Philips Payson O’Brien

Es kommt alles unter den gleichen Plan von Lendley. Was es ermöglicht, ist, Roosevelt zu erlauben, den USA-Alliierten fast alles, was er will, zu geben. So he can provide them any kind of military commitment or non-military in the sense he can provide aluminum. He can provide economic resources that if he is as president decides this is in the US interest.

Es kommt alles unter den gleichen Plan von Lendley. Was es ermöglicht, ist, Roosevelt zu erlauben, den USA-Alliierten fast alles, was er will, zu geben. So he can provide them any kind of military commitment or non-military in the sense he can provide aluminum. He can provide economic resources that if he is as president decides this is in the US interest.

So it's like, I don't want to say he has carte blanche because he couldn't like hand over the atomic secrets, but he can hand over pretty much any military good that he wants to to help the Soviet Union.

So it's like, I don't want to say he has carte blanche because he couldn't like hand over the atomic secrets, but he can hand over pretty much any military good that he wants to to help the Soviet Union.

Well, that wasn't the plan, though. The plan was that Roosevelt was going to stay in the US consulate and Stalin was going to stay in the Soviet Union. The Soviets had a very big compound. But what happens is Stalin, I hope, wants to bring Roosevelt into his orbit.

Well, that wasn't the plan, though. The plan was that Roosevelt was going to stay in the US consulate and Stalin was going to stay in the Soviet Union. The Soviets had a very big compound. But what happens is Stalin, I hope, wants to bring Roosevelt into his orbit.

And what happens is when Roosevelt gets there, the Soviets say, well, we have reports that there's going to be an assassination attempt on you as you travel between the two places. So why don't you come stay with us? And Roosevelt, I think, is quite skeptical of the reality. I think they understand that this might be a ploy by Stalin.

And what happens is when Roosevelt gets there, the Soviets say, well, we have reports that there's going to be an assassination attempt on you as you travel between the two places. So why don't you come stay with us? And Roosevelt, I think, is quite skeptical of the reality. I think they understand that this might be a ploy by Stalin.

But to show how trusting he is and how much he wants the relationship to work, he agrees. And he could only bring two people with him. So he could only bring his two closest advisors, or Harry Hopkins and Bill Leahy. They're the only ones allowed to live with Roosevelt.

But to show how trusting he is and how much he wants the relationship to work, he agrees. And he could only bring two people with him. So he could only bring his two closest advisors, or Harry Hopkins and Bill Leahy. They're the only ones allowed to live with Roosevelt.

And by the way, this is an extraordinary moment, because the President of the United States is basically a prisoner of the Soviet Union. Because he's living in a Soviet compound, which is patrolled overwhelmingly by Soviet soldiers, who could have taken the President hostage at any time, had they wanted to.

And by the way, this is an extraordinary moment, because the President of the United States is basically a prisoner of the Soviet Union. Because he's living in a Soviet compound, which is patrolled overwhelmingly by Soviet soldiers, who could have taken the President hostage at any time, had they wanted to.

Und Roosevelt hat seine Freiheit an Stalin übergeben als Zeichen von, guck, ich vertraue dir wirklich und ich will mit dir zusammenkommen. Aber ich glaube nicht, dass man manchmal merkt, dass es nur eine dramatische Sache war, dass er seine Person in der Sowjetunion übergeben hat, in einer Weise, in der kein anderer Amerikaner seit oder vorher an der Reise eines anderen Außenstaates war.

Und Roosevelt hat seine Freiheit an Stalin übergeben als Zeichen von, guck, ich vertraue dir wirklich und ich will mit dir zusammenkommen. Aber ich glaube nicht, dass man manchmal merkt, dass es nur eine dramatische Sache war, dass er seine Person in der Sowjetunion übergeben hat, in einer Weise, in der kein anderer Amerikaner seit oder vorher an der Reise eines anderen Außenstaates war.

Es ist nur ein paar Tage, ich glaube es sind etwa vier Tage.

Es ist nur ein paar Tage, ich glaube es sind etwa vier Tage.

Anders als Yalta, ein paar Jahre später, geht es darum, wie die Welt nach dem Krieg sein wird. Die Teheran-Konferenz ist darum, wie sie den Krieg gewinnen werden. Es geht darum, wie wir den Krieg zu einer erfolgreichen Schlussfolgerung sehen werden.

Anders als Yalta, ein paar Jahre später, geht es darum, wie die Welt nach dem Krieg sein wird. Die Teheran-Konferenz ist darum, wie sie den Krieg gewinnen werden. Es geht darum, wie wir den Krieg zu einer erfolgreichen Schlussfolgerung sehen werden.

Die große Entscheidung, die sie machen müssen, und das ist eine, die Churchill auch da ist, aber Churchill bleibt nicht im sowjetischen Komponenten, das ist auch eine interessante Unterschiede, dass die große Entscheidung, die sie machen, ist die Invasion von Europa 1944. Und das, übrigens, erlaubt Roosevelt und Stalin, gegen Churchill zu verbinden. Churchill will Frankreich nicht invadieren.

Die große Entscheidung, die sie machen müssen, und das ist eine, die Churchill auch da ist, aber Churchill bleibt nicht im sowjetischen Komponenten, das ist auch eine interessante Unterschiede, dass die große Entscheidung, die sie machen, ist die Invasion von Europa 1944. Und das, übrigens, erlaubt Roosevelt und Stalin, gegen Churchill zu verbinden. Churchill will Frankreich nicht invadieren.

Er will nicht, was wir als D-Day kennen. Für ihn ist das zu blutig, dass Britannien keine Soldaten für diese Operation haben. Viel besser, es nicht zu tun und in der Mediterranen zu kämpfen, ist Churchills Ansicht. Aber Roosevelt will D-Day in 1944 machen. Stalin will D-Day passieren.

Er will nicht, was wir als D-Day kennen. Für ihn ist das zu blutig, dass Britannien keine Soldaten für diese Operation haben. Viel besser, es nicht zu tun und in der Mediterranen zu kämpfen, ist Churchills Ansicht. Aber Roosevelt will D-Day in 1944 machen. Stalin will D-Day passieren.

