equivalent of a frivolous lawsuit and dismiss it and close the proceedings, or it had to determine that South Africa presented a plausible case that Israel was violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention and that it would on that basis hold a full hearing. Now, a lot of people
have looked at the court's ruling of the 26th of January and focused on the fact that the court did not order a ceasefire. I actually wasn't expecting it to order a ceasefire, and I wasn't surprised that it didn't, because in the other cases that the court has considered, most prominently Bosnia and Myanmar, it also didn't order a ceasefire.
have looked at the court's ruling of the 26th of January and focused on the fact that the court did not order a ceasefire. I actually wasn't expecting it to order a ceasefire, and I wasn't surprised that it didn't, because in the other cases that the court has considered, most prominently Bosnia and Myanmar, it also didn't order a ceasefire.
And South Africa, in requesting a ceasefire, also didn't ask the court to render an opinion on the legitimacy or lack thereof of Israel's military operation. From my perspective, the key issue on the 26th of January was whether the court would simply dismiss the case or decide to proceed with it.
And South Africa, in requesting a ceasefire, also didn't ask the court to render an opinion on the legitimacy or lack thereof of Israel's military operation. From my perspective, the key issue on the 26th of January was whether the court would simply dismiss the case or decide to proceed with it.
And it decided to proceed. And I think that's enormously significant.
And it decided to proceed. And I think that's enormously significant.
Can you let me finish? Well, the end of the story is you specifically asked whether I think Israel is committing genocide. I explained formally there is no finding. And as you said, we won't know for a number of years. And I think there's legitimate questions to be raised. I mean, in the Bosnia case, which I think all four of us would agree was clearly a case of genocide. the court determined.
Can you let me finish? Well, the end of the story is you specifically asked whether I think Israel is committing genocide. I explained formally there is no finding. And as you said, we won't know for a number of years. And I think there's legitimate questions to be raised. I mean, in the Bosnia case, which I think all four of us would agree was clearly a case of genocide. the court determined.
In the Bosnia case, the court determined that of all the evidence placed before them, only Srebrenica qualified as genocide and all the other atrocities committed did not qualify as genocide. You know, international law is a developing organism. I don't know how the court is going to respond in this case. So I wouldn't take it as a foregone conclusion how the court is going to respond.
In the Bosnia case, the court determined that of all the evidence placed before them, only Srebrenica qualified as genocide and all the other atrocities committed did not qualify as genocide. You know, international law is a developing organism. I don't know how the court is going to respond in this case. So I wouldn't take it as a foregone conclusion how the court is going to respond.
I have too, because you're asking my personal opinion. So as a matter of law, I want to state very clearly, it has not been determined and won't be determined for several years. Based on my... observations and the evidence before me, I would say it's indisputable that Israel is engaged in a genocidal assault against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
I have too, because you're asking my personal opinion. So as a matter of law, I want to state very clearly, it has not been determined and won't be determined for several years. Based on my... observations and the evidence before me, I would say it's indisputable that Israel is engaged in a genocidal assault against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
Genocide consists of two elements, the destruction of a people in whole or in part. So in other words, you can commit genocide by killing 30,000 people. Well, five probably is below the threshold. Yes, but I think 30,000 crosses the threshold. and not reaching 500,000 is probably relevant. And the second element is there has to be an intent. In other words- And you believe there's an intent?
Genocide consists of two elements, the destruction of a people in whole or in part. So in other words, you can commit genocide by killing 30,000 people. Well, five probably is below the threshold. Yes, but I think 30,000 crosses the threshold. and not reaching 500,000 is probably relevant. And the second element is there has to be an intent. In other words- And you believe there's an intent?
Yes, I think if there is any other plausible reason for why all these people are being murdered, it's not genocide. And as far as intent is concerned... What about hiding behind a human shield? You don't think that's a reason for them being killed? Well, let's get the intent part out of the way first. South Africa's... Forget South Africa.
Yes, I think if there is any other plausible reason for why all these people are being murdered, it's not genocide. And as far as intent is concerned... What about hiding behind a human shield? You don't think that's a reason for them being killed? Well, let's get the intent part out of the way first. South Africa's... Forget South Africa.
They're pro-Hamas government. That's got nothing to do with anything. I think they're pro-Satan as well, last time I checked. No, they're pro-Hamas. You know, for some reason, you don't have a problem with people being pro-Israeli at the time of this, but if they support Palestinians' right to life or self-determination, they get demonized and delegitimized as pro-Ahmad.
They're pro-Hamas government. That's got nothing to do with anything. I think they're pro-Satan as well, last time I checked. No, they're pro-Hamas. You know, for some reason, you don't have a problem with people being pro-Israeli at the time of this, but if they support Palestinians' right to life or self-determination, they get demonized and delegitimized as pro-Ahmad.
But supporting a state that has murdered 30,000.
But supporting a state that has murdered 30,000.
They wanted them killed.
They wanted them killed.
Of course they want them killed. Okay. You asked me about intent. And the reason that I bought in the South African application is because it is actually exceptionally detailed. on intent by quoting numerous... All sorts of idiotic ministers in Israel. Well, yeah, including the prime minister, the defense minister, the chief of staff.
Of course they want them killed. Okay. You asked me about intent. And the reason that I bought in the South African application is because it is actually exceptionally detailed. on intent by quoting numerous... All sorts of idiotic ministers in Israel. Well, yeah, including the prime minister, the defense minister, the chief of staff.
No, he said Amalek. He said Amalek.
No, he said Amalek. He said Amalek.
So the reason I raised the South African application is twofold, Hamas or no Hamas. It's exceptionally detailed on the question of intent. And secondly, when the International Court of Justice issues a ruling, individual justices can give their own opinion. Yeah, yeah.
So the reason I raised the South African application is twofold, Hamas or no Hamas. It's exceptionally detailed on the question of intent. And secondly, when the International Court of Justice issues a ruling, individual justices can give their own opinion. Yeah, yeah.
And I found the German one to be the most interesting on this specific question, because he was basically saying that he didn't think South Africa presented a persuasive case, but he said, Their section on intent was so overpowering that he felt he was left with no choice but to vote with the majority. So I think that answers the intent part of your question.
And I found the German one to be the most interesting on this specific question, because he was basically saying that he didn't think South Africa presented a persuasive case, but he said, Their section on intent was so overpowering that he felt he was left with no choice but to vote with the majority. So I think that answers the intent part of your question.
I think they found one.
I think they found one.
No, I think we... It hasn't.
No, I think we... It hasn't.
They can swim well enough to have a realistic prospect of winning a medal.
They can swim well enough to have a realistic prospect of winning a medal.
Bosnia, which was admittedly a special type of case because they were accusing Serbia of sponsoring the Bosnian Serbs. That took, I think, 17 years.
Bosnia, which was admittedly a special type of case because they were accusing Serbia of sponsoring the Bosnian Serbs. That took, I think, 17 years.
Yeah, but I think the problem with your characterization is You're saying in so many words that South Africans basically only have to show up in court with a coherent statement. Right. That is correct.
Yeah, but I think the problem with your characterization is You're saying in so many words that South Africans basically only have to show up in court with a coherent statement. Right. That is correct.
They needed to do a lot more. Not much more. Not much more. The American judge?
They needed to do a lot more. Not much more. Not much more. The American judge?
The American judge? Today's atmosphere.
The American judge? Today's atmosphere.
They needed to persuade the court that it was worth investing several years of their time. They're probably well paid for it. They're well paid whether they take this case or not. I mean, you know, they have a full docket whether they accept or reject this case. And I don't think we should... Remember what I just said.
They needed to persuade the court that it was worth investing several years of their time. They're probably well paid for it. They're well paid whether they take this case or not. I mean, you know, they have a full docket whether they accept or reject this case. And I don't think we should... Remember what I just said.
By lots of politicians. But you don't accept extreme Palestinians. But that's not Israeli policy.
By lots of politicians. But you don't accept extreme Palestinians. But that's not Israeli policy.
But you don't accept extreme Palestinian statements after they lost their entire country, not just 1,200 people. That's a good point. No, no, it's a good point. And on that...
But you don't accept extreme Palestinian statements after they lost their entire country, not just 1,200 people. That's a good point. No, no, it's a good point. And on that...
Oh, really?
Oh, really?
Is this... Because I know you've also... talked about the closure of the archives and stuff?
Is this... Because I know you've also... talked about the closure of the archives and stuff?
What's your casualty count for Deir Yassin?
What's your casualty count for Deir Yassin?
Because before they were... They used to say 245 or 254.
Because before they were... They used to say 245 or 254.
Because the Red Cross, I think, was the one that first put out that number.
Because the Red Cross, I think, was the one that first put out that number.
Maybe.
Maybe.
I think Begin and his memoirs... Yeah, yeah, yeah.
I think Begin and his memoirs... Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Of Israel or of a Jewish state?
Of Israel or of a Jewish state?
Well, just briefly in response⦠Arafat formally recognized Israel in 1993. Yeah, earlier. I don't think actually that in 2000, 2001, a genuine resolution was on offer because I think the maximum Israel was prepared to offer, admittedly more than it had been prepared to offer in the past, fell short of the minimum that the Palestinians considered to be a reasonable resolution.
Well, just briefly in response⦠Arafat formally recognized Israel in 1993. Yeah, earlier. I don't think actually that in 2000, 2001, a genuine resolution was on offer because I think the maximum Israel was prepared to offer, admittedly more than it had been prepared to offer in the past, fell short of the minimum that the Palestinians considered to be a reasonable resolution.
two-state settlement, bearing in mind that as of 1949, Israel controlled 78% of the British mandate of Palestine. Palestinians were seeking a stay on the remaining 22%, and this was apparently too much for Israel.
two-state settlement, bearing in mind that as of 1949, Israel controlled 78% of the British mandate of Palestine. Palestinians were seeking a stay on the remaining 22%, and this was apparently too much for Israel.
They were being offered, I think, less than a withdrawal to the 1967 borders with mutual and minor and reciprocal land swaps and the just resolution of... The refugee problem was one of the questions. Yes. You know, I worked for a number of years with International Crisis Group, and my boss at the time was Rob Malley, who was one of the American officials present at Camp David.
They were being offered, I think, less than a withdrawal to the 1967 borders with mutual and minor and reciprocal land swaps and the just resolution of... The refugee problem was one of the questions. Yes. You know, I worked for a number of years with International Crisis Group, and my boss at the time was Rob Malley, who was one of the American officials present at Camp David.
The point I want to make about Rob was he wrote, I think, a very perceptive article in 2001 in the New York Review of Books. I know that you and Ehud Barak had a debate with them, but I think he gives a very compelling reason of why and how Camp David failed.
The point I want to make about Rob was he wrote, I think, a very perceptive article in 2001 in the New York Review of Books. I know that you and Ehud Barak had a debate with them, but I think he gives a very compelling reason of why and how Camp David failed.
Hussein Ara, yes, who was not at Camp David. But in response to your question, I think there could have been real possibility of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace in the mid-1970s in the wake of the 1973 October War. I'll recall that in 1971,
Hussein Ara, yes, who was not at Camp David. But in response to your question, I think there could have been real possibility of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace in the mid-1970s in the wake of the 1973 October War. I'll recall that in 1971,
Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967, speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans stated, if I had to choose between Sharm el-Sheikh without peace or peace without Sharm el-Sheikh, this is referring to the resort
Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967, speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans stated, if I had to choose between Sharm el-Sheikh without peace or peace without Sharm el-Sheikh, this is referring to the resort
in Egyptian Sinai, which was then under Israeli occupation, Dayan said, I will choose for Sharm el-Sheikh without peace. Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly. And I think it was in that context that had there been a joint agreement
in Egyptian Sinai, which was then under Israeli occupation, Dayan said, I will choose for Sharm el-Sheikh without peace. Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly. And I think it was in that context that had there been a joint agreement
US-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in in the occupied territories. I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think, for several reasons. And ultimately, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided
US-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in in the occupied territories. I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think, for several reasons. And ultimately, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided
for reasons we can discuss later, to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand
for reasons we can discuss later, to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand
in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon, to get rid of the PLO and so on. You ask, when were we closest? And I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close, and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement.
in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon, to get rid of the PLO and so on. You ask, when were we closest? And I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close, and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement.
My own view, and I've written about this, I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly, if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories.
My own view, and I've written about this, I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly, if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories.
I would argue it's more tenuous than was the French position in Algeria in 1954, than was a British position in Ireland in 1916, than was the Ethiopian position in Eritrea in 1990. And so as a matter of practicality, as a matter of principle, I do think the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories remains realistic.
I would argue it's more tenuous than was the French position in Algeria in 1954, than was a British position in Ireland in 1916, than was the Ethiopian position in Eritrea in 1990. And so as a matter of practicality, as a matter of principle, I do think the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories remains realistic.
I think the question that we now need to ask ourselves, it's one I'm certainly asking myself since October 7th and looking at Israel's genocidal campaign, but also looking at larger questions, is it desirable? Can you have...
I think the question that we now need to ask ourselves, it's one I'm certainly asking myself since October 7th and looking at Israel's genocidal campaign, but also looking at larger questions, is it desirable? Can you have...
peace with what increasingly appears to be an irrational, genocidal state that seeks to confront and resolve each and every political challenge with violence and that reacts to its failure to achieve
peace with what increasingly appears to be an irrational, genocidal state that seeks to confront and resolve each and every political challenge with violence and that reacts to its failure to achieve
solutions to political challenges with violence by applying even more violence that has an insatiable lust for Palestinian territory, a genocidal apartheid state that seems increasingly incapable of even conceiving of peaceful coexistence with the other people on that land. So I'm very pessimistic. that a solution is possible. I grew up
solutions to political challenges with violence by applying even more violence that has an insatiable lust for Palestinian territory, a genocidal apartheid state that seems increasingly incapable of even conceiving of peaceful coexistence with the other people on that land. So I'm very pessimistic. that a solution is possible. I grew up
In Western Europe, in the long shadow of the Second World War, I think we can all agree that there could have been no peace in Europe had certain regimes on that continent not been removed from power. I look at Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, and I think we're all agreed that there could not have been peace in that region had the Khmer Rouge not been ousted.
In Western Europe, in the long shadow of the Second World War, I think we can all agree that there could have been no peace in Europe had certain regimes on that continent not been removed from power. I look at Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, and I think we're all agreed that there could not have been peace in that region had the Khmer Rouge not been ousted.
I look at Southern Africa during the 1990s, and I think we can all be agreed that had the white minority regimes that ruled Zimbabwe and South Africa not been dismantled, there could not have been peace in that region. Although I think it's worth having a discussion, I do think it's now a legitimate question to ask can there be peace without dismantling the Zionist regime?
I look at Southern Africa during the 1990s, and I think we can all be agreed that had the white minority regimes that ruled Zimbabwe and South Africa not been dismantled, there could not have been peace in that region. Although I think it's worth having a discussion, I do think it's now a legitimate question to ask can there be peace without dismantling the Zionist regime?
And I make a very clear distinction between the Israeli state and its institutions on the one hand, and the Israeli people, who I think, regardless of our discussion about the history, I think you can now talk about an Israeli people and a people that have developed rights over time.
And I make a very clear distinction between the Israeli state and its institutions on the one hand, and the Israeli people, who I think, regardless of our discussion about the history, I think you can now talk about an Israeli people and a people that have developed rights over time.
And a formula for peaceful coexistence with them will need to be found, which is a separate matter from dismantling the Israeli state and its institutions. And again, I haven't reached clear conclusions about this, except to say, as a practical matter, I think a two-state settlement remains feasible. But I think there are very legitimate questions
And a formula for peaceful coexistence with them will need to be found, which is a separate matter from dismantling the Israeli state and its institutions. And again, I haven't reached clear conclusions about this, except to say, as a practical matter, I think a two-state settlement remains feasible. But I think there are very legitimate questions
about its desirability and about whether peace can be achieved in the Middle East with the persistence of an irrational genocidal apartheid regime, particularly because Israeli society is beginning to develop many extremely, extremely distasteful, supremacist, dehumanizing aspects that I think also stand in the way of coexistence that are being fed by this regime.
about its desirability and about whether peace can be achieved in the Middle East with the persistence of an irrational genocidal apartheid regime, particularly because Israeli society is beginning to develop many extremely, extremely distasteful, supremacist, dehumanizing aspects that I think also stand in the way of coexistence that are being fed by this regime.
He was killed by the Abu Nidal organization. Sure, yeah.
He was killed by the Abu Nidal organization. Sure, yeah.
Of accepting Israel. Of accepting Israel, yeah. Which they formally did in 1993.
Of accepting Israel. Of accepting Israel, yeah. Which they formally did in 1993.
No, because 1993 was not a peace agreement.
No, because 1993 was not a peace agreement.
It was an interim agreement. And Palestinians actually began clamoring for commencing the permanent status resolutions on schedule. And the Israelis kept delaying them. In fact, they only began, I believe, in 99, under American pressure on the Israelis.
It was an interim agreement. And Palestinians actually began clamoring for commencing the permanent status resolutions on schedule. And the Israelis kept delaying them. In fact, they only began, I believe, in 99, under American pressure on the Israelis.