So really what happens is Stalin and Roosevelt gang up on Churchill at Tehran and forced Churchill to accept D-Day in 1944. So a lot of the discussions are about this.

So really what happens is Stalin and Roosevelt gang up on Churchill at Tehran and forced Churchill to accept D-Day in 1944. So a lot of the discussions are about this.

Oh, also, I mean, basically the US had been trying to bash Churchill's head in on D-Day for all of 1943. So there had been a series of conferences before that just between Roosevelt and Churchill in Washington and Quebec. And in those, Roosevelt's always pushing D-Day and Churchill's always resisting. But when Stalin's there, there's nothing Churchill can really do, because it's two against one.

Oh, also, I mean, basically the US had been trying to bash Churchill's head in on D-Day for all of 1943. So there had been a series of conferences before that just between Roosevelt and Churchill in Washington and Quebec. And in those, Roosevelt's always pushing D-Day and Churchill's always resisting. But when Stalin's there, there's nothing Churchill can really do, because it's two against one.

Well, certainly there's both the formal sessions, from which we have different sets of minutes, which are like formal conferences. You sit around a round table, a big group, and you'll propose issues and talk about it. And then there are the informal meetings. So the first time that Stalin and Roosevelt meet, it's actually an informal meeting.

Well, certainly there's both the formal sessions, from which we have different sets of minutes, which are like formal conferences. You sit around a round table, a big group, and you'll propose issues and talk about it. And then there are the informal meetings. So the first time that Stalin and Roosevelt meet, it's actually an informal meeting.

So when Roosevelt moves into the Soviet compound, Stalin comes over and pays him a visit. Crucially, Churchill is not there. So it is just Stalin, Roosevelt and their interpreters, because Stalin didn't speak English and Roosevelt didn't speak Russian or at least their linguistic abilities were not such that they could communicate with each other. So it's just the two men and their interpreters.

So when Roosevelt moves into the Soviet compound, Stalin comes over and pays him a visit. Crucially, Churchill is not there. So it is just Stalin, Roosevelt and their interpreters, because Stalin didn't speak English and Roosevelt didn't speak Russian or at least their linguistic abilities were not such that they could communicate with each other. So it's just the two men and their interpreters.

Und sie haben eine sehr freundliche, Roosevelt, man könnte sagen, freundliche Diskussion. Roosevelt versucht wirklich zu zeigen, wie er in Stalin kommt. Und was Roosevelt macht, ich denke, Churchill wäre begeistert gewesen, ist, dass Roosevelt sagt, oh, du weißt, ich hasse europäische Empires. Ich bin ein bisschen wie du, Joe.

Und sie haben eine sehr freundliche, Roosevelt, man könnte sagen, freundliche Diskussion. Roosevelt versucht wirklich zu zeigen, wie er in Stalin kommt. Und was Roosevelt macht, ich denke, Churchill wäre begeistert gewesen, ist, dass Roosevelt sagt, oh, du weißt, ich hasse europäische Empires. Ich bin ein bisschen wie du, Joe.

Wir sehen die Welt in der gleichen Weise, nicht wie diese schrecklichen britischen und französischen Imperialisten. Und so geht es.

Wir sehen die Welt in der gleichen Weise, nicht wie diese schrecklichen britischen und französischen Imperialisten. Und so geht es.

Oh, I mean, Poland in many ways becomes the emotive issue. By 1945, it's Das ist das wichtigste Thema zwischen Stalin und Roosevelt. Und es geht um so viele verschiedene Dinge zurück. Stalin hat den Nazi-Sowjet-Pakt mit Hitler gegründet, um Polen zu zerstören. Sein erster Schritt gegen Polen ist es, es zu zerstören und so viel Polen für die Sowjetunion wie möglich zu nehmen.

Oh, I mean, Poland in many ways becomes the emotive issue. By 1945, it's Das ist das wichtigste Thema zwischen Stalin und Roosevelt. Und es geht um so viele verschiedene Dinge zurück. Stalin hat den Nazi-Sowjet-Pakt mit Hitler gegründet, um Polen zu zerstören. Sein erster Schritt gegen Polen ist es, es zu zerstören und so viel Polen für die Sowjetunion wie möglich zu nehmen.

Während Roosevelt den vor der Kriegszeit polnischen Regierung erkennt, die Hitler invadiert hat und Stalin mit ihm übernommen hat. Roosevelt at this point is still trying to work, you know, formally recognize the London government, which is the successor of the state Stalin puts up.

Während Roosevelt den vor der Kriegszeit polnischen Regierung erkennt, die Hitler invadiert hat und Stalin mit ihm übernommen hat. Roosevelt at this point is still trying to work, you know, formally recognize the London government, which is the successor of the state Stalin puts up.

So they have this difference in 1943, certainly about who they're going to recognize, as what happens, of course, is that Stalin ends up occupying Poland. with the Red Army and that gives him as the war goes on the lion's share of the say of what's going to happen so that Roosevelt can ask or beg even to try and have some kind of concessions about Poland but ultimately it's up to Stalin

So they have this difference in 1943, certainly about who they're going to recognize, as what happens, of course, is that Stalin ends up occupying Poland. with the Red Army and that gives him as the war goes on the lion's share of the say of what's going to happen so that Roosevelt can ask or beg even to try and have some kind of concessions about Poland but ultimately it's up to Stalin

Ich meine, ja, der große Unterschied ist, Roosevelt zwischen dem Ende von Teheran und dem Anfang von Yalta geht von jemandem, der immer noch Vibranz und Kraft hat und die Möglichkeit, dynamisch zu sein, zu einem sterbenden Mann. Ja. In Februar 1945 ist er klar sterbend. Ich meine, die Leute sind überrascht, wenn sie ihn nicht schon lange gesehen haben. Er ist viel, viel dünner. Ja.

Ich meine, ja, der große Unterschied ist, Roosevelt zwischen dem Ende von Teheran und dem Anfang von Yalta geht von jemandem, der immer noch Vibranz und Kraft hat und die Möglichkeit, dynamisch zu sein, zu einem sterbenden Mann. Ja. In Februar 1945 ist er klar sterbend. Ich meine, die Leute sind überrascht, wenn sie ihn nicht schon lange gesehen haben. Er ist viel, viel dünner. Ja.

Und Stalin, natürlich, fühlt das und versteht es. Ich wundere, wie viel er für ihn schlecht fühlte oder ob die Möglichkeit da war, ihm vorzunehmen. Stalin hat viele seiner besten Freunde getötet. Könnte Stalin für irgendeine Menschheit schlecht fühlen? Ich denke nicht, dass er so viel Empathie hatte.

Und Stalin, natürlich, fühlt das und versteht es. Ich wundere, wie viel er für ihn schlecht fühlte oder ob die Möglichkeit da war, ihm vorzunehmen. Stalin hat viele seiner besten Freunde getötet. Könnte Stalin für irgendeine Menschheit schlecht fühlen? Ich denke nicht, dass er so viel Empathie hatte.

In vielen Fällen überreakt er zu diesem Thema, weil er Roosevelt verletzt.

In vielen Fällen überreakt er zu diesem Thema, weil er Roosevelt verletzt.

Also er, besonders in Polen, ich meine, Polen ist das Problem, es kommt viel in Yalta.

Also er, besonders in Polen, ich meine, Polen ist das Problem, es kommt viel in Yalta.

Also sie kommen eigentlich ziemlich gut zusammen, außer in Polen.

Also sie kommen eigentlich ziemlich gut zusammen, außer in Polen.

In the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union.

Stalin occupies it now. I mean, we're talking February 1945. The Red Army occupies all of Poland. I mean, it's on the Oder River. It's not far from Berlin at this point. And so what is going to happen in Poland will be determined by the Red Army. And Stalin controls the Red Army. And that's simply the reality of it. Now, what Roosevelt is doing is partly acknowledging that.

Stalin occupies it now. I mean, we're talking February 1945. The Red Army occupies all of Poland. I mean, it's on the Oder River. It's not far from Berlin at this point. And so what is going to happen in Poland will be determined by the Red Army. And Stalin controls the Red Army. And that's simply the reality of it. Now, what Roosevelt is doing is partly acknowledging that.

That Roosevelt knows that Stalin is going to have the lion's share of the say in what happens in Poland. But what he's desperate to do is get some kind of concessions so that he can go to the American people. Look, pre-war or democratic elements still are going to have a say in Poland. It's not just going to be a Soviet-dominated communist state.

That Roosevelt knows that Stalin is going to have the lion's share of the say in what happens in Poland. But what he's desperate to do is get some kind of concessions so that he can go to the American people. Look, pre-war or democratic elements still are going to have a say in Poland. It's not just going to be a Soviet-dominated communist state.

It will have some of the earlier, not, pre-war Poland wasn't democratic, but at least it would be a national identity that wasn't communist. So he keeps asking Stalin, look, can you include some elements in the government of Poland that aren't communist? And Stalin really fobs him off, fobs him off. Eventually he agrees to...

It will have some of the earlier, not, pre-war Poland wasn't democratic, but at least it would be a national identity that wasn't communist. So he keeps asking Stalin, look, can you include some elements in the government of Poland that aren't communist? And Stalin really fobs him off, fobs him off. Eventually he agrees to...

indefinite statement that there will be quote unquote democratic elements in the polish government but of course stalin believes the soviet union is democratic so he's really making no concession whatsoever but roosevelt tries and tries and eventually roosevelt gives up and he says at the end of it i'm i'm simply too tired bill to bill lehi wow are they already talking about carving up germany is that part of the plan well that becomes i think more formalized in yalta

indefinite statement that there will be quote unquote democratic elements in the polish government but of course stalin believes the soviet union is democratic so he's really making no concession whatsoever but roosevelt tries and tries and eventually roosevelt gives up and he says at the end of it i'm i'm simply too tired bill to bill lehi wow are they already talking about carving up germany is that part of the plan well that becomes i think more formalized in yalta

There had always been a question of occupation zones, which is what they're talking about. I mean, they're not talking in 1945 of two Germanys. So the idea of a East and West Germany as separate states is not actually on the agenda in 1945. The big question are the occupation zones.

There had always been a question of occupation zones, which is what they're talking about. I mean, they're not talking in 1945 of two Germanys. So the idea of a East and West Germany as separate states is not actually on the agenda in 1945. The big question are the occupation zones.

Because actually both of them, both the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the way, Britain, have a certain interest in at least keeping the core of Germany united. Das, was die Sowjets wollen, natürlich wissen sie, dass die meiste West-Germany unter britisch-amerikanischen Regeln kommen wird. Und zum Beispiel ist West-Germany der industriell reiche Teil des Landes.

Because actually both of them, both the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the way, Britain, have a certain interest in at least keeping the core of Germany united. Das, was die Sowjets wollen, natürlich wissen sie, dass die meiste West-Germany unter britisch-amerikanischen Regeln kommen wird. Und zum Beispiel ist West-Germany der industriell reiche Teil des Landes.

Also, wenn Deutschland tatsächlich in zwei Länder geteilt wird, ist das nicht großartig für die Sowjetunion, weil sie den Osten bekommen. Und deshalb wollen sie, sie würden lieber Deutschland unabhängig, aber schwach halten, wo sie ein Verhältnis in der ganzen Sache haben können.

Also, wenn Deutschland tatsächlich in zwei Länder geteilt wird, ist das nicht großartig für die Sowjetunion, weil sie den Osten bekommen. Und deshalb wollen sie, sie würden lieber Deutschland unabhängig, aber schwach halten, wo sie ein Verhältnis in der ganzen Sache haben können.

And what happens is therefore you end up in this bit of this dance about occupation zones, where the occupation zones are going to be, but they are not talking about two separate countries at that point.

And what happens is therefore you end up in this bit of this dance about occupation zones, where the occupation zones are going to be, but they are not talking about two separate countries at that point.

Stalin is one of those things that he can make concessions on because he just doesn't care. Yeah. And it's one of the Roosevelt cares. And he really believes the United Nations is important. And he's trying to set up an international body that will work. In seiner Meinung ist es wichtig, dass es anders ist als in der League of Nations, die gefehlt hat, aber er glaubt, dass es Versprechen gibt.