By the formal definition, I think it qualifies.
By the formal definition, I think it qualifies.
Didn't Dayan talk about the collapse of the third temple?
Didn't Dayan talk about the collapse of the third temple?
But we're talking about perceptions here.
But we're talking about perceptions here.
Palestinian national home.
Palestinian national home.
Ben-Ami was at Camp David.
Ben-Ami was at Camp David.
It also depends how you calculate.
It also depends how you calculate.
The exception is the Golan Heights.
The exception is the Golan Heights.
Now, you'll say- Allocated to the Palestinians.
Now, you'll say- Allocated to the Palestinians.
So what would your standard be then?
So what would your standard be then?
My response, you're basically saying, if I understand correctly- There's only one way to resolve this, and that is through direct bilateral negotiations. Probably, yeah. Okay. Or ideally, but... I've taken over your house, okay? You're not going to go to the police because, you know, the law is only of limited value. So you come over...
My response, you're basically saying, if I understand correctly- There's only one way to resolve this, and that is through direct bilateral negotiations. Probably, yeah. Okay. Or ideally, but... I've taken over your house, okay? You're not going to go to the police because, you know, the law is only of limited value. So you come over...
and sit in what is now my living room that used to be your living room, and we negotiate. The problem there is that you're not gonna get anything unless I agree to it. And standards and norms and law and all the rest of it be damned. So you need to take into account that when you're advocating bilateral negotiations, that effectively that gives each of the parties veto power.
and sit in what is now my living room that used to be your living room, and we negotiate. The problem there is that you're not gonna get anything unless I agree to it. And standards and norms and law and all the rest of it be damned. So you need to take into account that when you're advocating bilateral negotiations, that effectively that gives each of the parties veto power.
In the current circumstances, the Palestinians have already recognized Israel. They have... You keep bringing that up like it's a significant concession.
In the current circumstances, the Palestinians have already recognized Israel. They have... You keep bringing that up like it's a significant concession.
Yes, exactly. They didn't win a majority of the votes.
Yes, exactly. They didn't win a majority of the votes.
Does it matter what you or I think about what you felt?
Does it matter what you or I think about what you felt?
Okay, so... That does matter.
Okay, so... That does matter.
So for years, the Israeli... and US demand was that the Palestinians recognize 242 and 338. They did, but you're saying, okay, we demanded that they do this, but it was meaningless when they did it. Then the demand was that- It was a tactical thing, yes. Then the demand was the PLO recognize Israel. Tactical. Okay, we demanded that they did this, and they did it, but it's meaningless.
So for years, the Israeli... and US demand was that the Palestinians recognize 242 and 338. They did, but you're saying, okay, we demanded that they do this, but it was meaningless when they did it. Then the demand was that- It was a tactical thing, yes. Then the demand was the PLO recognize Israel. Tactical. Okay, we demanded that they did this, and they did it, but it's meaningless.
Yes. But the point is, the Palestinians, demands are constantly made of them. And when they accede to those demands, they're then told, actually, what you did is meaningless. So here's a new set of demands. I mean, you know, it's like a hamster. There's no new set of demands. It's like a hamster.
Yes. But the point is, the Palestinians, demands are constantly made of them. And when they accede to those demands, they're then told, actually, what you did is meaningless. So here's a new set of demands. I mean, you know, it's like a hamster. There's no new set of demands. It's like a hamster.
It's like a hamster stuck in a wheel that will be told, if you run fast enough, you'll get out of the cage.
It's like a hamster stuck in a wheel that will be told, if you run fast enough, you'll get out of the cage.
And what is the formal position of this Israeli government?
And what is the formal position of this Israeli government?
Okay, it's predecessor. And it's predecessor. And it's predecessor. Come on.
Okay, it's predecessor. And it's predecessor. And it's predecessor. Come on.
What I said. You didn't say that. Dismantle Israel. What I said and I've written.
What I said. You didn't say that. Dismantle Israel. What I said and I've written.
I've written extensively on this issue, on why a two-state settlement is still feasible, and I came out in support of that proposition. Perhaps in my heart you can see that I was just bullshitting, but that's what I actually wrote. That was a number of years ago, and just as a matter of historical record.
I've written extensively on this issue, on why a two-state settlement is still feasible, and I came out in support of that proposition. Perhaps in my heart you can see that I was just bullshitting, but that's what I actually wrote. That was a number of years ago, and just as a matter of historical record.
Beginning in the early 1970s, there was fierce debate within the Palestinian national movement about whether to accept or reject. And there were three schools of thought. There was one that would accept nothing less than the total liberation of Palestine.
Beginning in the early 1970s, there was fierce debate within the Palestinian national movement about whether to accept or reject. And there were three schools of thought. There was one that would accept nothing less than the total liberation of Palestine.
There was a second that accepted what was called the establishment of a fighting national authority on Palestinian soil, which they saw as a springboard for the total liberation of Palestine. And there was a third school that believed that under current dynamics and so on, that they should go for a two-state settlement. And our...
There was a second that accepted what was called the establishment of a fighting national authority on Palestinian soil, which they saw as a springboard for the total liberation of Palestine. And there was a third school that believed that under current dynamics and so on, that they should go for a two-state settlement. And our...
friend and correspondent, Gauter Loerse, has written a very perceptive article on when the PLO, already in 1976, came out in open support of a two-state resolution at the Security Council. PLO accepted it. Israel, of course, rejected it, but the resolution didn't pass because the US and the UK vetoed it. It was both of them.
friend and correspondent, Gauter Loerse, has written a very perceptive article on when the PLO, already in 1976, came out in open support of a two-state resolution at the Security Council. PLO accepted it. Israel, of course, rejected it, but the resolution didn't pass because the US and the UK vetoed it. It was both of them.
Okay. Yeah. But the fact of the matter is that the PLO came to accept a two-state settlement. Why they did it I think is irrelevant. And subsequently, the PLO acted on the basis of seeking to achieve a two-state settlement. The reason I think, and I think, Norm, you've written about this, the reason that Arafat was so insistent
Okay. Yeah. But the fact of the matter is that the PLO came to accept a two-state settlement. Why they did it I think is irrelevant. And subsequently, the PLO acted on the basis of seeking to achieve a two-state settlement. The reason I think, and I think, Norm, you've written about this, the reason that Arafat was so insistent
on getting minimally acceptable terms for a two-state settlement at Camp David and afterwards was precisely because he knew that once he signed, that was all the Palestinians were going to get. If his intention had been, you know, I'm not accepting Israel, I simply want to springboard, he would have accepted a Palestinian state in Jericho. But he didn't.
on getting minimally acceptable terms for a two-state settlement at Camp David and afterwards was precisely because he knew that once he signed, that was all the Palestinians were going to get. If his intention had been, you know, I'm not accepting Israel, I simply want to springboard, he would have accepted a Palestinian state in Jericho. But he didn't.
You're right. He should have accepted it. But if you're correct, okay, that he was really out to eliminate Israel, then... He wouldn't have cared about the borders. He wouldn't have cared about what the thing said about refugees. He would have gotten a sovereign state and used that to achieve that purpose.
You're right. He should have accepted it. But if you're correct, okay, that he was really out to eliminate Israel, then... He wouldn't have cared about the borders. He wouldn't have cared about what the thing said about refugees. He would have gotten a sovereign state and used that to achieve that purpose.
But I think it was precisely because he recognized that he was not negotiating for a springboard. He was negotiating permanent status that he was such a stickler about the details.
But I think it was precisely because he recognized that he was not negotiating for a springboard. He was negotiating permanent status that he was such a stickler about the details.
If you want to dismiss international law, that's fine, but then you have to do it consistently. You can't set standards for the Palestinians but reject applying those standards to Israel. If we're going to have the law of the jungle, then we can all be beasts and not only some of us. So it's either that
If you want to dismiss international law, that's fine, but then you have to do it consistently. You can't set standards for the Palestinians but reject applying those standards to Israel. If we're going to have the law of the jungle, then we can all be beasts and not only some of us. So it's either that
or you have certain agreed standards that are intended to regulate our conduct, all of our conduct, not just some of us.
or you have certain agreed standards that are intended to regulate our conduct, all of our conduct, not just some of us.
Well, you're saying, you know, international law and the millionth UN resolution, you're being very dismissive about all these things. And that's fine, but then you have to be dismissive across the board.
Well, you're saying, you know, international law and the millionth UN resolution, you're being very dismissive about all these things. And that's fine, but then you have to be dismissive across the board.
Yeah, but hold on, hold on. Every United Nations Security Council resolution, irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is by definition binding. binding not only on the members of the Security Council, but on every member state of the UN. Read the UN Charter. It's black and white.
Yeah, but hold on, hold on. Every United Nations Security Council resolution, irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is by definition binding. binding not only on the members of the Security Council, but on every member state of the UN. Read the UN Charter. It's black and white.
It's actually not that vague because the term land for peace- originates in 242.
It's actually not that vague because the term land for peace- originates in 242.
Those aren't violent.
Those aren't violent.
Let me finish. There's a very lengthy history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. You want to deny that those negotiations took place.
Let me finish. There's a very lengthy history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. You want to deny that those negotiations took place.
You can't do it. I think the problem is different. You want to say the Palestinians were only fighting and then when I point out they've also gone to the court and the UN say, well, all they do then is these things and they should be negotiating and I... demonstrate that there was a lengthy record of negotiations and said, yeah, but they didn't go in good faith.
You can't do it. I think the problem is different. You want to say the Palestinians were only fighting and then when I point out they've also gone to the court and the UN say, well, all they do then is these things and they should be negotiating and I... demonstrate that there was a lengthy record of negotiations and said, yeah, but they didn't go in good faith.
Again, you're placing the hamster in the wheel and telling him if he runs fast enough, maybe one day he'll get out of the cage. Okay, and please, if I could just finish. I think the fundamental problem here is not what the Palestinians have and haven't done. And it's perfectly legitimate to have a discussion about whether they could have been more effective.
Again, you're placing the hamster in the wheel and telling him if he runs fast enough, maybe one day he'll get out of the cage. Okay, and please, if I could just finish. I think the fundamental problem here is not what the Palestinians have and haven't done. And it's perfectly legitimate to have a discussion about whether they could have been more effective.
Of course they could have been more effective. Everyone could have always been more effective. The fundamental... issue here is that Israel has never been prepared to concede the legitimacy of Palestinian national rights in the land of the former British mandate of Palestine.
Of course they could have been more effective. Everyone could have always been more effective. The fundamental... issue here is that Israel has never been prepared to concede the legitimacy of Palestinian national rights in the land of the former British mandate of Palestine.
Wait, what is the occupied territories? The occupied territories. Is that all of Israel? The occupied territories are those territories that Israel occupied in June of 1967.
Wait, what is the occupied territories? The occupied territories. Is that all of Israel? The occupied territories are those territories that Israel occupied in June of 1967.
So they didn't say it, they didn't ask for it.
So they didn't say it, they didn't ask for it.
Hamas only negotiated with Israel about prisoner exchanges.
Hamas only negotiated with Israel about prisoner exchanges.
Again, I'm posing a question. And the question is, regardless of what's feasible or realistic today, the question I'm posing is, can you have peace in the Middle East with this militant, irrational, genocidal, apartheid state and power? Okay, and the question I'm asking is, can you have peace with this regime, or does this regime and its institutions
Again, I'm posing a question. And the question is, regardless of what's feasible or realistic today, the question I'm posing is, can you have peace in the Middle East with this militant, irrational, genocidal, apartheid state and power? Okay, and the question I'm asking is, can you have peace with this regime, or does this regime and its institutions
need to be dismantled, similar to the examples I gave of Europe and Southern Africa.
need to be dismantled, similar to the examples I gave of Europe and Southern Africa.
Yeah, you're correct. Several of them, most importantly Egypt, Jordan, have made their peace with Israel. I should add that Israel's conduct since then has placed these relations under strain. I had very little...
Yeah, you're correct. Several of them, most importantly Egypt, Jordan, have made their peace with Israel. I should add that Israel's conduct since then has placed these relations under strain. I had very little...
I didn't take the reports of a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement particularly seriously before October 7th, the reason being that it was really a Saudi-Israeli-US deal, which committed the US to make certain commitments to Saudi Arabia that would probably never get through Congress.
I didn't take the reports of a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement particularly seriously before October 7th, the reason being that it was really a Saudi-Israeli-US deal, which committed the US to make certain commitments to Saudi Arabia that would probably never get through Congress.
I don't think the question is whether that deal is legitimate or not. I think that deal exists. But the point is whether the core of this conflict is not between Israel and Egypt. The core of this conflict is between Israel and the Palestinian people.
I don't think the question is whether that deal is legitimate or not. I think that deal exists. But the point is whether the core of this conflict is not between Israel and Egypt. The core of this conflict is between Israel and the Palestinian people.
And the reason that Israel agreed to relinquish the occupied Egyptian Sinai, and the reason that Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979 is because Israel in 1973 recognized that its military superiority was ultimately no match for Egypt's determination to recover its occupied territories and that there would come a point when Egypt would find a way to extract an unbearable price.
And the reason that Israel agreed to relinquish the occupied Egyptian Sinai, and the reason that Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979 is because Israel in 1973 recognized that its military superiority was ultimately no match for Egypt's determination to recover its occupied territories and that there would come a point when Egypt would find a way to extract an unbearable price.
If you're talking about the average Israeli citizen, I think that's a fair characterization. If you're talking about the Israeli leadership, I think they looked at it in more strategic terms. How do you remove the most powerful Arab military state from the equation?
If you're talking about the average Israeli citizen, I think that's a fair characterization. If you're talking about the Israeli leadership, I think they looked at it in more strategic terms. How do you remove the most powerful Arab military state from the equation?
Often. The only allies of the dispossessed are those who experience similar circumstances.
Often. The only allies of the dispossessed are those who experience similar circumstances.
Not one. They're always on the verge. They're on the verge. There have been documented cases. I haven't seen them.
Not one. They're always on the verge. They're on the verge. There have been documented cases. I haven't seen them.
I don't think there's famine in Israel.
I don't think there's famine in Israel.
It's something which is produced for the Western... There are infants dying due to an engineered lack of access to food and nutrition.
It's something which is produced for the Western... There are infants dying due to an engineered lack of access to food and nutrition.
Sure. There's a lot to unpack here. I'll try to limit myself to just a few points. Regarding Zionism and transfer, I think Chaim Weizmann, the head of the World Zionist Organization, had it exactly right when he said that the objective of Zionism is to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English or France is French. In other words, as...
Sure. There's a lot to unpack here. I'll try to limit myself to just a few points. Regarding Zionism and transfer, I think Chaim Weizmann, the head of the World Zionist Organization, had it exactly right when he said that the objective of Zionism is to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English or France is French. In other words, as...
Well, first of all, I would agree with Benny Morris and Norman Finkelstein that the current situation is bleak. And... I think it would be unreasonable to expect it to not get even bleaker in the coming weeks and months. This conflict originated in the late 19th century. It's been a more or less active conflict since the 1920s, 1930s.
Well, first of all, I would agree with Benny Morris and Norman Finkelstein that the current situation is bleak. And... I think it would be unreasonable to expect it to not get even bleaker in the coming weeks and months. This conflict originated in the late 19th century. It's been a more or less active conflict since the 1920s, 1930s.
And it has produced a tremendous amount of suffering and regional conflict and geopolitical complications and all of that. But what gives me hope is that throughout their entire ordeal, the Palestinian people have never surrendered. And I believe they never will surrender to overwhelming force and violence. They have taken everything that Israel has thrown at them.
And it has produced a tremendous amount of suffering and regional conflict and geopolitical complications and all of that. But what gives me hope is that throughout their entire ordeal, the Palestinian people have never surrendered. And I believe they never will surrender to overwhelming force and violence. They have taken everything that Israel has thrown at them.
They have taken everything that the West has thrown at them. They have taken everything that those who are supposed to be their natural allies have on occasion thrown at them. But this is a people that never has, and I believe never will surrender.
They have taken everything that the West has thrown at them. They have taken everything that those who are supposed to be their natural allies have on occasion thrown at them. But this is a people that never has, and I believe never will surrender.
And at a certain point, I think Israel and its leaders will have to come to the realization that by hook or by crook, these people are going to achieve their inalienable and legitimate national rights. And that that is going to be a reality. I, as I was... What do you mean by that?
And at a certain point, I think Israel and its leaders will have to come to the realization that by hook or by crook, these people are going to achieve their inalienable and legitimate national rights. And that that is going to be a reality. I, as I was... What do you mean by that?
No, and... From the river to the sea? Well, ideally, of course, yes.
No, and... From the river to the sea? Well, ideally, of course, yes.
No, what I was saying earlier, and then the discussion got sidetracked, is that I did believe that a two-state settlement, a partition of Palestine... along the 1967 boundaries would have been a reasonable solution because I think it also would have opened pathways to further non-violent engagement between Israel and the Palestinians that could
No, what I was saying earlier, and then the discussion got sidetracked, is that I did believe that a two-state settlement, a partition of Palestine... along the 1967 boundaries would have been a reasonable solution because I think it also would have opened pathways to further non-violent engagement between Israel and the Palestinians that could
create other forms of coexistence in a federal or binational or other... What do you think about refugees in regards to that?
create other forms of coexistence in a federal or binational or other... What do you think about refugees in regards to that?