Stalin is one of those things that he can make concessions on because he just doesn't care. Yeah. And it's one of the Roosevelt cares. And he really believes the United Nations is important. And he's trying to set up an international body that will work. In seiner Meinung ist es wichtig, dass es anders ist als in der League of Nations, die gefehlt hat, aber er glaubt, dass es Versprechen gibt.

Für Stalin ist das ein bisschen schmerzhaft. Und wie er gesagt hat, brauchen wir nicht einen internationalen Körper. Wir brauchen die großen Kräfte, die das tun, was wir tun, sitzen an einer Table hier und entscheiden. Ich meine, die echten Fragen werden in seiner Meinung nie von der Vereinigten Nation beschlossen werden.

Für Stalin ist das ein bisschen schmerzhaft. Und wie er gesagt hat, brauchen wir nicht einen internationalen Körper. Wir brauchen die großen Kräfte, die das tun, was wir tun, sitzen an einer Table hier und entscheiden. Ich meine, die echten Fragen werden in seiner Meinung nie von der Vereinigten Nation beschlossen werden.

Sie werden von Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill beschlossen, sitzen an einer Table und dividieren den Welt. So Stalin is a bit confused as to why Roosevelt cares so much about it. And on the other hand, it allows him to make some concessions to Roosevelt and seem like he's being cooperative, even when he's a bit confused as to why it's become so key to the Roosevelt agenda.

Sie werden von Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill beschlossen, sitzen an einer Table und dividieren den Welt. So Stalin is a bit confused as to why Roosevelt cares so much about it. And on the other hand, it allows him to make some concessions to Roosevelt and seem like he's being cooperative, even when he's a bit confused as to why it's become so key to the Roosevelt agenda.

Stalin hat eine sehr klare Agenda, die ist, mit Japan aus der Kriegskrise zu bleiben, bis Deutschland verletzt wird. Und dann versucht, so viel Asien wie er kann, wenn Hitler in seinem Graben sicher ist. Dann wird er in die Kriegskrise einsteigen. Und so ist es ein Problem, weil die USA früher auf Stalin gezwungen haben, in die Kriegskrise zu einsteigen gegen Japan.

Stalin hat eine sehr klare Agenda, die ist, mit Japan aus der Kriegskrise zu bleiben, bis Deutschland verletzt wird. Und dann versucht, so viel Asien wie er kann, wenn Hitler in seinem Graben sicher ist. Dann wird er in die Kriegskrise einsteigen. Und so ist es ein Problem, weil die USA früher auf Stalin gezwungen haben, in die Kriegskrise zu einsteigen gegen Japan.

And Stalin had always been resisting, saying, look, I can't, I have to throw everything against the German army, but I will join, I promise you, I will join the war later. I don't think when these original promises are made, the United States thought Japan would be as close to defeat as it was in 1945.

And Stalin had always been resisting, saying, look, I can't, I have to throw everything against the German army, but I will join, I promise you, I will join the war later. I don't think when these original promises are made, the United States thought Japan would be as close to defeat as it was in 1945.

So really, by this point, the US is saying, we don't need the Soviet Union, we don't need Stalin, but they don't want to turn around and say that to him. Because they had been asking him to join for, you know, 42, 43. So that's the problem. Stalin sort of hoists the US on its own petard. So he can make it look like he's being magnanimous.

So really, by this point, the US is saying, we don't need the Soviet Union, we don't need Stalin, but they don't want to turn around and say that to him. Because they had been asking him to join for, you know, 42, 43. So that's the problem. Stalin sort of hoists the US on its own petard. So he can make it look like he's being magnanimous.

Yes, I will join the war within three months of it ending in Europe. I'll join the war against Japan. And at this point, the US, the people around Roosevelt would say, we really don't need you. But they can't say no, because they'd been asking it.

Yes, I will join the war within three months of it ending in Europe. I'll join the war against Japan. And at this point, the US, the people around Roosevelt would say, we really don't need you. But they can't say no, because they'd been asking it.

He couldn't have not died. I mean, he could have died in Yalta. Roosevelt was going to die. He was in such bad shape. And the amazing thing is actually that he runs for re-election in 1944. Es ist unglaublich, wie furchtbar es ist. Es ist furchtbar. People on the whole treat FDR, I think, quite gently. And I think FDR had a number of very positive aspects as a war leader.

He couldn't have not died. I mean, he could have died in Yalta. Roosevelt was going to die. He was in such bad shape. And the amazing thing is actually that he runs for re-election in 1944. Es ist unglaublich, wie furchtbar es ist. Es ist furchtbar. People on the whole treat FDR, I think, quite gently. And I think FDR had a number of very positive aspects as a war leader.

But his decision to run for re-election in 1944 is super hubris and it's irresponsible. Because not only does he decide to run for re-election with no prospect of living out the term, he chooses his vice president, someone he doesn't like and doesn't talk to. So he chooses Truman and then he spends no time preparing Truman for the presidency. Exactly.

But his decision to run for re-election in 1944 is super hubris and it's irresponsible. Because not only does he decide to run for re-election with no prospect of living out the term, he chooses his vice president, someone he doesn't like and doesn't talk to. So he chooses Truman and then he spends no time preparing Truman for the presidency. Exactly.

He chooses Truman entirely for political reasons and he basically is sort of saying, if I die, okay, well then, you know, that's it. I don't care. And that's what happened. Truman is not prepared because Roosevelt doesn't do anything to help him get ready.

He chooses Truman entirely for political reasons and he basically is sort of saying, if I die, okay, well then, you know, that's it. I don't care. And that's what happened. Truman is not prepared because Roosevelt doesn't do anything to help him get ready.

Yeah, basically I do a lot of writing on my substack, which is just Philips' newsletter substack. So that's where I write a lot about geopolitics and military history. Excellent. Thanks, Philips. Thanks for having me.

Yeah, basically I do a lot of writing on my substack, which is just Philips' newsletter substack. So that's where I write a lot about geopolitics and military history. Excellent. Thanks, Philips. Thanks for having me.

Thanks for having me, Don. Glad to be here.

Thanks for having me, Don. Glad to be here.

Well, what Roosevelt's been trying to do since Pearl Harbor, really, is to set up a personal meeting with Stalin. So once they become formal allies, which, I mean, in some ways they become informal allies from the moment Hitler invades. So that Roosevelt sends Harry Hopkins to meet with Stalin and to set up getting USAID.

Well, what Roosevelt's been trying to do since Pearl Harbor, really, is to set up a personal meeting with Stalin. So once they become formal allies, which, I mean, in some ways they become informal allies from the moment Hitler invades. So that Roosevelt sends Harry Hopkins to meet with Stalin and to set up getting USAID.

But really, they become formal allies in the war against Hitler in December 1941, when Germany and the United States go to war. Roosevelt has been very keen to have a meeting with Stalin. Roosevelt believes in personal relationships. He believes he is personally important to not only winning the war, but setting up a sort of a post-war world that will work.

But really, they become formal allies in the war against Hitler in December 1941, when Germany and the United States go to war. Roosevelt has been very keen to have a meeting with Stalin. Roosevelt believes in personal relationships. He believes he is personally important to not only winning the war, but setting up a sort of a post-war world that will work.

Und so was er versucht zu tun, ist in vielen Fällen, Stalin zu ermutigen. Ich meine, Roosevelt ist ein sehr ermutigender Mann. Ja. Viele Leute werden von Roosevelt gewonnen und dann glauben sie, sie seien Roosevelt's Freunde. Er hatte einen Weg, dich zu machen, dass er dich liebte. Ich würde viel mehr argumentieren, als er es wirklich tat. Did Stalin feel the same way?

Und so was er versucht zu tun, ist in vielen Fällen, Stalin zu ermutigen. Ich meine, Roosevelt ist ein sehr ermutigender Mann. Ja. Viele Leute werden von Roosevelt gewonnen und dann glauben sie, sie seien Roosevelt's Freunde. Er hatte einen Weg, dich zu machen, dass er dich liebte. Ich würde viel mehr argumentieren, als er es wirklich tat. Did Stalin feel the same way?

Is there any record of that? No, I don't think he did. I think there's two interesting things about Stalin. One, he was actually very respectful and a little nervous to meet Roosevelt. Stalin, I think, understood the power balance. He understood the United States was extremely powerful in the world in 1942, 3, 4 and 5.

Is there any record of that? No, I don't think he did. I think there's two interesting things about Stalin. One, he was actually very respectful and a little nervous to meet Roosevelt. Stalin, I think, understood the power balance. He understood the United States was extremely powerful in the world in 1942, 3, 4 and 5.

und dass der amerikanische Macht etwas war, mit dem er leben musste, und dass Roosevelt der Exemplar des amerikanischen Machts war. Er war für so lange Präsident, weniger als jeder Mensch in der Geschichte. Ich denke, es gab diese grundlegende, man könnte sagen, Respekt und eine kleine Nervosität.

und dass der amerikanische Macht etwas war, mit dem er leben musste, und dass Roosevelt der Exemplar des amerikanischen Machts war. Er war für so lange Präsident, weniger als jeder Mensch in der Geschichte. Ich denke, es gab diese grundlegende, man könnte sagen, Respekt und eine kleine Nervosität.

Die erste Zeit, als sie sich tatsächlich treffen, ist Stalin sehr nervös darüber, den Tisch richtig zu setzen für ein formelles Event. Die andere Sache ist, dass er sich überrascht bleibt. That Stalin is in some ways acting throughout the Second World War as being more friendly towards the United States and the United Kingdom than he really was.

Die erste Zeit, als sie sich tatsächlich treffen, ist Stalin sehr nervös darüber, den Tisch richtig zu setzen für ein formelles Event. Die andere Sache ist, dass er sich überrascht bleibt. That Stalin is in some ways acting throughout the Second World War as being more friendly towards the United States and the United Kingdom than he really was.

That he hadn't gotten over and changed his basic ideological outlook that capitalism and communism were not going to be long-term friends. And so he was always playing a bit of a role of, I don't want to say a false friend, but you'd say a temporary friend. Ja, sie waren in seinem Geist Allies, um den Krieg zu gewinnen.

That he hadn't gotten over and changed his basic ideological outlook that capitalism and communism were not going to be long-term friends. And so he was always playing a bit of a role of, I don't want to say a false friend, but you'd say a temporary friend. Ja, sie waren in seinem Geist Allies, um den Krieg zu gewinnen.

Yeah, I mean, he knows. I mean, he knows as much as people can know about it without being there. But on the other hand, I think what Roosevelt, this is what Roosevelt's not an ideological man. And I think that's an important thing to understand about him. He is a practical politician. In many ways, the New Deal is not ideologically motivated, it's practically motivated. He's just trying things.

Yeah, I mean, he knows. I mean, he knows as much as people can know about it without being there. But on the other hand, I think what Roosevelt, this is what Roosevelt's not an ideological man. And I think that's an important thing to understand about him. He is a practical politician. In many ways, the New Deal is not ideologically motivated, it's practically motivated. He's just trying things.

And when it comes to dealing with Stalin, because he views Stalin, Stalin has been bloody, Stalin has been brutal, but heck, that's what happens in the 1930s. You have Nazi Germany, you have the Soviet Union, you have Imperial Japan. By the way, he's no fan of the British Empire, which he also believes can be very brutal.

And when it comes to dealing with Stalin, because he views Stalin, Stalin has been bloody, Stalin has been brutal, but heck, that's what happens in the 1930s. You have Nazi Germany, you have the Soviet Union, you have Imperial Japan. By the way, he's no fan of the British Empire, which he also believes can be very brutal.

So I think he views Stalin as pretty tough and pretty brutal, but not someone with whom he can't deal.

So I think he views Stalin as pretty tough and pretty brutal, but not someone with whom he can't deal.

Well, there certainly was sympathy for the Soviet Union, particularly in the left wing of the Democratic Party. And Roosevelt is a Democrat and he is desperate to keep the party together. In the 20s, when the Republicans are in power, they're not going to recognize the Soviet Union. However, the Democrats have at least an element of their party that is more sympathetic. They're not communists.