I think there has to be an explicit acknowledgement of the responsibility and of the rights. I think that in the framework of a two-state settlement, I think a formula would need to be found that does not undermine the foundations of a two-state settlement. And I don't think
I think there has to be an explicit acknowledgement of the responsibility and of the rights. I think that in the framework of a two-state settlement, I think a formula would need to be found that does not undermine the foundations of a two-state settlement. And I don't think
it would be that difficult because I suspect that there are probably large numbers of Palestinian refugees who, once their rights are acknowledged, will find it exceptionally distasteful to have to live among the kind of sentiments that we've heard around this table today, to be quite frank. I was previously unfamiliar with you. And I watched one of your preparation videos.
it would be that difficult because I suspect that there are probably large numbers of Palestinian refugees who, once their rights are acknowledged, will find it exceptionally distasteful to have to live among the kind of sentiments that we've heard around this table today, to be quite frank. I was previously unfamiliar with you. And I watched one of your preparation videos.
Very disconcerting stuff, I have to say. You were explaining two days ago in the discussion about apartheid and how absurd it was, that in your view, Jim Crow was not apartheid. Jim Crow was not apartheid. But Arab states not giving citizenship to Palestinian refugees is apartheid.
Very disconcerting stuff, I have to say. You were explaining two days ago in the discussion about apartheid and how absurd it was, that in your view, Jim Crow was not apartheid. Jim Crow was not apartheid. But Arab states not giving citizenship to Palestinian refugees is apartheid.
As Norman explained, a Jewish state requires Jewish political, demographic, and territorial supremacy. Without those three elements, the state would be Jewish in name only. And I think what distinguishes Zionism is its insistence, supremacy, and exclusivity. That would be my first point.
As Norman explained, a Jewish state requires Jewish political, demographic, and territorial supremacy. Without those three elements, the state would be Jewish in name only. And I think what distinguishes Zionism is its insistence, supremacy, and exclusivity. That would be my first point.
I would expect nothing less from someone who doesn't think Jim Crow is apartheid.
I would expect nothing less from someone who doesn't think Jim Crow is apartheid.
No.
No.
In your eyes, probably not.
In your eyes, probably not.
Let me finish answering.
Let me finish answering.
I think it's pretty clear that the majority of civilians that were killed- 51% or 90%? Don't ask me to put a number on something I don't know.
I think it's pretty clear that the majority of civilians that were killed- 51% or 90%? Don't ask me to put a number on something I don't know.
First of all, when you say Hamas, do you mean Palestinians or do you mean Hamas specifically?
First of all, when you say Hamas, do you mean Palestinians or do you mean Hamas specifically?
But that's how this discussion started. You said Hamas and I began to answer that. And then Benny Morris said, actually, he means Hamas in addition to Jihad and the others.
But that's how this discussion started. You said Hamas and I began to answer that. And then Benny Morris said, actually, he means Hamas in addition to Jihad and the others.
Well, the figures we have are that about a third of the casualties on October 7th were military. That's not what I asked at all. What's your question?
Well, the figures we have are that about a third of the casualties on October 7th were military. That's not what I asked at all. What's your question?
I think a clear majority, but I can't give you a specific figure.
I think a clear majority, but I can't give you a specific figure.
Just as they are now in this conflict. Exactly. More journalists have been killed in the last several months in Gaza than in any other conflict.
Just as they are now in this conflict. Exactly. More journalists have been killed in the last several months in Gaza than in any other conflict.
He doesn't want to hear it.
He doesn't want to hear it.
The second point is I think what the Soviet foreign minister at the time, Andrei Gromyko, said is exactly right with one reservation. Gromyko was describing a European savagery unleashed against Europe's Jews. At the time, it wasn't Palestinians or Arabs. The savages and the barbarians were European to the core. had nothing to do with developments in Palestine or the Middle East.
The second point is I think what the Soviet foreign minister at the time, Andrei Gromyko, said is exactly right with one reservation. Gromyko was describing a European savagery unleashed against Europe's Jews. At the time, it wasn't Palestinians or Arabs. The savages and the barbarians were European to the core. had nothing to do with developments in Palestine or the Middle East.
You asked me a direct question and you got a direct answer.
You asked me a direct question and you got a direct answer.
I got majority, which could be from 51 to 99. I said a clear majority.
I got majority, which could be from 51 to 99. I said a clear majority.
A clear majority, in my view, is well over 50%. Please don't ask me to be more precise.
A clear majority, in my view, is well over 50%. Please don't ask me to be more precise.
If I knew that, I would say it.
If I knew that, I would say it.
I hold as a historian. If I was trying to belittle, I would give you a very different answer. I would just say, I don't know. I do know that some were shot up.
I hold as a historian. If I was trying to belittle, I would give you a very different answer. I would just say, I don't know. I do know that some were shot up.
You're not speaking as a historian, though. That's probably true. I can state with confidence a clear majority. overwhelming majority. You may be correct, but I can't state that with certainty. I think there's a very easy way to find out, is to have an independent... Forget independent. Well, of course you forget independent.
You're not speaking as a historian, though. That's probably true. I can state with confidence a clear majority. overwhelming majority. You may be correct, but I can't state that with certainty. I think there's a very easy way to find out, is to have an independent... Forget independent. Well, of course you forget independent.
Not necessarily.
Not necessarily.
But if it was in Australia, it would have been okay. He certainly would have been more honest than from your perspective.
But if it was in Australia, it would have been okay. He certainly would have been more honest than from your perspective.
But he could have killed a lot more.
But he could have killed a lot more.
Secondly, at the time that Gromyka was speaking, those Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and others who were in need of safe haven were still overwhelmingly on the European continent and not in Palestine. And I think given the scale of the savagery, I don't think that any one state or country should have borne the responsibility for addressing this crisis.
Secondly, at the time that Gromyka was speaking, those Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and others who were in need of safe haven were still overwhelmingly on the European continent and not in Palestine. And I think given the scale of the savagery, I don't think that any one state or country should have borne the responsibility for addressing this crisis.
I think it should have been an international responsibility. The Soviet Union could have contributed. Germany certainly could and should have contributed. the United Kingdom and the United States, which slammed their doors shut to the persecuted Jews of Europe as the Nazis were rising to power. They certainly should have played a role.
I think it should have been an international responsibility. The Soviet Union could have contributed. Germany certainly could and should have contributed. the United Kingdom and the United States, which slammed their doors shut to the persecuted Jews of Europe as the Nazis were rising to power. They certainly should have played a role.
But instead, what passed for the international community at the time decided to partition Palestine. And here I think we need to judge the partition resolution against the realities that obtained at the time. two-thirds of the population of Palestine was Arab.
But instead, what passed for the international community at the time decided to partition Palestine. And here I think we need to judge the partition resolution against the realities that obtained at the time. two-thirds of the population of Palestine was Arab.
the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, constituted about one-third of the total population and controlled even less of the land within Palestine. As a preeminent Palestinian historian, Walid al-Khalidi has pointed out, the partition resolution in giving roughly 55% of Palestine to the Jewish community
the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, constituted about one-third of the total population and controlled even less of the land within Palestine. As a preeminent Palestinian historian, Walid al-Khalidi has pointed out, the partition resolution in giving roughly 55% of Palestine to the Jewish community
And I think 41, 42% to the Arab community, to the Palestinians, did not preserve the position of each community or even favor one community at the expense of the others. Rather, it thoroughly inverted and revolutionized the relationship between the two communities. And
And I think 41, 42% to the Arab community, to the Palestinians, did not preserve the position of each community or even favor one community at the expense of the others. Rather, it thoroughly inverted and revolutionized the relationship between the two communities. And
As many have written, the Nakba was the inevitable consequence of partition, given the nature of Zionism, given the territorial disposition, given the weakness of the Palestinian community, whose leadership had been largely decimated during a major revolt at the end of the 1930s, given that the Arab states were still very much under French and British influence,
As many have written, the Nakba was the inevitable consequence of partition, given the nature of Zionism, given the territorial disposition, given the weakness of the Palestinian community, whose leadership had been largely decimated during a major revolt at the end of the 1930s, given that the Arab states were still very much under French and British influence,
The Nakba was inevitable, the inevitable product of the partition resolution. And one last point also about the UN's partition resolution is, yes, formally that is what the international community decided on the 29th of November 1947. It's not a resolution that could ever have gotten through the UN General Assembly today for a very simple reason. It was a very different General Assembly.
The Nakba was inevitable, the inevitable product of the partition resolution. And one last point also about the UN's partition resolution is, yes, formally that is what the international community decided on the 29th of November 1947. It's not a resolution that could ever have gotten through the UN General Assembly today for a very simple reason. It was a very different General Assembly.
Most African, most Asian states were not yet independent. Were the resolution to be placed before the international community today, and I find it telling that the minority opinion was led by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, I think they would have represented the clear majority.
Most African, most Asian states were not yet independent. Were the resolution to be placed before the international community today, and I find it telling that the minority opinion was led by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, I think they would have represented the clear majority.
So partition, given what we know about Zionism, given that it was entirely predictable what would happen, given the realities on the ground in Palestine, was deeply unjust. And the idea that either the Palestinians or the Arab states could have accepted such a resolution is, I think, an illusion. That was in 1947. We saw what happened in 48 and 49. Palestinian society was essentially destroyed.
So partition, given what we know about Zionism, given that it was entirely predictable what would happen, given the realities on the ground in Palestine, was deeply unjust. And the idea that either the Palestinians or the Arab states could have accepted such a resolution is, I think, an illusion. That was in 1947. We saw what happened in 48 and 49. Palestinian society was essentially destroyed.
Over 80%, I believe, of Palestinians resident in the territory that became the state of Israel were either expelled or fled and ultimately were ethnically cleansed because ethnic cleansing consists of two components. It's not just forcing people into refuge or expelling them, it's just as importantly preventing their return.
Over 80%, I believe, of Palestinians resident in the territory that became the state of Israel were either expelled or fled and ultimately were ethnically cleansed because ethnic cleansing consists of two components. It's not just forcing people into refuge or expelling them, it's just as importantly preventing their return.
And here, and Benny Morris has written, I think, an article about Joseph Leitz and the transfer committees, there was a very detailed initiative to prevent their return, and it consisted of raising hundreds of Palestinian villages to the ground, which was systematically implemented and so on. And so Palestinians became a stateless people.
And here, and Benny Morris has written, I think, an article about Joseph Leitz and the transfer committees, there was a very detailed initiative to prevent their return, and it consisted of raising hundreds of Palestinian villages to the ground, which was systematically implemented and so on. And so Palestinians became a stateless people.
Now, what is the most important reason that no Arab state was established in Palestine? Well, since the 1930s, the Zionist leadership and The Hashemite leadership of Jordan, as it's been thoroughly researched and written about by the Israeli-British historian Avi Schleim, essentially colluded to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine in the late 1940s.
Now, what is the most important reason that no Arab state was established in Palestine? Well, since the 1930s, the Zionist leadership and The Hashemite leadership of Jordan, as it's been thoroughly researched and written about by the Israeli-British historian Avi Schleim, essentially colluded to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine in the late 1940s.
There's much more here, but I think those are the key points I would make about 1948.
There's much more here, but I think those are the key points I would make about 1948.
As have you.
As have you.
If I understood you correctly... you're making the claim that transfer, expulsion, and so on was in fact a very localized phenomenon resulting from individual land purchases. And that, if I understand you correctly, you're also making the claim that the idea that a Jewish state requires a removal or overwhelming reduction of the non-Jewish population was... If the Arabs are attacking you, yes.
If I understood you correctly... you're making the claim that transfer, expulsion, and so on was in fact a very localized phenomenon resulting from individual land purchases. And that, if I understand you correctly, you're also making the claim that the idea that a Jewish state requires a removal or overwhelming reduction of the non-Jewish population was... If the Arabs are attacking you, yes.
But let's say prior to 1947, it would be your claim... that the idea that a significant reduction or wholesale removal of their population was not part of Zionist thinking. Well, I think there's two problems with that. I think what you're saying about localized disputes is correct, but I also think that there is a whole literature
But let's say prior to 1947, it would be your claim... that the idea that a significant reduction or wholesale removal of their population was not part of Zionist thinking. Well, I think there's two problems with that. I think what you're saying about localized disputes is correct, but I also think that there is a whole literature
that demonstrates that transfer was envisioned by Zionist leaders on a much broader scale than simply individual land purchases. In other words, it went way beyond, we need to remove these tenants so that we can farm this land. The idea was we can't have a state where all these Arabs remain and we have to get rid of them.
that demonstrates that transfer was envisioned by Zionist leaders on a much broader scale than simply individual land purchases. In other words, it went way beyond, we need to remove these tenants so that we can farm this land. The idea was we can't have a state where all these Arabs remain and we have to get rid of them.
And the second, I think, impediment to that view is that long before the UN General Assembly convened to address the question of Palestine, Palestinian and Arab and other leaders as well had been warning ad infinitum that the purpose of the Zionist movement is not just to establish a Jewish state, but to establish an exclusivist Jewish state.
And the second, I think, impediment to that view is that long before the UN General Assembly convened to address the question of Palestine, Palestinian and Arab and other leaders as well had been warning ad infinitum that the purpose of the Zionist movement is not just to establish a Jewish state, but to establish an exclusivist Jewish state.
And that transfer, forced displacement, was fundamental to that project. And just responding to, sorry, was it Bonnell or Donnell? With a B. Yeah. Yeah. You made the point that the problem here is that people don't recognize is that the first and last result for the Arabs is always war. I think there's a problem with that. I think you might do well to recall
And that transfer, forced displacement, was fundamental to that project. And just responding to, sorry, was it Bonnell or Donnell? With a B. Yeah. Yeah. You made the point that the problem here is that people don't recognize is that the first and last result for the Arabs is always war. I think there's a problem with that. I think you might do well to recall
the 1936 general strike conducted by Palestinians at the beginning of the revolt, which at the time was the longest recorded general strike in history. You may want to consult the book published last year by Laurie Allen, A History of False Hope.
the 1936 general strike conducted by Palestinians at the beginning of the revolt, which at the time was the longest recorded general strike in history. You may want to consult the book published last year by Laurie Allen, A History of False Hope.
which discusses in great detail the consistent engagement by Palestinians, their leaders, their elites, their diplomats, and so on, with all these international committees. If we look at today, the Palestinians are once again going to the International Court of Justice. They're consistently trying to persuade the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to do his job.
which discusses in great detail the consistent engagement by Palestinians, their leaders, their elites, their diplomats, and so on, with all these international committees. If we look at today, the Palestinians are once again going to the International Court of Justice. They're consistently trying to persuade the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to do his job.
They have launched widespread boycott campaigns. So, of course, the Palestinians have engaged in military resistance. But I think the suggestion that this has always been their first and last resort and that they have somehow spurned civic action, spurned diplomacy, I think really has no basis in reality.
They have launched widespread boycott campaigns. So, of course, the Palestinians have engaged in military resistance. But I think the suggestion that this has always been their first and last resort and that they have somehow spurned civic action, spurned diplomacy, I think really has no basis in reality.
Well, one of the first books on this issue I read when I was still in high school, because my late father had it, was The Diaries of Theodor Herzl. And I think Theodor Herzl, of course, was the founder of the contemporary Zionist movement. And I think if you read that, it's very clear. For Herzl, the model upon which the Zionist movement would proceed, his model was Cecil Rhodes.
Well, one of the first books on this issue I read when I was still in high school, because my late father had it, was The Diaries of Theodor Herzl. And I think Theodor Herzl, of course, was the founder of the contemporary Zionist movement. And I think if you read that, it's very clear. For Herzl, the model upon which the Zionist movement would proceed, his model was Cecil Rhodes.
I think Rhodes, from what I recall, correct me if I'm wrong, has quite a prominent place in Herzl's diaries. I think Herzl was also corresponding with him and seeking his support. Cecil Rhodes, of course, was the British colonialist after whom the former white minority regime in Rhodesia existed.
I think Rhodes, from what I recall, correct me if I'm wrong, has quite a prominent place in Herzl's diaries. I think Herzl was also corresponding with him and seeking his support. Cecil Rhodes, of course, was the British colonialist after whom the former white minority regime in Rhodesia existed.
uh was named and herzel also says explicitly in his diaries that it is essential um to remove uh the existing population from palestine in a moment please he says we shall have to spirit the penniless population across the borders and procure employment for them elsewhere And Israel Zangwill, who you mentioned, a land without a people for a people without a land.
uh was named and herzel also says explicitly in his diaries that it is essential um to remove uh the existing population from palestine in a moment please he says we shall have to spirit the penniless population across the borders and procure employment for them elsewhere And Israel Zangwill, who you mentioned, a land without a people for a people without a land.
They knew damn well it wasn't a people, a land without a people. I'll continue, but please go ahead.
They knew damn well it wasn't a people, a land without a people. I'll continue, but please go ahead.
Just one clarification on Herzl's diaries. I mean, the other thing that I recall from those diaries is he was... He was very preoccupied with, in fact, getting great power patronage, seeing Palestine, the Jewish state in Palestine, I think his words, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. In other words, very much seeing his project as a proxy for Western imperialism in the Middle East.
Just one clarification on Herzl's diaries. I mean, the other thing that I recall from those diaries is he was... He was very preoccupied with, in fact, getting great power patronage, seeing Palestine, the Jewish state in Palestine, I think his words, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. In other words, very much seeing his project as a proxy for Western imperialism in the Middle East.
Including the Ottoman Sultan, who he tried to cultivate. I just want to respond to a point you made earlier, which was that People expressed their rejection of the partition resolution on the grounds that it gave the majority of Palestine to the Jewish community, which formed only a third.
Including the Ottoman Sultan, who he tried to cultivate. I just want to respond to a point you made earlier, which was that People expressed their rejection of the partition resolution on the grounds that it gave the majority of Palestine to the Jewish community, which formed only a third.
Whereas, in fact, if I understood you correctly, you're saying the Palestinians and the Arabs would have rejected any partition resolution.
Whereas, in fact, if I understood you correctly, you're saying the Palestinians and the Arabs would have rejected any partition resolution.
I think you raise a valid point because I think the Palestinians did reject the partition of their homeland in principle and I think the fact that the United Nations General Assembly then awarded the majority of their homeland to the Zionist movement only added insult to injury.
I think you raise a valid point because I think the Palestinians did reject the partition of their homeland in principle and I think the fact that the United Nations General Assembly then awarded the majority of their homeland to the Zionist movement only added insult to injury.
I mean, one doesn't have to sympathize with the Palestinians to recognize that they have now been a stateless people for 75 years. Can you name any country Yours, for example, or yours, that would be prepared to give 55%, 25%, 10% of your country to the Palestinians? Of course not. And so the issue was not the existence of Jews in Palestine. They had been there for centuries.
I mean, one doesn't have to sympathize with the Palestinians to recognize that they have now been a stateless people for 75 years. Can you name any country Yours, for example, or yours, that would be prepared to give 55%, 25%, 10% of your country to the Palestinians? Of course not. And so the issue was not the existence of Jews in Palestine. They had been there for centuries.
And of course, they had ties to Palestine and particularly to Jerusalem and other places going back centuries, if not millennia. But the idea of establishing an exclusively Jewish state at the expense of those who are already living there, I think... It was right to reject that.
And of course, they had ties to Palestine and particularly to Jerusalem and other places going back centuries, if not millennia. But the idea of establishing an exclusively Jewish state at the expense of those who are already living there, I think... It was right to reject that.
And I don't think we can look back now, 75 years later and say, well, you should have accepted losing 55% of your homeland because you ended up losing 78% of it and the remaining 22% was occupied in 1967. That's not how things work. And I can imagine an American
And I don't think we can look back now, 75 years later and say, well, you should have accepted losing 55% of your homeland because you ended up losing 78% of it and the remaining 22% was occupied in 1967. That's not how things work. And I can imagine an American
rejecting giving 10% of the United States to the Palestinians, and if that rejection leads to war and you lose half your country, I doubt that 50 years from now you're going to say, well, maybe I should have accepted that.
rejecting giving 10% of the United States to the Palestinians, and if that rejection leads to war and you lose half your country, I doubt that 50 years from now you're going to say, well, maybe I should have accepted that.
It was a matter of principle.
It was a matter of principle.
That last point is actually not correct because for all its injustice, the mandate system recognized Palestine as a class A mandate, which provisionally recognized the independence Of that territory.
That last point is actually not correct because for all its injustice, the mandate system recognized Palestine as a class A mandate, which provisionally recognized the independence Of that territory.
It was provisionally recognized.
It was provisionally recognized.
It was a British mandate of Palestine, not the British mandate of Israel.
It was a British mandate of Palestine, not the British mandate of Israel.
Well, first of all, I think that Zionist leadership's acceptance of the partition resolution And I think you may have written about this, that they accepted it because it provided international endorsement of the legitimacy of the principle of Jewish statehood. And they didn't accept the borders. And in fact, later expanded the borders. Second of all, the borders were expanded in war.
Well, first of all, I think that Zionist leadership's acceptance of the partition resolution And I think you may have written about this, that they accepted it because it provided international endorsement of the legitimacy of the principle of Jewish statehood. And they didn't accept the borders. And in fact, later expanded the borders. Second of all, the borders were expanded in war.
Including their most senior leaders who said so, and I think you've quoted them saying so.
Including their most senior leaders who said so, and I think you've quoted them saying so.
And second of all, I mean, removing dark people? Darker people? It's intrinsic.
And second of all, I mean, removing dark people? Darker people? It's intrinsic.
So the idea that... Americans or Brits or the French would have an issue with, I mean, French had been doing it in Algeria for decades. The Americans have been doing it in North America for centuries. So how would Israel, forcibly displacing Palestinians, somehow besmirch Israel in the eyes of the West?
So the idea that... Americans or Brits or the French would have an issue with, I mean, French had been doing it in Algeria for decades. The Americans have been doing it in North America for centuries. So how would Israel, forcibly displacing Palestinians, somehow besmirch Israel in the eyes of the West?
80% went missing.
80% went missing.
I think just one last point on this. I remember... reading your book when it first came out and reading, you know, one incident after the other and one example after the other, and then getting to the conclusion where you said the Nakba was a product of war, not design, I think we were, and I remember,
I think just one last point on this. I remember... reading your book when it first came out and reading, you know, one incident after the other and one example after the other, and then getting to the conclusion where you said the Nakba was a product of war, not design, I think we were, and I remember,
reacting almost in shock to that, that I felt you had mobilized overwhelming evidence that it was a product of design, not war. And I think our discussion today very much reflects, let's say, the dissonance between the evidence and the conclusion. You don't feel that the research that you have conducted and published demonstrates that it was in fact inherent and built and inevitable.
reacting almost in shock to that, that I felt you had mobilized overwhelming evidence that it was a product of design, not war. And I think our discussion today very much reflects, let's say, the dissonance between the evidence and the conclusion. You don't feel that the research that you have conducted and published demonstrates that it was in fact inherent and built and inevitable.
And I think the point that Norm and I are making is that your own historical research, together with that of others, indisputably demonstrates that it does. I think that's a fundamental disagreement we're having here.
And I think the point that Norm and I are making is that your own historical research, together with that of others, indisputably demonstrates that it does. I think that's a fundamental disagreement we're having here.
I think the Palestinians and the Arabs were explicit. that they wanted a unitary, I think, federal state, and they made their submissions to UNSCOP. They made their appeals at the UN General Assembly.
I think the Palestinians and the Arabs were explicit. that they wanted a unitary, I think, federal state, and they made their submissions to UNSCOP. They made their appeals at the UN General Assembly.
Yes, yes.
Yes, yes.
No, it wasn't an exclusively Arab state. I think we have to distinguish between Palestinian and Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on the one hand, and Palestinian and Arab attitudes to Jewish existence in Palestine. There's a fundamental difference.
No, it wasn't an exclusively Arab state. I think we have to distinguish between Palestinian and Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on the one hand, and Palestinian and Arab attitudes to Jewish existence in Palestine. There's a fundamental difference.
Husseini did say that, and I'm sure there was a very substantial body of Palestinian Arab public opinion that endorsed that. But by the same token, I think a unitary Arab state, as you call it, or a Palestinian state could have been established with arrangements, with guarantees to ensure the security and rights of both communities. How that would work in detail had...
Husseini did say that, and I'm sure there was a very substantial body of Palestinian Arab public opinion that endorsed that. But by the same token, I think a unitary Arab state, as you call it, or a Palestinian state could have been established with arrangements, with guarantees to ensure the security and rights of both communities. How that would work in detail had...
had been discussed and proposed, but never resolved. And again, I think, you know, Jewish fears about what would have happened- A second Holocaust, that's what we're talking about.
had been discussed and proposed, but never resolved. And again, I think, you know, Jewish fears about what would have happened- A second Holocaust, that's what we're talking about.
That may well have been the Jewish fear. It was an unfounded Jewish fear. It was unfounded? Of course it was unfounded.
That may well have been the Jewish fear. It was an unfounded Jewish fear. It was unfounded? Of course it was unfounded.
You really think that the Palestinians, had they won the war, were going to import ovens and crematoria from Germany?
You really think that the Palestinians, had they won the war, were going to import ovens and crematoria from Germany?
I don't think it would be... I wouldn't say there were always pogroms in every Arab state. I think there was flight of... Arab Jews for multiple reasons, in some cases for precisely the reasons you say. If you look at the Jewish community in Algeria, for example, their flight had virtually nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
I don't think it would be... I wouldn't say there were always pogroms in every Arab state. I think there was flight of... Arab Jews for multiple reasons, in some cases for precisely the reasons you say. If you look at the Jewish community in Algeria, for example, their flight had virtually nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The issue of Algerian Jews was that the French gave them citizenship during their colonial rule of Algeria, and they increasingly became identified with French rule. And when Algeria became independent and all the French ended up leaving, out of fear or out of disappointment or out of whatever, the Jews were identified as French rather than Algerian.
The issue of Algerian Jews was that the French gave them citizenship during their colonial rule of Algeria, and they increasingly became identified with French rule. And when Algeria became independent and all the French ended up leaving, out of fear or out of disappointment or out of whatever, the Jews were identified as French rather than Algerian.
I'm not denying any of that history.
I'm not denying any of that history.
Look, without getting into the details, I think we can both agree that ultimately a clear majority of Arab Jews who believe that after having lived in these countries for centuries, if not millennia, came to the unfortunate conclusion that their situation had become untenable.
Look, without getting into the details, I think we can both agree that ultimately a clear majority of Arab Jews who believe that after having lived in these countries for centuries, if not millennia, came to the unfortunate conclusion that their situation had become untenable.
Um, I also think, um, that we can both agree that this had never been an issue prior to Zionism and the emergence of the state of Israel. Look, I'm, I'm not, didn't begin with Zionism in the Arab world. The issue is, is, is, is the point I raised, which is whether these communities had ever come to a collective conclusion that they're, position had become untenable in this part of the world.
Um, I also think, um, that we can both agree that this had never been an issue prior to Zionism and the emergence of the state of Israel. Look, I'm, I'm not, didn't begin with Zionism in the Arab world. The issue is, is, is, is the point I raised, which is whether these communities had ever come to a collective conclusion that they're, position had become untenable in this part of the world.
No, they were Arab Jews.
No, they were Arab Jews.
It wasn't the Jews of England or the Soviet Jews. I think it's useful to refer to Zionists before 1948 and Israelis after 1948.
It wasn't the Jews of England or the Soviet Jews. I think it's useful to refer to Zionists before 1948 and Israelis after 1948.
Yeah, from Morocco. Avishlaim from Iraq has written on this issue.
Yeah, from Morocco. Avishlaim from Iraq has written on this issue.
I think it's more complex than that. I think it was... Sorry, I interrupted you.
I think it's more complex than that. I think it was... Sorry, I interrupted you.
That's indisputable.
That's indisputable.
I'll make two points. The first is, you mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini and his collaboration with the Nazis. entirely legitimate point to raise, but I think one can also say definitively had Hajj Amin al-Husseini never existed, the Holocaust would have played out precisely as it did.
I'll make two points. The first is, you mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini and his collaboration with the Nazis. entirely legitimate point to raise, but I think one can also say definitively had Hajj Amin al-Husseini never existed, the Holocaust would have played out precisely as it did.
As far as Palestinian opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine during the 1930s is concerned, it was of a different character than, for example, British and American rejection of Jewish immigration. They just didn't want Jews on their soil. Objectively, it helped the Germans kill the Jews.
As far as Palestinian opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine during the 1930s is concerned, it was of a different character than, for example, British and American rejection of Jewish immigration. They just didn't want Jews on their soil. Objectively, it helped the Germans kill the Jews.
In the Palestinian case, their opposition to Jewish immigration was to prevent the transformation of their homeland into a Jewish state that would dispossess them. And I think that's an important distinction. make.
In the Palestinian case, their opposition to Jewish immigration was to prevent the transformation of their homeland into a Jewish state that would dispossess them. And I think that's an important distinction. make.
The other point I wanted to make is we've spent the past several hours talking about Zionism transfer and so on, but I think there's a more fundamental aspect to this, which is that Zionism, I think, would have emerged and disappeared as yet one more utopian political project, had it not been for the British, what the preeminent Palestinian historian, Waleed Khalidi, has termed the British shield.
The other point I wanted to make is we've spent the past several hours talking about Zionism transfer and so on, but I think there's a more fundamental aspect to this, which is that Zionism, I think, would have emerged and disappeared as yet one more utopian political project, had it not been for the British, what the preeminent Palestinian historian, Waleed Khalidi, has termed the British shield.
Because I think without the British sponsorship, we wouldn't be having this discussion today. The British sponsored Zionism for a very simple reason, which is that during World War I, the Ottoman armies attempted to march on the Suez Canal. Suez Canal was the jugular vein of the British Empire between Europe and India. And the British came to the conclusion that they needed to
Because I think without the British sponsorship, we wouldn't be having this discussion today. The British sponsored Zionism for a very simple reason, which is that during World War I, the Ottoman armies attempted to march on the Suez Canal. Suez Canal was the jugular vein of the British Empire between Europe and India. And the British came to the conclusion that they needed to
secure the Suez Canal from any threat. And as the British have done so often in so many places, how do you deal with this? Well, you bring in a foreign minority, implant them amongst a hostile population, and establish a protectorate over them. I don't think a Jewish state in Palestine had been part of British intentions. In the Balfour Declaration,
secure the Suez Canal from any threat. And as the British have done so often in so many places, how do you deal with this? Well, you bring in a foreign minority, implant them amongst a hostile population, and establish a protectorate over them. I don't think a Jewish state in Palestine had been part of British intentions. In the Balfour Declaration,
very specifically speaks about a Jewish national home in Palestine. In other words, a British protectorate. Things ended up taking a different course. And I think the most important development was World War II. And I think this had maybe less to do with the Holocaust and more to do with the effective bankruptcy of the United Kingdom during that war and its inability to sustain its global empire.
very specifically speaks about a Jewish national home in Palestine. In other words, a British protectorate. Things ended up taking a different course. And I think the most important development was World War II. And I think this had maybe less to do with the Holocaust and more to do with the effective bankruptcy of the United Kingdom during that war and its inability to sustain its global empire.
It ended up giving up India, ended up giving up Palestine. And it's in that context, I think, that we need to see the emergence of a of a Jewish state in Palestine. And again, a Jewish state means a state in which the Jewish community enjoys not only a demographic majority, but an uncontestable demographic majority, an uncontestable territorial hegemony, and an uncontestable political supremacy.
It ended up giving up India, ended up giving up Palestine. And it's in that context, I think, that we need to see the emergence of a of a Jewish state in Palestine. And again, a Jewish state means a state in which the Jewish community enjoys not only a demographic majority, but an uncontestable demographic majority, an uncontestable territorial hegemony, and an uncontestable political supremacy.
And that is also why after 1948, the nascent Israeli state confiscated, I believe, up to 90% of lands that had been previously owned by Palestinians who became citizens of Israel. It is why the new Israeli state imposed a military government on its population of Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966. It is why...
And that is also why after 1948, the nascent Israeli state confiscated, I believe, up to 90% of lands that had been previously owned by Palestinians who became citizens of Israel. It is why the new Israeli state imposed a military government on its population of Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966. It is why...
the Israeli state effectively reduced the Palestinians living within the Israeli state as citizens of the Israeli state to second-class citizens, on the one hand, promoting Jewish nationalism and Jewish nationalist parties, on the other hand, doing everything within its power to suppress and eliminate Palestinian or Arab nationalist movements. And that's why today there's a consensus
the Israeli state effectively reduced the Palestinians living within the Israeli state as citizens of the Israeli state to second-class citizens, on the one hand, promoting Jewish nationalism and Jewish nationalist parties, on the other hand, doing everything within its power to suppress and eliminate Palestinian or Arab nationalist movements. And that's why today there's a consensus
among all major human rights organizations, that Israel is an apartheid state. With the Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem describes a regime of Jewish supremacy between the river and the sea.
among all major human rights organizations, that Israel is an apartheid state. With the Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem describes a regime of Jewish supremacy between the river and the sea.
I'd like to respond to that. Speaking of propaganda, I find it simply impossible to accept that Balfour, who as British Prime Minister in 1905 was a chief sponsor of the Aliens Act, which was specifically designed to keep persecuted Eastern European Jews out of the streets of the UK, and who was denounced as an anti-Semite by the entire British Jewish establishment.
I'd like to respond to that. Speaking of propaganda, I find it simply impossible to accept that Balfour, who as British Prime Minister in 1905 was a chief sponsor of the Aliens Act, which was specifically designed to keep persecuted Eastern European Jews out of the streets of the UK, and who was denounced as an anti-Semite by the entire British Jewish establishment.
A decade later, all of a sudden... Changed his mind. People change their minds, but when the changing of the mind just coincidentally happens to coincide with the British imperial interest, I think perhaps the transformation is a little more superficial than he's being given credit for. It was clearly a...