Well, there certainly was sympathy for the Soviet Union, particularly in the left wing of the Democratic Party. And Roosevelt is a Democrat and he is desperate to keep the party together. In the 20s, when the Republicans are in power, they're not going to recognize the Soviet Union. However, the Democrats have at least an element of their party that is more sympathetic. They're not communists.

And I think we need to be very careful about you calling people in the Democratic Party communists. They're not. But they are sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. They want good relations. Roosevelt's Vice President in his third term, Henry Wallace, who was Vice President in the time of Casablanca and Cairo and Tehran, is pacifist. Er ist sehr sympathisch mit der Sowjetunion.

And I think we need to be very careful about you calling people in the Democratic Party communists. They're not. But they are sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. They want good relations. Roosevelt's Vice President in his third term, Henry Wallace, who was Vice President in the time of Casablanca and Cairo and Tehran, is pacifist. Er ist sehr sympathisch mit der Sowjetunion.

Roosevelt ist auf der linken Seite der Partei. Er hat eine sehr gute Beziehung zu Stalin und der Sowjetunion. Jemand wie Harry Hopkins, auf den Roosevelt wirklich verlangt. Und Hopkins ist eine unglaublich starke Figur von 1938, 1939 bis 1943. Er ist auch sehr sympathisch mit Stalin und der Sowjetunion. Roosevelt hört von einer Seite seines Partei, Ja, aber Sie benutzen das Wort pragmatisch.

Roosevelt ist auf der linken Seite der Partei. Er hat eine sehr gute Beziehung zu Stalin und der Sowjetunion. Jemand wie Harry Hopkins, auf den Roosevelt wirklich verlangt. Und Hopkins ist eine unglaublich starke Figur von 1938, 1939 bis 1943. Er ist auch sehr sympathisch mit Stalin und der Sowjetunion. Roosevelt hört von einer Seite seines Partei, Ja, aber Sie benutzen das Wort pragmatisch.

But Roosevelt always did it. When he recognizes the Soviet Union in 1933, this is while the Ukrainian famine is going on.

But Roosevelt always did it. When he recognizes the Soviet Union in 1933, this is while the Ukrainian famine is going on.

Ja, ich meine, er glaubt, dass der Deal wert ist, dass wir mit brutalen Ländern leben müssen. Er macht keinen Hinweis auf den ukrainischen Verbrechen, auch wenn es aufgehört ist und Millionen von Menschen sterben. Für Roosevelt, denke ich, sind das die Schmerzen der modernen Welt und sie werden damit leben müssen.

Ja, ich meine, er glaubt, dass der Deal wert ist, dass wir mit brutalen Ländern leben müssen. Er macht keinen Hinweis auf den ukrainischen Verbrechen, auch wenn es aufgehört ist und Millionen von Menschen sterben. Für Roosevelt, denke ich, sind das die Schmerzen der modernen Welt und sie werden damit leben müssen.

Well, what he did, I mean, if you remember, Roosevelt had had his career as an aristocrat, an elite. He had been making international trips since he was a young boy. His father used to like to go to Germany to spa. His father was a bit of a hypochondriac. And so he would drag Franklin across the Atlantic every, not every summer, but many summers to go to these spas.

Well, what he did, I mean, if you remember, Roosevelt had had his career as an aristocrat, an elite. He had been making international trips since he was a young boy. His father used to like to go to Germany to spa. His father was a bit of a hypochondriac. And so he would drag Franklin across the Atlantic every, not every summer, but many summers to go to these spas.

So Roosevelt was used to international travel. He had done a lot of international travel during the First World War. He had represented the United States as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. By the way, what he learns from the First World War is a very healthy respect of German power, which is why he is always more afraid of Hitler than Stalin.

So Roosevelt was used to international travel. He had done a lot of international travel during the First World War. He had represented the United States as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. By the way, what he learns from the First World War is a very healthy respect of German power, which is why he is always more afraid of Hitler than Stalin.

And one of the reasons I would argue he's more afraid of Hitler and Nazi Germany is that he really believes Germany is a threat. Germany almost wins the First World War and Russia loses it. And I think he never gets beyond that. And that has that imprint that Nazi Germany is always more of a threat to the United States in his mind than the Soviet Union.

And one of the reasons I would argue he's more afraid of Hitler and Nazi Germany is that he really believes Germany is a threat. Germany almost wins the First World War and Russia loses it. And I think he never gets beyond that. And that has that imprint that Nazi Germany is always more of a threat to the United States in his mind than the Soviet Union.

Well, Tehran is a fascinating sign of how desperate Roosevelt is to meet Stalin. Where is Tehran? It's just over the border from the Soviet Union in Iran. It's actually not very far for Stalin to go. It really is close. It's about as close as one can go and leave the Soviet Union. Whereas for Roosevelt, it's a trip around the world.

Well, Tehran is a fascinating sign of how desperate Roosevelt is to meet Stalin. Where is Tehran? It's just over the border from the Soviet Union in Iran. It's actually not very far for Stalin to go. It really is close. It's about as close as one can go and leave the Soviet Union. Whereas for Roosevelt, it's a trip around the world.

dass er aus Washington nach Ägypten fliegt und dann nach Teheran fliegt. Es ist eine lange, lange Reise. Und Roosevelt macht das, weil das der einzige Weg ist, wie Stalin sich treffen wird. Stalin sagt wirklich, ich kann nicht reisen. Stalin ist, übrigens, Angst vor dem Reisen. Er ist Angst vor dem Fliegen. So he really doesn't want to travel far.

dass er aus Washington nach Ägypten fliegt und dann nach Teheran fliegt. Es ist eine lange, lange Reise. Und Roosevelt macht das, weil das der einzige Weg ist, wie Stalin sich treffen wird. Stalin sagt wirklich, ich kann nicht reisen. Stalin ist, übrigens, Angst vor dem Reisen. Er ist Angst vor dem Fliegen. So he really doesn't want to travel far.

He also is personally always paranoid about his rule. So he doesn't want to, I think, leave Moscow for very long or leave the Soviet Union, because that's where his power is. But Roosevelt's willing, as an older, Roosevelt is a ill, not ill man, but he is growing weaker in 43, make this trip halfway around the world to meet Stalin. So that is really important to understand.

He also is personally always paranoid about his rule. So he doesn't want to, I think, leave Moscow for very long or leave the Soviet Union, because that's where his power is. But Roosevelt's willing, as an older, Roosevelt is a ill, not ill man, but he is growing weaker in 43, make this trip halfway around the world to meet Stalin. So that is really important to understand.

Die Power-Dynamik ist, Roosevelt ist versäumt, dieses Meeting zu haben. Stalin ist wirklich nicht so versäumt, aber er ist endlich bereit, es zu tun.

Die Power-Dynamik ist, Roosevelt ist versäumt, dieses Meeting zu haben. Stalin ist wirklich nicht so versäumt, aber er ist endlich bereit, es zu tun.

Es kommt alles unter den gleichen Plan von Lendley. Was es ermöglicht, ist, Roosevelt zu erlauben, den USA-Alliierten fast alles, was er will, zu geben. So he can provide them any kind of military commitment or non-military in the sense he can provide aluminum. He can provide economic resources that if he is as president decides this is in the US interest.

So it's like, I don't want to say he has carte blanche because he couldn't like hand over the atomic secrets, but he can hand over pretty much any military good that he wants to to help the Soviet Union.

Well, that wasn't the plan, though. The plan was that Roosevelt was going to stay in the US consulate and Stalin was going to stay in the Soviet Union. The Soviets had a very big compound. But what happens is Stalin, I hope, wants to bring Roosevelt into his orbit.

And what happens is when Roosevelt gets there, the Soviets say, well, we have reports that there's going to be an assassination attempt on you as you travel between the two places. So why don't you come stay with us? And Roosevelt, I think, is quite skeptical of the reality. I think they understand that this might be a ploy by Stalin.

But to show how trusting he is and how much he wants the relationship to work, he agrees. And he could only bring two people with him. So he could only bring his two closest advisors, or Harry Hopkins and Bill Leahy. They're the only ones allowed to live with Roosevelt.

And by the way, this is an extraordinary moment, because the President of the United States is basically a prisoner of the Soviet Union. Because he's living in a Soviet compound, which is patrolled overwhelmingly by Soviet soldiers, who could have taken the President hostage at any time, had they wanted to.

Und Roosevelt hat seine Freiheit an Stalin übergeben als Zeichen von, guck, ich vertraue dir wirklich und ich will mit dir zusammenkommen. Aber ich glaube nicht, dass man manchmal merkt, dass es nur eine dramatische Sache war, dass er seine Person in der Sowjetunion übergeben hat, in einer Weise, in der kein anderer Amerikaner seit oder vorher an der Reise eines anderen Außenstaates war.

Es ist nur ein paar Tage, ich glaube es sind etwa vier Tage.

Anders als Yalta, ein paar Jahre später, geht es darum, wie die Welt nach dem Krieg sein wird. Die Teheran-Konferenz ist darum, wie sie den Krieg gewinnen werden. Es geht darum, wie wir den Krieg zu einer erfolgreichen Schlussfolgerung sehen werden.

Die große Entscheidung, die sie machen müssen, und das ist eine, die Churchill auch da ist, aber Churchill bleibt nicht im sowjetischen Komponenten, das ist auch eine interessante Unterschiede, dass die große Entscheidung, die sie machen, ist die Invasion von Europa 1944. Und das, übrigens, erlaubt Roosevelt und Stalin, gegen Churchill zu verbinden. Churchill will Frankreich nicht invadieren.

Er will nicht, was wir als D-Day kennen. Für ihn ist das zu blutig, dass Britannien keine Soldaten für diese Operation haben. Viel besser, es nicht zu tun und in der Mediterranen zu kämpfen, ist Churchills Ansicht. Aber Roosevelt will D-Day in 1944 machen. Stalin will D-Day passieren.

So really what happens is Stalin and Roosevelt gang up on Churchill at Tehran and forced Churchill to accept D-Day in 1944. So a lot of the discussions are about this.

Oh, also, I mean, basically the US had been trying to bash Churchill's head in on D-Day for all of 1943. So there had been a series of conferences before that just between Roosevelt and Churchill in Washington and Quebec. And in those, Roosevelt's always pushing D-Day and Churchill's always resisting. But when Stalin's there, there's nothing Churchill can really do, because it's two against one.

Well, certainly there's both the formal sessions, from which we have different sets of minutes, which are like formal conferences. You sit around a round table, a big group, and you'll propose issues and talk about it. And then there are the informal meetings. So the first time that Stalin and Roosevelt meet, it's actually an informal meeting.

So when Roosevelt moves into the Soviet compound, Stalin comes over and pays him a visit. Crucially, Churchill is not there. So it is just Stalin, Roosevelt and their interpreters, because Stalin didn't speak English and Roosevelt didn't speak Russian or at least their linguistic abilities were not such that they could communicate with each other. So it's just the two men and their interpreters.

Und sie haben eine sehr freundliche, Roosevelt, man könnte sagen, freundliche Diskussion. Roosevelt versucht wirklich zu zeigen, wie er in Stalin kommt. Und was Roosevelt macht, ich denke, Churchill wäre begeistert gewesen, ist, dass Roosevelt sagt, oh, du weißt, ich hasse europäische Empires. Ich bin ein bisschen wie du, Joe.

Wir sehen die Welt in der gleichen Weise, nicht wie diese schrecklichen britischen und französischen Imperialisten. Und so geht es.

Oh, I mean, Poland in many ways becomes the emotive issue. By 1945, it's Das ist das wichtigste Thema zwischen Stalin und Roosevelt. Und es geht um so viele verschiedene Dinge zurück. Stalin hat den Nazi-Sowjet-Pakt mit Hitler gegründet, um Polen zu zerstören. Sein erster Schritt gegen Polen ist es, es zu zerstören und so viel Polen für die Sowjetunion wie möglich zu nehmen.