A decade later, all of a sudden... Changed his mind. People change their minds, but when the changing of the mind just coincidentally happens to coincide with the British imperial interest, I think perhaps the transformation is a little more superficial than he's being given credit for. It was clearly a...
British imperial venture, and if there had been no threat to the Suez Canal during World War I, regardless of what Balfour would have thought about the Jews and their contribution to history and their persecution and so on, there would have been no Balfour Declaration.
British imperial venture, and if there had been no threat to the Suez Canal during World War I, regardless of what Balfour would have thought about the Jews and their contribution to history and their persecution and so on, there would have been no Balfour Declaration.
Well...
Well...
Yeah, in the 40s, yeah. And we're talking now about 1917. And as I mentioned earlier, I don't think the British had a Jewish state in mind. That's why they used the term Jewish national home. I think what they wanted was a British protectorate, loyal to and dependent upon the British.
Yeah, in the 40s, yeah. And we're talking now about 1917. And as I mentioned earlier, I don't think the British had a Jewish state in mind. That's why they used the term Jewish national home. I think what they wanted was a British protectorate, loyal to and dependent upon the British.
I think an outstanding review of British policy towards these issues during the mandate has been done by Martin Bunton of the University of Victoria. And he basically makes the argument that once the British realized the mess they were in, certainly by the late 20s, early 30s, they recognized the mess they were in, the irreconcilable differences, and basically pursued a policy of just muddling on.
I think an outstanding review of British policy towards these issues during the mandate has been done by Martin Bunton of the University of Victoria. And he basically makes the argument that once the British realized the mess they were in, certainly by the late 20s, early 30s, they recognized the mess they were in, the irreconcilable differences, and basically pursued a policy of just muddling on.
And muddling on in the context of British rule in Palestine, whose overall purpose was to serve for the development of Zionist institutions, Yeshuv's economy and so on, meant even if the British were not self-consciously doing this, preparing the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state. I don't know if that answers your question.
And muddling on in the context of British rule in Palestine, whose overall purpose was to serve for the development of Zionist institutions, Yeshuv's economy and so on, meant even if the British were not self-consciously doing this, preparing the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state. I don't know if that answers your question.
Yes, of course.
Yes, of course.
And if I may, just also one point. You mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini during... Well, entirely legitimate. But what I would also point out is that you had a Zionist organization, the Lehi. 300 people. 300 people, one of whom happened to become an Israeli prime minister, an Israeli foreign minister, a speaker of Israeli parliament.
And if I may, just also one point. You mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini during... Well, entirely legitimate. But what I would also point out is that you had a Zionist organization, the Lehi. 300 people. 300 people, one of whom happened to become an Israeli prime minister, an Israeli foreign minister, a speaker of Israeli parliament.
Yitzhak Shamir proposing an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941. Shamir proposed? Well, no, the Lehi proposed. Some people in the Lehi proposed. Of which Shamir was a prominent leader. Yeah, but this is a red herring also. No, no. Okay, well, if he's a red herring, I'm sorry.
Yitzhak Shamir proposing an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941. Shamir proposed? Well, no, the Lehi proposed. Some people in the Lehi proposed. Of which Shamir was a prominent leader. Yeah, but this is a red herring also. No, no. Okay, well, if he's a red herring, I'm sorry.
They approached the German emissary in Istanbul or something. Yes. And if I may... proposed an alliance with Nazi Germany on what the Leahy described as on the basis of shared ideological principles. Well, they said they did.
They approached the German emissary in Istanbul or something. Yes. And if I may... proposed an alliance with Nazi Germany on what the Leahy described as on the basis of shared ideological principles. Well, they said they did.
That's what they wanted. What did the agreement say? Well, that's what Haj Amin al-Husseini wanted also. That's what others in India and elsewhere.
That's what they wanted. What did the agreement say? Well, that's what Haj Amin al-Husseini wanted also. That's what others in India and elsewhere.
Yes. And Hashemir called himself a terrorist. They were so irrelevant that their leader ended up being kicked upstairs to the leader of the Israeli parliament.
Yes. And Hashemir called himself a terrorist. They were so irrelevant that their leader ended up being kicked upstairs to the leader of the Israeli parliament.
To the Israeli foreign minister.
To the Israeli foreign minister.
You want to characterize him as irrelevant as well? Go ahead.
You want to characterize him as irrelevant as well? Go ahead.
But if we're agreed that Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and actively sought their sponsorship, why is it irrelevant?
But if we're agreed that Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and actively sought their sponsorship, why is it irrelevant?
He probably wanted a lot of things. If that's relevant, why is it irrelevant That a prime minister of Israel... Not prime minister.
He probably wanted a lot of things. If that's relevant, why is it irrelevant That a prime minister of Israel... Not prime minister.
Do you consider it irrelevant that many years ago, Mahmoud Abbas wrote a doctoral thesis, which is basically tantamount... It showed something about Mahmoud Abbas.
Do you consider it irrelevant that many years ago, Mahmoud Abbas wrote a doctoral thesis, which is basically tantamount... It showed something about Mahmoud Abbas.
Yes, but you consider that relevant.
Yes, but you consider that relevant.
I think that's a fair characterization of Mahmoud Abbas. But I didn't bring it up. I brought it up. Yeah. Okay. Because my question is, then why is Shamir's antecedency relevant?
I think that's a fair characterization of Mahmoud Abbas. But I didn't bring it up. I brought it up. Yeah. Okay. Because my question is, then why is Shamir's antecedency relevant?
That was the point. And I explained why I think that's not an entirely... accurate characterization. And then I wanted to make another point. If it's legitimate to bring up his role during World War II, why is it illegitimate to bring up a man who would become Israel's speaker of parliament, foreign minister? Yes. Why is it? And also- He was a young terrorist. And was also responsible for
That was the point. And I explained why I think that's not an entirely... accurate characterization. And then I wanted to make another point. If it's legitimate to bring up his role during World War II, why is it illegitimate to bring up a man who would become Israel's speaker of parliament, foreign minister? Yes. Why is it? And also- He was a young terrorist. And was also responsible for
for the murder of the United Nations' first international envoy, Bernadotti, Foki Bernadotti. Why is all that irrelevant?
for the murder of the United Nations' first international envoy, Bernadotti, Foki Bernadotti. Why is all that irrelevant?
Actually, Benny Morris made the specific claim that the Palestinians played an indirect role in the Holocaust.
Actually, Benny Morris made the specific claim that the Palestinians played an indirect role in the Holocaust.
And my response to that is, first of all, I disagree with that characterization.
And my response to that is, first of all, I disagree with that characterization.
That's what they did. And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe at the time. the only spot of land on earth?
That's what they did. And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe at the time. the only spot of land on earth?
What about your great friends in Britain, the architects of the Balfour Declaration?
What about your great friends in Britain, the architects of the Balfour Declaration?
And why are Palestinians, who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this? Why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe?
And why are Palestinians, who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this? Why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe?
So that wasn't the only safe haven, but shouldn't you be focusing your anger and outrage?
So that wasn't the only safe haven, but shouldn't you be focusing your anger and outrage?
And he happens to be the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. I cannot be responsible for them. You're not responsible for them, but it is relevant that he's the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. Unfortunately,
And he happens to be the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. I cannot be responsible for them. You're not responsible for them, but it is relevant that he's the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. Unfortunately,
Yes, and he gets selected, not despite saying such things, but because he says such things.
Yes, and he gets selected, not despite saying such things, but because he says such things.
You may well be right, but... Anyway, not to beat a dead horse, but I still don't understand. I'll just conclude by saying I don't understand why the Mufti of Jerusalem is relevant. He is relevant. He is relevant.
You may well be right, but... Anyway, not to beat a dead horse, but I still don't understand. I'll just conclude by saying I don't understand why the Mufti of Jerusalem is relevant. He is relevant. He is relevant.
What can you do? I think we're speaking past each other. We're not.
What can you do? I think we're speaking past each other. We're not.
1988, so it's from the 80s. I think your characterization of that charter as anti-Semitic is indisputable. I think your characterization of that charter is genocidal. is off the mark. And more importantly, that charter has been superseded by a new charter. There is no new charter.
1988, so it's from the 80s. I think your characterization of that charter as anti-Semitic is indisputable. I think your characterization of that charter is genocidal. is off the mark. And more importantly, that charter has been superseded by a new charter. There is no new charter.
2018, the Hamas charter, if we look at the current version of the charter... It's not a call to charter.
2018, the Hamas charter, if we look at the current version of the charter... It's not a call to charter.
The only thing called the charter is what was issued in 1988 by Yassin himself. Anyway, it makes a clear distinction between Jews and Zionists in 2018. Now, you can choose to dismiss it, believe it, it's sincere, it's insincere, whatever.
The only thing called the charter is what was issued in 1988 by Yassin himself. Anyway, it makes a clear distinction between Jews and Zionists in 2018. Now, you can choose to dismiss it, believe it, it's sincere, it's insincere, whatever.
Secondly, I'm really unfamiliar with fighters who consult these kinds of documents before they go on.
Secondly, I'm really unfamiliar with fighters who consult these kinds of documents before they go on.
At the instruction of the Commissioner General of UNRWA, right? Right.
At the instruction of the Commissioner General of UNRWA, right? Right.
Secondly, you keep saying Jews, to which I would respond. They use the word Jews. To which I would respond that Hamas does not have a record of... deliberately targeting Jews who are not Israelis. And in fact, it also doesn't have a record of deliberately targeting either Jews or Israelis outside Israel and Palestine.
Secondly, you keep saying Jews, to which I would respond. They use the word Jews. To which I would respond that Hamas does not have a record of... deliberately targeting Jews who are not Israelis. And in fact, it also doesn't have a record of deliberately targeting either Jews or Israelis outside Israel and Palestine.
So, you know, all this talk of... Unlike the Hezbollah, which has targeted Jews outside Palestine. We're talking about October 7th in Hamas. If you'd also like to speak about Hezbollah, let's get to that separately, if you don't mind. Okay. So again, genocidal. Well, if that term is going to be discussed, my first response would be, let's talk about
So, you know, all this talk of... Unlike the Hezbollah, which has targeted Jews outside Palestine. We're talking about October 7th in Hamas. If you'd also like to speak about Hezbollah, let's get to that separately, if you don't mind. Okay. So again, genocidal. Well, if that term is going to be discussed, my first response would be, let's talk about
potentially genocidal actions against Israelis rather than against Jews for the reasons that I just mentioned. And again, I find this constant conflation of Jews, Israel, Zionism to be a bit disturbing. Secondly, I think there are quite a few indications in the factual record that raise serious questions
potentially genocidal actions against Israelis rather than against Jews for the reasons that I just mentioned. And again, I find this constant conflation of Jews, Israel, Zionism to be a bit disturbing. Secondly, I think there are quite a few indications in the factual record that raise serious questions
about the accusations of the genocidal intent and genocidal practice of what happened on October 7th. And my final point would be, I don't think I should take your word for it. I don't think you should take my word for it. I think what we need here is a proper, independent, international investigation. And the reason we need that of genocide during this conflict, whether by...
about the accusations of the genocidal intent and genocidal practice of what happened on October 7th. And my final point would be, I don't think I should take your word for it. I don't think you should take my word for it. I think what we need here is a proper, independent, international investigation. And the reason we need that of genocide during this conflict, whether by...
Palestinians on October 7th or Israel thereafter. The reason that we need such an investigation is because there won't be any hearings on what Hamas did on October 7th at the International Court of Justice. because the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide deals only with states and not with movements.
Palestinians on October 7th or Israel thereafter. The reason that we need such an investigation is because there won't be any hearings on what Hamas did on October 7th at the International Court of Justice. because the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide deals only with states and not with movements.
I think the International Criminal Court, and specifically its current prosecutor, Karim Khan, lacks any and all credibility. He's been an absolute failure at his job. He's just been sitting on his backside for years on this file. And I think I would point out that Hamas has called for independent investigations of all these allegations.
I think the International Criminal Court, and specifically its current prosecutor, Karim Khan, lacks any and all credibility. He's been an absolute failure at his job. He's just been sitting on his backside for years on this file. And I think I would point out that Hamas has called for independent investigations of all these allegations.
Israel has categorically rejected any international investigation, of course, fully supported by the United States. And I think what is required is to have credible investigations of these things, because I don't think you're going to convince me. I don't think I'm going to convince you. And This is two people sitting across the table from each other.
Israel has categorically rejected any international investigation, of course, fully supported by the United States. And I think what is required is to have credible investigations of these things, because I don't think you're going to convince me. I don't think I'm going to convince you. And This is two people sitting across the table from each other.
If I understood your question correctly.
If I understood your question correctly.
No, but let me explain why that's a difficult question to answer. The total number of civilians killed was 800, 850. We know that Hamas is responsible probably for the majority of those killings. We also know that there were killings by Islamic Jihad.
No, but let me explain why that's a difficult question to answer. The total number of civilians killed was 800, 850. We know that Hamas is responsible probably for the majority of those killings. We also know that there were killings by Islamic Jihad.
Do you know why the number went down? The number went down because the Israeli authorities were in possession of 200 corpses that were burned to a crisp that they assumed were Israelis who had been killed on October 7th. They later determined that these were in fact Palestinian fighters. Now, how does a Palestinian fighter get burned to a crisp?
Do you know why the number went down? The number went down because the Israeli authorities were in possession of 200 corpses that were burned to a crisp that they assumed were Israelis who had been killed on October 7th. They later determined that these were in fact Palestinian fighters. Now, how does a Palestinian fighter get burned to a crisp?
And the reason is that a proportion of Israeli civilians killed on October 7th. I don't believe it was a majority. We don't know how many. Some were killed in crossfire. Some were killed by Israeli shell fire, helicopter fire, and so on. And the majority were killed by Palestinians. And of that majority, we don't know.
And the reason is that a proportion of Israeli civilians killed on October 7th. I don't believe it was a majority. We don't know how many. Some were killed in crossfire. Some were killed by Israeli shell fire, helicopter fire, and so on. And the majority were killed by Palestinians. And of that majority, we don't know.
I mean, again, I understood your question is referring specifically to Hamas, which is why I tried to answer it that way. But if you meant generically Palestinians, yes. If you mean specifically Hamas, we don't have a clear breakdown of how many were- No, I don't mean specifically Hamas.
I mean, again, I understood your question is referring specifically to Hamas, which is why I tried to answer it that way. But if you meant generically Palestinians, yes. If you mean specifically Hamas, we don't have a clear breakdown of how many were- No, I don't mean specifically Hamas.
Well, Palestinians have the right to resistance. That right includes the right to armed resistance. At the same time, armed resistance is subject to the laws of war, and there are very clear regulations. that separate legitimate acts of armed resistance from acts of armed resistance that are not legitimate.
Well, Palestinians have the right to resistance. That right includes the right to armed resistance. At the same time, armed resistance is subject to the laws of war, and there are very clear regulations. that separate legitimate acts of armed resistance from acts of armed resistance that are not legitimate.
There's been almost exclusive focus on the attacks on civilian population centers and the killings of civilians on October 7th. What is much more much less discussed to the point of amnesia is that there were very extensive attacks on Israeli military and intelligence facilities on October 7th. I would make a very clear distinction between those two.
There's been almost exclusive focus on the attacks on civilian population centers and the killings of civilians on October 7th. What is much more much less discussed to the point of amnesia is that there were very extensive attacks on Israeli military and intelligence facilities on October 7th. I would make a very clear distinction between those two.
And secondly, I'm not sure that I would characterize the efforts by Palestinians on October 7th to seize Israeli territory and Israeli population centers as in and of themselves illegitimate.
And secondly, I'm not sure that I would characterize the efforts by Palestinians on October 7th to seize Israeli territory and Israeli population centers as in and of themselves illegitimate.
No, no, that's not what I said.
No, no, that's not what I said.
I think what you had on October 7th was an effort by Hamas to seize Israeli territory and population centers. And kill civilians. That's not what I said.
I think what you had on October 7th was an effort by Hamas to seize Israeli territory and population centers. And kill civilians. That's not what I said.
What I said is I think I would not describe the effort to seize Israeli territory as in and of itself illegitimate, as a separate issue from the killing of Israeli civilians where in those cases where they had been deliberately targeted, that's very clearly illegitimate.
What I said is I think I would not describe the effort to seize Israeli territory as in and of itself illegitimate, as a separate issue from the killing of Israeli civilians where in those cases where they had been deliberately targeted, that's very clearly illegitimate.
Again, I'm making a distinction here.
Again, I'm making a distinction here.
Well, I don't do selective condemnation.
Well, I don't do selective condemnation.
You know what the issue is? I've been speaking in public now, I would say since the late 1980s and interviewed and so on. I have never on one occasion ever been asked to condemn any Israeli act. When I've been in group discussions, those supporting the Israeli action or perspective, I have never encountered an example where these individuals are asked to condemn what Israel is doing.
You know what the issue is? I've been speaking in public now, I would say since the late 1980s and interviewed and so on. I have never on one occasion ever been asked to condemn any Israeli act. When I've been in group discussions, those supporting the Israeli action or perspective, I have never encountered an example where these individuals are asked to condemn what Israel is doing.
The demand and obligation of condemnation is exclusively applied And my personal experience over decades is exclusively applied to Palestinians.
The demand and obligation of condemnation is exclusively applied And my personal experience over decades is exclusively applied to Palestinians.
Like taking land back. No, the point I was making was, what was Hamas trying to achieve militarily on October 7th? And I was pointing out that the focus has been very much on Hamas attacks on civilians and atrocities and so on. And I'm not saying those things should be ignored.
Like taking land back. No, the point I was making was, what was Hamas trying to achieve militarily on October 7th? And I was pointing out that the focus has been very much on Hamas attacks on civilians and atrocities and so on. And I'm not saying those things should be ignored.
What I'm saying is that what's getting lost in the shuffle is that there were extensive attacks on military and intelligence facilities. And as far as the other aspects are concerned, because I think either you or Lex asked me about the legitimacy of these attacks, I said I'm unclear whether
What I'm saying is that what's getting lost in the shuffle is that there were extensive attacks on military and intelligence facilities. And as far as the other aspects are concerned, because I think either you or Lex asked me about the legitimacy of these attacks, I said I'm unclear whether
efforts by Hamas to seize Israeli population centers in and of themselves are illegitimate as opposed to actions that either deliberately targeted Israeli civilians or actions that should reasonably have been expected to result in the killings of Israeli civilians. Those strike me as by definition illegitimate. And I want to be very clear about that. I have- Illegitimate means you condemn them.
efforts by Hamas to seize Israeli population centers in and of themselves are illegitimate as opposed to actions that either deliberately targeted Israeli civilians or actions that should reasonably have been expected to result in the killings of Israeli civilians. Those strike me as by definition illegitimate. And I want to be very clear about that. I have- Illegitimate means you condemn them.
Illegitimate means they are not legitimate. I have a problem- Condemning your side, yes. No, not condemning my side. I have a problem with selective outrage, and I have a problem with selective condemnation. And as I explained to you a few minutes ago- In my decades of appearing in public and being interviewed, I have never been asked to condemn an Israeli action.
Illegitimate means they are not legitimate. I have a problem- Condemning your side, yes. No, not condemning my side. I have a problem with selective outrage, and I have a problem with selective condemnation. And as I explained to you a few minutes ago- In my decades of appearing in public and being interviewed, I have never been asked to condemn an Israeli action.
I've never been asked for a moral judgment on an Israeli action. Exclusive request for condemnation has to do with what Palestinianism, and just as importantly, I'm sure if you watch BBC or CNN, when is the last time an Israeli spokesperson has been asked to condemn an Israeli act? I've never seen it.
I've never been asked for a moral judgment on an Israeli action. Exclusive request for condemnation has to do with what Palestinianism, and just as importantly, I'm sure if you watch BBC or CNN, when is the last time an Israeli spokesperson has been asked to condemn an Israeli act? I've never seen it.
No, but now that we're talking about Israeli victims, all of a sudden morality is central.
No, but now that we're talking about Israeli victims, all of a sudden morality is central.
Sorry, if I can interrupt you. In 1948, the entire world stood behind the establishment of a Jewish state in the entire world.
Sorry, if I can interrupt you. In 1948, the entire world stood behind the establishment of a Jewish state in the entire world.
Okay, but I think you know what I mean by that.
Okay, but I think you know what I mean by that.
I don't think there's a maybe there at the
I don't think there's a maybe there at the
By accepting the Oslo Agreement.
By accepting the Oslo Agreement.
I think the problem with your statement is that if you go back and listen to it, the first part of it is war is hell, civilians die. It's a fact of life. And you state that in a very factual matter. Then when you start talking about Hamas, all of a sudden you've discovered morality, and you've discovered condemnation, and you've discovered intent, and you are unfortunately far from alone in this.
Even the Amnesty International in 2008 and in 2014 and even today will continue to say that it's like the types of attacksβ I don't think you'll find anyone who will deny that Hamas has targeted civilians. Sure. You gave the example ofβ But there's a differenceβ Of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. I mean, facts are facts.
Yeah, but the idea that Israel is not in the business of intentionally targeting civilians, I know that's what we're supposed to believe. But the historical record stands very clearly.
I'd just like to make... The way you characterized it, I think the best example of that I've come across during this specific conflict is John Kirby, the White House spokesman. I've named him Tears Tossed Her Own for a very good reason. When he's talking about Palestinian civilian deaths, war is hell, it's a fact of life, get used to it.
When he was confronted with Israeli civilian deaths on October 7th, he literally broke down in tears.
He understood that. No, that's what he tried to make us understand.
I'm willing to grant you. You don't have to pursue it. Allow me to finish. I don't know anything about this. I'd like to hear it.
He didn't say they're a waste of time. I'd like to respond to what you were saying. I think the question that we're trying to answer... I think you don't understand Israel.
Now it works. I think we're all agreed that Palestinians have deliberately targeted civilians. whether we're talking about Hamas and Islamic Jihad today or previously... I prefer the word murdered and raped rather than targeted.
I'm not talking about... I'm talking about this now. Yeah, but I'm trying to answer his question. Historically, there is substantial evidence that Palestinians have targeted civilians, whether it's been incidental or systematic is a different discussion. I don't want to get into that now. For some reason, there seems to be a huge debate about whether
any Israeli has ever sunk so low as to target a civilian.
If I understand you correctly, you're basically making the claim that that none of these attacks could have happened without going through an entire chain of command.
My understanding of the Israeli military, and you could perhaps, you've served in it, you would know better, It's actually a fairly chaotic organization.
Well, my understanding of the Israeli military is that it's quite chaotic and there's also a lot of testimonies from Israel, but be that as it may, okay, I'm prepared to accept both of your contentions that it's a highly organized and disciplined force. Air Force under any scenario is going to be more organized than the other branches. And you're saying such a strike would have been inconceivable.
Your basic claim is that it would be fair to assume that such a strike could have only been carried out with multiple levels of authorization and signing off. Okay, let's accept that for the sake of argument. We have now seen... Incident after incident after incident after incident where entire families are vaporized in single strikes.
Family members.
Why do I have to prove a negative?
You know,
30,000 is a small number. You consider 30,000 a small number?
12,000 children is only...
Is there a genocide going on in Gaza? Well, in several years, we will have a definitive response to that question. What has happened thus far is that on the 29th of December, the Republic of South Africa instituted proceedings against Israel pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
South Africa basically accused Israel of perpetrating genocide in the Gaza Strip. On the 26th of January, the court issued its initial ruling. The court at this stage is not making a determination on whether Israel has or has not committed genocide. So just as it has not found Israel guilty, it certainly also hasn't found Israel innocent.
What the court had to do at this stage was take one of two decisions. Either South Africa's case was the equivalent of a frivolous lawsuit and dismiss it and close the proceedings, or it had to determine that South Africa presented a plausible case that Israel was violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention and that it would on that basis hold a full hearing. Now, a lot of people
have looked at the court's ruling of the 26th of January and focused on the fact that the court did not order a ceasefire. I actually wasn't expecting it to order a ceasefire, and I wasn't surprised that it didn't, because in the other cases that the court has considered, most prominently Bosnia and Myanmar, it also didn't order a ceasefire.
And South Africa, in requesting a ceasefire, also didn't ask the court to render an opinion on the legitimacy or lack thereof of Israel's military operation. From my perspective, the key issue on the 26th of January was whether the court would simply dismiss the case or decide to proceed with it.
And it decided to proceed. And I think that's enormously significant.
Can you let me finish? Well, the end of the story is you specifically asked whether I think Israel is committing genocide. I explained formally there is no finding. And as you said, we won't know for a number of years. And I think there's legitimate questions to be raised. I mean, in the Bosnia case, which I think all four of us would agree was clearly a case of genocide. the court determined.
In the Bosnia case, the court determined that of all the evidence placed before them, only Srebrenica qualified as genocide and all the other atrocities committed did not qualify as genocide. You know, international law is a developing organism. I don't know how the court is going to respond in this case. So I wouldn't take it as a foregone conclusion how the court is going to respond.
I have too, because you're asking my personal opinion. So as a matter of law, I want to state very clearly, it has not been determined and won't be determined for several years. Based on my... observations and the evidence before me, I would say it's indisputable that Israel is engaged in a genocidal assault against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
Genocide consists of two elements, the destruction of a people in whole or in part. So in other words, you can commit genocide by killing 30,000 people. Well, five probably is below the threshold. Yes, but I think 30,000 crosses the threshold. and not reaching 500,000 is probably relevant. And the second element is there has to be an intent. In other words- And you believe there's an intent?
Yes, I think if there is any other plausible reason for why all these people are being murdered, it's not genocide. And as far as intent is concerned... What about hiding behind a human shield? You don't think that's a reason for them being killed? Well, let's get the intent part out of the way first. South Africa's... Forget South Africa.
They're pro-Hamas government. That's got nothing to do with anything. I think they're pro-Satan as well, last time I checked. No, they're pro-Hamas. You know, for some reason, you don't have a problem with people being pro-Israeli at the time of this, but if they support Palestinians' right to life or self-determination, they get demonized and delegitimized as pro-Ahmad.
But supporting a state that has murdered 30,000.
They wanted them killed.
Of course they want them killed. Okay. You asked me about intent. And the reason that I bought in the South African application is because it is actually exceptionally detailed. on intent by quoting numerous... All sorts of idiotic ministers in Israel. Well, yeah, including the prime minister, the defense minister, the chief of staff.
No, he said Amalek. He said Amalek.
So the reason I raised the South African application is twofold, Hamas or no Hamas. It's exceptionally detailed on the question of intent. And secondly, when the International Court of Justice issues a ruling, individual justices can give their own opinion. Yeah, yeah.
And I found the German one to be the most interesting on this specific question, because he was basically saying that he didn't think South Africa presented a persuasive case, but he said, Their section on intent was so overpowering that he felt he was left with no choice but to vote with the majority. So I think that answers the intent part of your question.
I think they found one.
No, I think we... It hasn't.
They can swim well enough to have a realistic prospect of winning a medal.
Bosnia, which was admittedly a special type of case because they were accusing Serbia of sponsoring the Bosnian Serbs. That took, I think, 17 years.
Yeah, but I think the problem with your characterization is You're saying in so many words that South Africans basically only have to show up in court with a coherent statement. Right. That is correct.
They needed to do a lot more. Not much more. Not much more. The American judge?
The American judge? Today's atmosphere.
They needed to persuade the court that it was worth investing several years of their time. They're probably well paid for it. They're well paid whether they take this case or not. I mean, you know, they have a full docket whether they accept or reject this case. And I don't think we should... Remember what I just said.
By lots of politicians. But you don't accept extreme Palestinians. But that's not Israeli policy.
But you don't accept extreme Palestinian statements after they lost their entire country, not just 1,200 people. That's a good point. No, no, it's a good point. And on that...
Oh, really?
Is this... Because I know you've also... talked about the closure of the archives and stuff?
What's your casualty count for Deir Yassin?
Because before they were... They used to say 245 or 254.
Because the Red Cross, I think, was the one that first put out that number.
Maybe.
I think Begin and his memoirs... Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Of Israel or of a Jewish state?
Well, just briefly in response⦠Arafat formally recognized Israel in 1993. Yeah, earlier. I don't think actually that in 2000, 2001, a genuine resolution was on offer because I think the maximum Israel was prepared to offer, admittedly more than it had been prepared to offer in the past, fell short of the minimum that the Palestinians considered to be a reasonable resolution.
two-state settlement, bearing in mind that as of 1949, Israel controlled 78% of the British mandate of Palestine. Palestinians were seeking a stay on the remaining 22%, and this was apparently too much for Israel.
They were being offered, I think, less than a withdrawal to the 1967 borders with mutual and minor and reciprocal land swaps and the just resolution of... The refugee problem was one of the questions. Yes. You know, I worked for a number of years with International Crisis Group, and my boss at the time was Rob Malley, who was one of the American officials present at Camp David.
The point I want to make about Rob was he wrote, I think, a very perceptive article in 2001 in the New York Review of Books. I know that you and Ehud Barak had a debate with them, but I think he gives a very compelling reason of why and how Camp David failed.
Hussein Ara, yes, who was not at Camp David. But in response to your question, I think there could have been real possibility of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace in the mid-1970s in the wake of the 1973 October War. I'll recall that in 1971,
Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967, speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans stated, if I had to choose between Sharm el-Sheikh without peace or peace without Sharm el-Sheikh, this is referring to the resort
in Egyptian Sinai, which was then under Israeli occupation, Dayan said, I will choose for Sharm el-Sheikh without peace. Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly. And I think it was in that context that had there been a joint agreement
US-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in in the occupied territories. I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think, for several reasons. And ultimately, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided
for reasons we can discuss later, to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand
in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon, to get rid of the PLO and so on. You ask, when were we closest? And I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close, and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement.
My own view, and I've written about this, I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly, if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories.
I would argue it's more tenuous than was the French position in Algeria in 1954, than was a British position in Ireland in 1916, than was the Ethiopian position in Eritrea in 1990. And so as a matter of practicality, as a matter of principle, I do think the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories remains realistic.
I think the question that we now need to ask ourselves, it's one I'm certainly asking myself since October 7th and looking at Israel's genocidal campaign, but also looking at larger questions, is it desirable? Can you have...
peace with what increasingly appears to be an irrational, genocidal state that seeks to confront and resolve each and every political challenge with violence and that reacts to its failure to achieve
solutions to political challenges with violence by applying even more violence that has an insatiable lust for Palestinian territory, a genocidal apartheid state that seems increasingly incapable of even conceiving of peaceful coexistence with the other people on that land. So I'm very pessimistic. that a solution is possible. I grew up
In Western Europe, in the long shadow of the Second World War, I think we can all agree that there could have been no peace in Europe had certain regimes on that continent not been removed from power. I look at Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, and I think we're all agreed that there could not have been peace in that region had the Khmer Rouge not been ousted.
I look at Southern Africa during the 1990s, and I think we can all be agreed that had the white minority regimes that ruled Zimbabwe and South Africa not been dismantled, there could not have been peace in that region. Although I think it's worth having a discussion, I do think it's now a legitimate question to ask can there be peace without dismantling the Zionist regime?
And I make a very clear distinction between the Israeli state and its institutions on the one hand, and the Israeli people, who I think, regardless of our discussion about the history, I think you can now talk about an Israeli people and a people that have developed rights over time.
And a formula for peaceful coexistence with them will need to be found, which is a separate matter from dismantling the Israeli state and its institutions. And again, I haven't reached clear conclusions about this, except to say, as a practical matter, I think a two-state settlement remains feasible. But I think there are very legitimate questions
about its desirability and about whether peace can be achieved in the Middle East with the persistence of an irrational genocidal apartheid regime, particularly because Israeli society is beginning to develop many extremely, extremely distasteful, supremacist, dehumanizing aspects that I think also stand in the way of coexistence that are being fed by this regime.
He was killed by the Abu Nidal organization. Sure, yeah.
Of accepting Israel. Of accepting Israel, yeah. Which they formally did in 1993.
No, because 1993 was not a peace agreement.
It was an interim agreement. And Palestinians actually began clamoring for commencing the permanent status resolutions on schedule. And the Israelis kept delaying them. In fact, they only began, I believe, in 99, under American pressure on the Israelis.
By the formal definition, I think it qualifies.
Didn't Dayan talk about the collapse of the third temple?
But we're talking about perceptions here.
Palestinian national home.
Ben-Ami was at Camp David.
It also depends how you calculate.
The exception is the Golan Heights.
Now, you'll say- Allocated to the Palestinians.
So what would your standard be then?
My response, you're basically saying, if I understand correctly- There's only one way to resolve this, and that is through direct bilateral negotiations. Probably, yeah. Okay. Or ideally, but... I've taken over your house, okay? You're not going to go to the police because, you know, the law is only of limited value. So you come over...
and sit in what is now my living room that used to be your living room, and we negotiate. The problem there is that you're not gonna get anything unless I agree to it. And standards and norms and law and all the rest of it be damned. So you need to take into account that when you're advocating bilateral negotiations, that effectively that gives each of the parties veto power.
In the current circumstances, the Palestinians have already recognized Israel. They have... You keep bringing that up like it's a significant concession.
Yes, exactly. They didn't win a majority of the votes.
Does it matter what you or I think about what you felt?
Okay, so... That does matter.
So for years, the Israeli... and US demand was that the Palestinians recognize 242 and 338. They did, but you're saying, okay, we demanded that they do this, but it was meaningless when they did it. Then the demand was that- It was a tactical thing, yes. Then the demand was the PLO recognize Israel. Tactical. Okay, we demanded that they did this, and they did it, but it's meaningless.
Yes. But the point is, the Palestinians, demands are constantly made of them. And when they accede to those demands, they're then told, actually, what you did is meaningless. So here's a new set of demands. I mean, you know, it's like a hamster. There's no new set of demands. It's like a hamster.
It's like a hamster stuck in a wheel that will be told, if you run fast enough, you'll get out of the cage.
And what is the formal position of this Israeli government?
Okay, it's predecessor. And it's predecessor. And it's predecessor. Come on.
What I said. You didn't say that. Dismantle Israel. What I said and I've written.
I've written extensively on this issue, on why a two-state settlement is still feasible, and I came out in support of that proposition. Perhaps in my heart you can see that I was just bullshitting, but that's what I actually wrote. That was a number of years ago, and just as a matter of historical record.
Beginning in the early 1970s, there was fierce debate within the Palestinian national movement about whether to accept or reject. And there were three schools of thought. There was one that would accept nothing less than the total liberation of Palestine.
There was a second that accepted what was called the establishment of a fighting national authority on Palestinian soil, which they saw as a springboard for the total liberation of Palestine. And there was a third school that believed that under current dynamics and so on, that they should go for a two-state settlement. And our...
friend and correspondent, Gauter Loerse, has written a very perceptive article on when the PLO, already in 1976, came out in open support of a two-state resolution at the Security Council. PLO accepted it. Israel, of course, rejected it, but the resolution didn't pass because the US and the UK vetoed it. It was both of them.
Okay. Yeah. But the fact of the matter is that the PLO came to accept a two-state settlement. Why they did it I think is irrelevant. And subsequently, the PLO acted on the basis of seeking to achieve a two-state settlement. The reason I think, and I think, Norm, you've written about this, the reason that Arafat was so insistent
on getting minimally acceptable terms for a two-state settlement at Camp David and afterwards was precisely because he knew that once he signed, that was all the Palestinians were going to get. If his intention had been, you know, I'm not accepting Israel, I simply want to springboard, he would have accepted a Palestinian state in Jericho. But he didn't.
You're right. He should have accepted it. But if you're correct, okay, that he was really out to eliminate Israel, then... He wouldn't have cared about the borders. He wouldn't have cared about what the thing said about refugees. He would have gotten a sovereign state and used that to achieve that purpose.
But I think it was precisely because he recognized that he was not negotiating for a springboard. He was negotiating permanent status that he was such a stickler about the details.
If you want to dismiss international law, that's fine, but then you have to do it consistently. You can't set standards for the Palestinians but reject applying those standards to Israel. If we're going to have the law of the jungle, then we can all be beasts and not only some of us. So it's either that
or you have certain agreed standards that are intended to regulate our conduct, all of our conduct, not just some of us.
Well, you're saying, you know, international law and the millionth UN resolution, you're being very dismissive about all these things. And that's fine, but then you have to be dismissive across the board.
Yeah, but hold on, hold on. Every United Nations Security Council resolution, irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is by definition binding. binding not only on the members of the Security Council, but on every member state of the UN. Read the UN Charter. It's black and white.
It's actually not that vague because the term land for peace- originates in 242.
Those aren't violent.
Let me finish. There's a very lengthy history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. You want to deny that those negotiations took place.
You can't do it. I think the problem is different. You want to say the Palestinians were only fighting and then when I point out they've also gone to the court and the UN say, well, all they do then is these things and they should be negotiating and I... demonstrate that there was a lengthy record of negotiations and said, yeah, but they didn't go in good faith.
Again, you're placing the hamster in the wheel and telling him if he runs fast enough, maybe one day he'll get out of the cage. Okay, and please, if I could just finish. I think the fundamental problem here is not what the Palestinians have and haven't done. And it's perfectly legitimate to have a discussion about whether they could have been more effective.
Of course they could have been more effective. Everyone could have always been more effective. The fundamental... issue here is that Israel has never been prepared to concede the legitimacy of Palestinian national rights in the land of the former British mandate of Palestine.
Wait, what is the occupied territories? The occupied territories. Is that all of Israel? The occupied territories are those territories that Israel occupied in June of 1967.
So they didn't say it, they didn't ask for it.
Hamas only negotiated with Israel about prisoner exchanges.
Again, I'm posing a question. And the question is, regardless of what's feasible or realistic today, the question I'm posing is, can you have peace in the Middle East with this militant, irrational, genocidal, apartheid state and power? Okay, and the question I'm asking is, can you have peace with this regime, or does this regime and its institutions
need to be dismantled, similar to the examples I gave of Europe and Southern Africa.
Yeah, you're correct. Several of them, most importantly Egypt, Jordan, have made their peace with Israel. I should add that Israel's conduct since then has placed these relations under strain. I had very little...
I didn't take the reports of a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement particularly seriously before October 7th, the reason being that it was really a Saudi-Israeli-US deal, which committed the US to make certain commitments to Saudi Arabia that would probably never get through Congress.
I don't think the question is whether that deal is legitimate or not. I think that deal exists. But the point is whether the core of this conflict is not between Israel and Egypt. The core of this conflict is between Israel and the Palestinian people.
And the reason that Israel agreed to relinquish the occupied Egyptian Sinai, and the reason that Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979 is because Israel in 1973 recognized that its military superiority was ultimately no match for Egypt's determination to recover its occupied territories and that there would come a point when Egypt would find a way to extract an unbearable price.
If you're talking about the average Israeli citizen, I think that's a fair characterization. If you're talking about the Israeli leadership, I think they looked at it in more strategic terms. How do you remove the most powerful Arab military state from the equation?
Often. The only allies of the dispossessed are those who experience similar circumstances.
Not one. They're always on the verge. They're on the verge. There have been documented cases. I haven't seen them.
I don't think there's famine in Israel.
It's something which is produced for the Western... There are infants dying due to an engineered lack of access to food and nutrition.
Sure. There's a lot to unpack here. I'll try to limit myself to just a few points. Regarding Zionism and transfer, I think Chaim Weizmann, the head of the World Zionist Organization, had it exactly right when he said that the objective of Zionism is to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English or France is French. In other words, as...
Well, first of all, I would agree with Benny Morris and Norman Finkelstein that the current situation is bleak. And... I think it would be unreasonable to expect it to not get even bleaker in the coming weeks and months. This conflict originated in the late 19th century. It's been a more or less active conflict since the 1920s, 1930s.
And it has produced a tremendous amount of suffering and regional conflict and geopolitical complications and all of that. But what gives me hope is that throughout their entire ordeal, the Palestinian people have never surrendered. And I believe they never will surrender to overwhelming force and violence. They have taken everything that Israel has thrown at them.
They have taken everything that the West has thrown at them. They have taken everything that those who are supposed to be their natural allies have on occasion thrown at them. But this is a people that never has, and I believe never will surrender.
And at a certain point, I think Israel and its leaders will have to come to the realization that by hook or by crook, these people are going to achieve their inalienable and legitimate national rights. And that that is going to be a reality. I, as I was... What do you mean by that?
No, and... From the river to the sea? Well, ideally, of course, yes.
No, what I was saying earlier, and then the discussion got sidetracked, is that I did believe that a two-state settlement, a partition of Palestine... along the 1967 boundaries would have been a reasonable solution because I think it also would have opened pathways to further non-violent engagement between Israel and the Palestinians that could
create other forms of coexistence in a federal or binational or other... What do you think about refugees in regards to that?
I think there has to be an explicit acknowledgement of the responsibility and of the rights. I think that in the framework of a two-state settlement, I think a formula would need to be found that does not undermine the foundations of a two-state settlement. And I don't think
it would be that difficult because I suspect that there are probably large numbers of Palestinian refugees who, once their rights are acknowledged, will find it exceptionally distasteful to have to live among the kind of sentiments that we've heard around this table today, to be quite frank. I was previously unfamiliar with you. And I watched one of your preparation videos.
Very disconcerting stuff, I have to say. You were explaining two days ago in the discussion about apartheid and how absurd it was, that in your view, Jim Crow was not apartheid. Jim Crow was not apartheid. But Arab states not giving citizenship to Palestinian refugees is apartheid.
As Norman explained, a Jewish state requires Jewish political, demographic, and territorial supremacy. Without those three elements, the state would be Jewish in name only. And I think what distinguishes Zionism is its insistence, supremacy, and exclusivity. That would be my first point.
I would expect nothing less from someone who doesn't think Jim Crow is apartheid.
No.
In your eyes, probably not.
Let me finish answering.
I think it's pretty clear that the majority of civilians that were killed- 51% or 90%? Don't ask me to put a number on something I don't know.
First of all, when you say Hamas, do you mean Palestinians or do you mean Hamas specifically?
But that's how this discussion started. You said Hamas and I began to answer that. And then Benny Morris said, actually, he means Hamas in addition to Jihad and the others.
Well, the figures we have are that about a third of the casualties on October 7th were military. That's not what I asked at all. What's your question?
I think a clear majority, but I can't give you a specific figure.
Just as they are now in this conflict. Exactly. More journalists have been killed in the last several months in Gaza than in any other conflict.
He doesn't want to hear it.
The second point is I think what the Soviet foreign minister at the time, Andrei Gromyko, said is exactly right with one reservation. Gromyko was describing a European savagery unleashed against Europe's Jews. At the time, it wasn't Palestinians or Arabs. The savages and the barbarians were European to the core. had nothing to do with developments in Palestine or the Middle East.
You asked me a direct question and you got a direct answer.
I got majority, which could be from 51 to 99. I said a clear majority.
A clear majority, in my view, is well over 50%. Please don't ask me to be more precise.
If I knew that, I would say it.
I hold as a historian. If I was trying to belittle, I would give you a very different answer. I would just say, I don't know. I do know that some were shot up.
You're not speaking as a historian, though. That's probably true. I can state with confidence a clear majority. overwhelming majority. You may be correct, but I can't state that with certainty. I think there's a very easy way to find out, is to have an independent... Forget independent. Well, of course you forget independent.
Not necessarily.
But if it was in Australia, it would have been okay. He certainly would have been more honest than from your perspective.
But he could have killed a lot more.
Secondly, at the time that Gromyka was speaking, those Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and others who were in need of safe haven were still overwhelmingly on the European continent and not in Palestine. And I think given the scale of the savagery, I don't think that any one state or country should have borne the responsibility for addressing this crisis.
I think it should have been an international responsibility. The Soviet Union could have contributed. Germany certainly could and should have contributed. the United Kingdom and the United States, which slammed their doors shut to the persecuted Jews of Europe as the Nazis were rising to power. They certainly should have played a role.
But instead, what passed for the international community at the time decided to partition Palestine. And here I think we need to judge the partition resolution against the realities that obtained at the time. two-thirds of the population of Palestine was Arab.
the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, constituted about one-third of the total population and controlled even less of the land within Palestine. As a preeminent Palestinian historian, Walid al-Khalidi has pointed out, the partition resolution in giving roughly 55% of Palestine to the Jewish community
And I think 41, 42% to the Arab community, to the Palestinians, did not preserve the position of each community or even favor one community at the expense of the others. Rather, it thoroughly inverted and revolutionized the relationship between the two communities. And
As many have written, the Nakba was the inevitable consequence of partition, given the nature of Zionism, given the territorial disposition, given the weakness of the Palestinian community, whose leadership had been largely decimated during a major revolt at the end of the 1930s, given that the Arab states were still very much under French and British influence,
The Nakba was inevitable, the inevitable product of the partition resolution. And one last point also about the UN's partition resolution is, yes, formally that is what the international community decided on the 29th of November 1947. It's not a resolution that could ever have gotten through the UN General Assembly today for a very simple reason. It was a very different General Assembly.
Most African, most Asian states were not yet independent. Were the resolution to be placed before the international community today, and I find it telling that the minority opinion was led by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, I think they would have represented the clear majority.
So partition, given what we know about Zionism, given that it was entirely predictable what would happen, given the realities on the ground in Palestine, was deeply unjust. And the idea that either the Palestinians or the Arab states could have accepted such a resolution is, I think, an illusion. That was in 1947. We saw what happened in 48 and 49. Palestinian society was essentially destroyed.
Over 80%, I believe, of Palestinians resident in the territory that became the state of Israel were either expelled or fled and ultimately were ethnically cleansed because ethnic cleansing consists of two components. It's not just forcing people into refuge or expelling them, it's just as importantly preventing their return.
And here, and Benny Morris has written, I think, an article about Joseph Leitz and the transfer committees, there was a very detailed initiative to prevent their return, and it consisted of raising hundreds of Palestinian villages to the ground, which was systematically implemented and so on. And so Palestinians became a stateless people.
Now, what is the most important reason that no Arab state was established in Palestine? Well, since the 1930s, the Zionist leadership and The Hashemite leadership of Jordan, as it's been thoroughly researched and written about by the Israeli-British historian Avi Schleim, essentially colluded to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine in the late 1940s.
There's much more here, but I think those are the key points I would make about 1948.
As have you.
If I understood you correctly... you're making the claim that transfer, expulsion, and so on was in fact a very localized phenomenon resulting from individual land purchases. And that, if I understand you correctly, you're also making the claim that the idea that a Jewish state requires a removal or overwhelming reduction of the non-Jewish population was... If the Arabs are attacking you, yes.
But let's say prior to 1947, it would be your claim... that the idea that a significant reduction or wholesale removal of their population was not part of Zionist thinking. Well, I think there's two problems with that. I think what you're saying about localized disputes is correct, but I also think that there is a whole literature
that demonstrates that transfer was envisioned by Zionist leaders on a much broader scale than simply individual land purchases. In other words, it went way beyond, we need to remove these tenants so that we can farm this land. The idea was we can't have a state where all these Arabs remain and we have to get rid of them.
And the second, I think, impediment to that view is that long before the UN General Assembly convened to address the question of Palestine, Palestinian and Arab and other leaders as well had been warning ad infinitum that the purpose of the Zionist movement is not just to establish a Jewish state, but to establish an exclusivist Jewish state.
And that transfer, forced displacement, was fundamental to that project. And just responding to, sorry, was it Bonnell or Donnell? With a B. Yeah. Yeah. You made the point that the problem here is that people don't recognize is that the first and last result for the Arabs is always war. I think there's a problem with that. I think you might do well to recall
the 1936 general strike conducted by Palestinians at the beginning of the revolt, which at the time was the longest recorded general strike in history. You may want to consult the book published last year by Laurie Allen, A History of False Hope.
which discusses in great detail the consistent engagement by Palestinians, their leaders, their elites, their diplomats, and so on, with all these international committees. If we look at today, the Palestinians are once again going to the International Court of Justice. They're consistently trying to persuade the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to do his job.
They have launched widespread boycott campaigns. So, of course, the Palestinians have engaged in military resistance. But I think the suggestion that this has always been their first and last resort and that they have somehow spurned civic action, spurned diplomacy, I think really has no basis in reality.
Well, one of the first books on this issue I read when I was still in high school, because my late father had it, was The Diaries of Theodor Herzl. And I think Theodor Herzl, of course, was the founder of the contemporary Zionist movement. And I think if you read that, it's very clear. For Herzl, the model upon which the Zionist movement would proceed, his model was Cecil Rhodes.
I think Rhodes, from what I recall, correct me if I'm wrong, has quite a prominent place in Herzl's diaries. I think Herzl was also corresponding with him and seeking his support. Cecil Rhodes, of course, was the British colonialist after whom the former white minority regime in Rhodesia existed.
uh was named and herzel also says explicitly in his diaries that it is essential um to remove uh the existing population from palestine in a moment please he says we shall have to spirit the penniless population across the borders and procure employment for them elsewhere And Israel Zangwill, who you mentioned, a land without a people for a people without a land.
They knew damn well it wasn't a people, a land without a people. I'll continue, but please go ahead.
Just one clarification on Herzl's diaries. I mean, the other thing that I recall from those diaries is he was... He was very preoccupied with, in fact, getting great power patronage, seeing Palestine, the Jewish state in Palestine, I think his words, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. In other words, very much seeing his project as a proxy for Western imperialism in the Middle East.
Including the Ottoman Sultan, who he tried to cultivate. I just want to respond to a point you made earlier, which was that People expressed their rejection of the partition resolution on the grounds that it gave the majority of Palestine to the Jewish community, which formed only a third.
Whereas, in fact, if I understood you correctly, you're saying the Palestinians and the Arabs would have rejected any partition resolution.
I think you raise a valid point because I think the Palestinians did reject the partition of their homeland in principle and I think the fact that the United Nations General Assembly then awarded the majority of their homeland to the Zionist movement only added insult to injury.
I mean, one doesn't have to sympathize with the Palestinians to recognize that they have now been a stateless people for 75 years. Can you name any country Yours, for example, or yours, that would be prepared to give 55%, 25%, 10% of your country to the Palestinians? Of course not. And so the issue was not the existence of Jews in Palestine. They had been there for centuries.
And of course, they had ties to Palestine and particularly to Jerusalem and other places going back centuries, if not millennia. But the idea of establishing an exclusively Jewish state at the expense of those who are already living there, I think... It was right to reject that.
And I don't think we can look back now, 75 years later and say, well, you should have accepted losing 55% of your homeland because you ended up losing 78% of it and the remaining 22% was occupied in 1967. That's not how things work. And I can imagine an American
rejecting giving 10% of the United States to the Palestinians, and if that rejection leads to war and you lose half your country, I doubt that 50 years from now you're going to say, well, maybe I should have accepted that.
It was a matter of principle.
That last point is actually not correct because for all its injustice, the mandate system recognized Palestine as a class A mandate, which provisionally recognized the independence Of that territory.
It was provisionally recognized.
It was a British mandate of Palestine, not the British mandate of Israel.
Well, first of all, I think that Zionist leadership's acceptance of the partition resolution And I think you may have written about this, that they accepted it because it provided international endorsement of the legitimacy of the principle of Jewish statehood. And they didn't accept the borders. And in fact, later expanded the borders. Second of all, the borders were expanded in war.
Including their most senior leaders who said so, and I think you've quoted them saying so.
And second of all, I mean, removing dark people? Darker people? It's intrinsic.
So the idea that... Americans or Brits or the French would have an issue with, I mean, French had been doing it in Algeria for decades. The Americans have been doing it in North America for centuries. So how would Israel, forcibly displacing Palestinians, somehow besmirch Israel in the eyes of the West?
80% went missing.
I think just one last point on this. I remember... reading your book when it first came out and reading, you know, one incident after the other and one example after the other, and then getting to the conclusion where you said the Nakba was a product of war, not design, I think we were, and I remember,
reacting almost in shock to that, that I felt you had mobilized overwhelming evidence that it was a product of design, not war. And I think our discussion today very much reflects, let's say, the dissonance between the evidence and the conclusion. You don't feel that the research that you have conducted and published demonstrates that it was in fact inherent and built and inevitable.
And I think the point that Norm and I are making is that your own historical research, together with that of others, indisputably demonstrates that it does. I think that's a fundamental disagreement we're having here.
I think the Palestinians and the Arabs were explicit. that they wanted a unitary, I think, federal state, and they made their submissions to UNSCOP. They made their appeals at the UN General Assembly.
Yes, yes.
No, it wasn't an exclusively Arab state. I think we have to distinguish between Palestinian and Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on the one hand, and Palestinian and Arab attitudes to Jewish existence in Palestine. There's a fundamental difference.
Husseini did say that, and I'm sure there was a very substantial body of Palestinian Arab public opinion that endorsed that. But by the same token, I think a unitary Arab state, as you call it, or a Palestinian state could have been established with arrangements, with guarantees to ensure the security and rights of both communities. How that would work in detail had...
had been discussed and proposed, but never resolved. And again, I think, you know, Jewish fears about what would have happened- A second Holocaust, that's what we're talking about.
That may well have been the Jewish fear. It was an unfounded Jewish fear. It was unfounded? Of course it was unfounded.
You really think that the Palestinians, had they won the war, were going to import ovens and crematoria from Germany?
I don't think it would be... I wouldn't say there were always pogroms in every Arab state. I think there was flight of... Arab Jews for multiple reasons, in some cases for precisely the reasons you say. If you look at the Jewish community in Algeria, for example, their flight had virtually nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The issue of Algerian Jews was that the French gave them citizenship during their colonial rule of Algeria, and they increasingly became identified with French rule. And when Algeria became independent and all the French ended up leaving, out of fear or out of disappointment or out of whatever, the Jews were identified as French rather than Algerian.
I'm not denying any of that history.
Look, without getting into the details, I think we can both agree that ultimately a clear majority of Arab Jews who believe that after having lived in these countries for centuries, if not millennia, came to the unfortunate conclusion that their situation had become untenable.
Um, I also think, um, that we can both agree that this had never been an issue prior to Zionism and the emergence of the state of Israel. Look, I'm, I'm not, didn't begin with Zionism in the Arab world. The issue is, is, is, is the point I raised, which is whether these communities had ever come to a collective conclusion that they're, position had become untenable in this part of the world.
No, they were Arab Jews.
It wasn't the Jews of England or the Soviet Jews. I think it's useful to refer to Zionists before 1948 and Israelis after 1948.
Yeah, from Morocco. Avishlaim from Iraq has written on this issue.
I think it's more complex than that. I think it was... Sorry, I interrupted you.
That's indisputable.
I'll make two points. The first is, you mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini and his collaboration with the Nazis. entirely legitimate point to raise, but I think one can also say definitively had Hajj Amin al-Husseini never existed, the Holocaust would have played out precisely as it did.
As far as Palestinian opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine during the 1930s is concerned, it was of a different character than, for example, British and American rejection of Jewish immigration. They just didn't want Jews on their soil. Objectively, it helped the Germans kill the Jews.
In the Palestinian case, their opposition to Jewish immigration was to prevent the transformation of their homeland into a Jewish state that would dispossess them. And I think that's an important distinction. make.
The other point I wanted to make is we've spent the past several hours talking about Zionism transfer and so on, but I think there's a more fundamental aspect to this, which is that Zionism, I think, would have emerged and disappeared as yet one more utopian political project, had it not been for the British, what the preeminent Palestinian historian, Waleed Khalidi, has termed the British shield.
Because I think without the British sponsorship, we wouldn't be having this discussion today. The British sponsored Zionism for a very simple reason, which is that during World War I, the Ottoman armies attempted to march on the Suez Canal. Suez Canal was the jugular vein of the British Empire between Europe and India. And the British came to the conclusion that they needed to
secure the Suez Canal from any threat. And as the British have done so often in so many places, how do you deal with this? Well, you bring in a foreign minority, implant them amongst a hostile population, and establish a protectorate over them. I don't think a Jewish state in Palestine had been part of British intentions. In the Balfour Declaration,
very specifically speaks about a Jewish national home in Palestine. In other words, a British protectorate. Things ended up taking a different course. And I think the most important development was World War II. And I think this had maybe less to do with the Holocaust and more to do with the effective bankruptcy of the United Kingdom during that war and its inability to sustain its global empire.
It ended up giving up India, ended up giving up Palestine. And it's in that context, I think, that we need to see the emergence of a of a Jewish state in Palestine. And again, a Jewish state means a state in which the Jewish community enjoys not only a demographic majority, but an uncontestable demographic majority, an uncontestable territorial hegemony, and an uncontestable political supremacy.
And that is also why after 1948, the nascent Israeli state confiscated, I believe, up to 90% of lands that had been previously owned by Palestinians who became citizens of Israel. It is why the new Israeli state imposed a military government on its population of Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966. It is why...
the Israeli state effectively reduced the Palestinians living within the Israeli state as citizens of the Israeli state to second-class citizens, on the one hand, promoting Jewish nationalism and Jewish nationalist parties, on the other hand, doing everything within its power to suppress and eliminate Palestinian or Arab nationalist movements. And that's why today there's a consensus
among all major human rights organizations, that Israel is an apartheid state. With the Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem describes a regime of Jewish supremacy between the river and the sea.
I'd like to respond to that. Speaking of propaganda, I find it simply impossible to accept that Balfour, who as British Prime Minister in 1905 was a chief sponsor of the Aliens Act, which was specifically designed to keep persecuted Eastern European Jews out of the streets of the UK, and who was denounced as an anti-Semite by the entire British Jewish establishment.
A decade later, all of a sudden... Changed his mind. People change their minds, but when the changing of the mind just coincidentally happens to coincide with the British imperial interest, I think perhaps the transformation is a little more superficial than he's being given credit for. It was clearly a...
British imperial venture, and if there had been no threat to the Suez Canal during World War I, regardless of what Balfour would have thought about the Jews and their contribution to history and their persecution and so on, there would have been no Balfour Declaration.
Well...
Yeah, in the 40s, yeah. And we're talking now about 1917. And as I mentioned earlier, I don't think the British had a Jewish state in mind. That's why they used the term Jewish national home. I think what they wanted was a British protectorate, loyal to and dependent upon the British.
I think an outstanding review of British policy towards these issues during the mandate has been done by Martin Bunton of the University of Victoria. And he basically makes the argument that once the British realized the mess they were in, certainly by the late 20s, early 30s, they recognized the mess they were in, the irreconcilable differences, and basically pursued a policy of just muddling on.
And muddling on in the context of British rule in Palestine, whose overall purpose was to serve for the development of Zionist institutions, Yeshuv's economy and so on, meant even if the British were not self-consciously doing this, preparing the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state. I don't know if that answers your question.
Yes, of course.
And if I may, just also one point. You mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini during... Well, entirely legitimate. But what I would also point out is that you had a Zionist organization, the Lehi. 300 people. 300 people, one of whom happened to become an Israeli prime minister, an Israeli foreign minister, a speaker of Israeli parliament.
Yitzhak Shamir proposing an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941. Shamir proposed? Well, no, the Lehi proposed. Some people in the Lehi proposed. Of which Shamir was a prominent leader. Yeah, but this is a red herring also. No, no. Okay, well, if he's a red herring, I'm sorry.
They approached the German emissary in Istanbul or something. Yes. And if I may... proposed an alliance with Nazi Germany on what the Leahy described as on the basis of shared ideological principles. Well, they said they did.
That's what they wanted. What did the agreement say? Well, that's what Haj Amin al-Husseini wanted also. That's what others in India and elsewhere.
Yes. And Hashemir called himself a terrorist. They were so irrelevant that their leader ended up being kicked upstairs to the leader of the Israeli parliament.
To the Israeli foreign minister.
You want to characterize him as irrelevant as well? Go ahead.
But if we're agreed that Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and actively sought their sponsorship, why is it irrelevant?
He probably wanted a lot of things. If that's relevant, why is it irrelevant That a prime minister of Israel... Not prime minister.
Do you consider it irrelevant that many years ago, Mahmoud Abbas wrote a doctoral thesis, which is basically tantamount... It showed something about Mahmoud Abbas.
Yes, but you consider that relevant.
I think that's a fair characterization of Mahmoud Abbas. But I didn't bring it up. I brought it up. Yeah. Okay. Because my question is, then why is Shamir's antecedency relevant?
That was the point. And I explained why I think that's not an entirely... accurate characterization. And then I wanted to make another point. If it's legitimate to bring up his role during World War II, why is it illegitimate to bring up a man who would become Israel's speaker of parliament, foreign minister? Yes. Why is it? And also- He was a young terrorist. And was also responsible for
for the murder of the United Nations' first international envoy, Bernadotti, Foki Bernadotti. Why is all that irrelevant?
Actually, Benny Morris made the specific claim that the Palestinians played an indirect role in the Holocaust.
And my response to that is, first of all, I disagree with that characterization.
That's what they did. And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe at the time. the only spot of land on earth?
What about your great friends in Britain, the architects of the Balfour Declaration?
And why are Palestinians, who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this? Why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe?
So that wasn't the only safe haven, but shouldn't you be focusing your anger and outrage?
And he happens to be the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. I cannot be responsible for them. You're not responsible for them, but it is relevant that he's the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. Unfortunately,
Yes, and he gets selected, not despite saying such things, but because he says such things.
You may well be right, but... Anyway, not to beat a dead horse, but I still don't understand. I'll just conclude by saying I don't understand why the Mufti of Jerusalem is relevant. He is relevant. He is relevant.
What can you do? I think we're speaking past each other. We're not.
1988, so it's from the 80s. I think your characterization of that charter as anti-Semitic is indisputable. I think your characterization of that charter is genocidal. is off the mark. And more importantly, that charter has been superseded by a new charter. There is no new charter.
2018, the Hamas charter, if we look at the current version of the charter... It's not a call to charter.
The only thing called the charter is what was issued in 1988 by Yassin himself. Anyway, it makes a clear distinction between Jews and Zionists in 2018. Now, you can choose to dismiss it, believe it, it's sincere, it's insincere, whatever.
Secondly, I'm really unfamiliar with fighters who consult these kinds of documents before they go on.
At the instruction of the Commissioner General of UNRWA, right? Right.
Secondly, you keep saying Jews, to which I would respond. They use the word Jews. To which I would respond that Hamas does not have a record of... deliberately targeting Jews who are not Israelis. And in fact, it also doesn't have a record of deliberately targeting either Jews or Israelis outside Israel and Palestine.
So, you know, all this talk of... Unlike the Hezbollah, which has targeted Jews outside Palestine. We're talking about October 7th in Hamas. If you'd also like to speak about Hezbollah, let's get to that separately, if you don't mind. Okay. So again, genocidal. Well, if that term is going to be discussed, my first response would be, let's talk about
potentially genocidal actions against Israelis rather than against Jews for the reasons that I just mentioned. And again, I find this constant conflation of Jews, Israel, Zionism to be a bit disturbing. Secondly, I think there are quite a few indications in the factual record that raise serious questions
about the accusations of the genocidal intent and genocidal practice of what happened on October 7th. And my final point would be, I don't think I should take your word for it. I don't think you should take my word for it. I think what we need here is a proper, independent, international investigation. And the reason we need that of genocide during this conflict, whether by...
Palestinians on October 7th or Israel thereafter. The reason that we need such an investigation is because there won't be any hearings on what Hamas did on October 7th at the International Court of Justice. because the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide deals only with states and not with movements.
I think the International Criminal Court, and specifically its current prosecutor, Karim Khan, lacks any and all credibility. He's been an absolute failure at his job. He's just been sitting on his backside for years on this file. And I think I would point out that Hamas has called for independent investigations of all these allegations.
Israel has categorically rejected any international investigation, of course, fully supported by the United States. And I think what is required is to have credible investigations of these things, because I don't think you're going to convince me. I don't think I'm going to convince you. And This is two people sitting across the table from each other.
If I understood your question correctly.
No, but let me explain why that's a difficult question to answer. The total number of civilians killed was 800, 850. We know that Hamas is responsible probably for the majority of those killings. We also know that there were killings by Islamic Jihad.
Do you know why the number went down? The number went down because the Israeli authorities were in possession of 200 corpses that were burned to a crisp that they assumed were Israelis who had been killed on October 7th. They later determined that these were in fact Palestinian fighters. Now, how does a Palestinian fighter get burned to a crisp?
And the reason is that a proportion of Israeli civilians killed on October 7th. I don't believe it was a majority. We don't know how many. Some were killed in crossfire. Some were killed by Israeli shell fire, helicopter fire, and so on. And the majority were killed by Palestinians. And of that majority, we don't know.
I mean, again, I understood your question is referring specifically to Hamas, which is why I tried to answer it that way. But if you meant generically Palestinians, yes. If you mean specifically Hamas, we don't have a clear breakdown of how many were- No, I don't mean specifically Hamas.
Well, Palestinians have the right to resistance. That right includes the right to armed resistance. At the same time, armed resistance is subject to the laws of war, and there are very clear regulations. that separate legitimate acts of armed resistance from acts of armed resistance that are not legitimate.
There's been almost exclusive focus on the attacks on civilian population centers and the killings of civilians on October 7th. What is much more much less discussed to the point of amnesia is that there were very extensive attacks on Israeli military and intelligence facilities on October 7th. I would make a very clear distinction between those two.
And secondly, I'm not sure that I would characterize the efforts by Palestinians on October 7th to seize Israeli territory and Israeli population centers as in and of themselves illegitimate.
No, no, that's not what I said.
I think what you had on October 7th was an effort by Hamas to seize Israeli territory and population centers. And kill civilians. That's not what I said.
What I said is I think I would not describe the effort to seize Israeli territory as in and of itself illegitimate, as a separate issue from the killing of Israeli civilians where in those cases where they had been deliberately targeted, that's very clearly illegitimate.
Again, I'm making a distinction here.
Well, I don't do selective condemnation.
You know what the issue is? I've been speaking in public now, I would say since the late 1980s and interviewed and so on. I have never on one occasion ever been asked to condemn any Israeli act. When I've been in group discussions, those supporting the Israeli action or perspective, I have never encountered an example where these individuals are asked to condemn what Israel is doing.
The demand and obligation of condemnation is exclusively applied And my personal experience over decades is exclusively applied to Palestinians.
Like taking land back. No, the point I was making was, what was Hamas trying to achieve militarily on October 7th? And I was pointing out that the focus has been very much on Hamas attacks on civilians and atrocities and so on. And I'm not saying those things should be ignored.
What I'm saying is that what's getting lost in the shuffle is that there were extensive attacks on military and intelligence facilities. And as far as the other aspects are concerned, because I think either you or Lex asked me about the legitimacy of these attacks, I said I'm unclear whether
efforts by Hamas to seize Israeli population centers in and of themselves are illegitimate as opposed to actions that either deliberately targeted Israeli civilians or actions that should reasonably have been expected to result in the killings of Israeli civilians. Those strike me as by definition illegitimate. And I want to be very clear about that. I have- Illegitimate means you condemn them.
Illegitimate means they are not legitimate. I have a problem- Condemning your side, yes. No, not condemning my side. I have a problem with selective outrage, and I have a problem with selective condemnation. And as I explained to you a few minutes ago- In my decades of appearing in public and being interviewed, I have never been asked to condemn an Israeli action.
I've never been asked for a moral judgment on an Israeli action. Exclusive request for condemnation has to do with what Palestinianism, and just as importantly, I'm sure if you watch BBC or CNN, when is the last time an Israeli spokesperson has been asked to condemn an Israeli act? I've never seen it.
No, but now that we're talking about Israeli victims, all of a sudden morality is central.
Sorry, if I can interrupt you. In 1948, the entire world stood behind the establishment of a Jewish state in the entire world.
Okay, but I think you know what I mean by that.
I don't think there's a maybe there at the
By accepting the Oslo Agreement.