Während Roosevelt den vor der Kriegszeit polnischen Regierung erkennt, die Hitler invadiert hat und Stalin mit ihm übernommen hat. Roosevelt at this point is still trying to work, you know, formally recognize the London government, which is the successor of the state Stalin puts up.

So they have this difference in 1943, certainly about who they're going to recognize, as what happens, of course, is that Stalin ends up occupying Poland. with the Red Army and that gives him as the war goes on the lion's share of the say of what's going to happen so that Roosevelt can ask or beg even to try and have some kind of concessions about Poland but ultimately it's up to Stalin

Ich meine, ja, der große Unterschied ist, Roosevelt zwischen dem Ende von Teheran und dem Anfang von Yalta geht von jemandem, der immer noch Vibranz und Kraft hat und die Möglichkeit, dynamisch zu sein, zu einem sterbenden Mann. Ja. In Februar 1945 ist er klar sterbend. Ich meine, die Leute sind überrascht, wenn sie ihn nicht schon lange gesehen haben. Er ist viel, viel dünner. Ja.

Und Stalin, natürlich, fühlt das und versteht es. Ich wundere, wie viel er für ihn schlecht fühlte oder ob die Möglichkeit da war, ihm vorzunehmen. Stalin hat viele seiner besten Freunde getötet. Könnte Stalin für irgendeine Menschheit schlecht fühlen? Ich denke nicht, dass er so viel Empathie hatte.

In vielen Fällen überreakt er zu diesem Thema, weil er Roosevelt verletzt.

Also er, besonders in Polen, ich meine, Polen ist das Problem, es kommt viel in Yalta.

Also sie kommen eigentlich ziemlich gut zusammen, außer in Polen.

In the Soviet Union.

Stalin occupies it now. I mean, we're talking February 1945. The Red Army occupies all of Poland. I mean, it's on the Oder River. It's not far from Berlin at this point. And so what is going to happen in Poland will be determined by the Red Army. And Stalin controls the Red Army. And that's simply the reality of it. Now, what Roosevelt is doing is partly acknowledging that.

That Roosevelt knows that Stalin is going to have the lion's share of the say in what happens in Poland. But what he's desperate to do is get some kind of concessions so that he can go to the American people. Look, pre-war or democratic elements still are going to have a say in Poland. It's not just going to be a Soviet-dominated communist state.

It will have some of the earlier, not, pre-war Poland wasn't democratic, but at least it would be a national identity that wasn't communist. So he keeps asking Stalin, look, can you include some elements in the government of Poland that aren't communist? And Stalin really fobs him off, fobs him off. Eventually he agrees to...

indefinite statement that there will be quote unquote democratic elements in the polish government but of course stalin believes the soviet union is democratic so he's really making no concession whatsoever but roosevelt tries and tries and eventually roosevelt gives up and he says at the end of it i'm i'm simply too tired bill to bill lehi wow are they already talking about carving up germany is that part of the plan well that becomes i think more formalized in yalta

There had always been a question of occupation zones, which is what they're talking about. I mean, they're not talking in 1945 of two Germanys. So the idea of a East and West Germany as separate states is not actually on the agenda in 1945. The big question are the occupation zones.

Because actually both of them, both the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the way, Britain, have a certain interest in at least keeping the core of Germany united. Das, was die Sowjets wollen, natürlich wissen sie, dass die meiste West-Germany unter britisch-amerikanischen Regeln kommen wird. Und zum Beispiel ist West-Germany der industriell reiche Teil des Landes.

Also, wenn Deutschland tatsächlich in zwei Länder geteilt wird, ist das nicht großartig für die Sowjetunion, weil sie den Osten bekommen. Und deshalb wollen sie, sie würden lieber Deutschland unabhängig, aber schwach halten, wo sie ein Verhältnis in der ganzen Sache haben können.

And what happens is therefore you end up in this bit of this dance about occupation zones, where the occupation zones are going to be, but they are not talking about two separate countries at that point.

Stalin is one of those things that he can make concessions on because he just doesn't care. Yeah. And it's one of the Roosevelt cares. And he really believes the United Nations is important. And he's trying to set up an international body that will work. In seiner Meinung ist es wichtig, dass es anders ist als in der League of Nations, die gefehlt hat, aber er glaubt, dass es Versprechen gibt.

Für Stalin ist das ein bisschen schmerzhaft. Und wie er gesagt hat, brauchen wir nicht einen internationalen Körper. Wir brauchen die großen Kräfte, die das tun, was wir tun, sitzen an einer Table hier und entscheiden. Ich meine, die echten Fragen werden in seiner Meinung nie von der Vereinigten Nation beschlossen werden.

Sie werden von Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill beschlossen, sitzen an einer Table und dividieren den Welt. So Stalin is a bit confused as to why Roosevelt cares so much about it. And on the other hand, it allows him to make some concessions to Roosevelt and seem like he's being cooperative, even when he's a bit confused as to why it's become so key to the Roosevelt agenda.

Stalin hat eine sehr klare Agenda, die ist, mit Japan aus der Kriegskrise zu bleiben, bis Deutschland verletzt wird. Und dann versucht, so viel Asien wie er kann, wenn Hitler in seinem Graben sicher ist. Dann wird er in die Kriegskrise einsteigen. Und so ist es ein Problem, weil die USA früher auf Stalin gezwungen haben, in die Kriegskrise zu einsteigen gegen Japan.

And Stalin had always been resisting, saying, look, I can't, I have to throw everything against the German army, but I will join, I promise you, I will join the war later. I don't think when these original promises are made, the United States thought Japan would be as close to defeat as it was in 1945.

So really, by this point, the US is saying, we don't need the Soviet Union, we don't need Stalin, but they don't want to turn around and say that to him. Because they had been asking him to join for, you know, 42, 43. So that's the problem. Stalin sort of hoists the US on its own petard. So he can make it look like he's being magnanimous.

Yes, I will join the war within three months of it ending in Europe. I'll join the war against Japan. And at this point, the US, the people around Roosevelt would say, we really don't need you. But they can't say no, because they'd been asking it.

He couldn't have not died. I mean, he could have died in Yalta. Roosevelt was going to die. He was in such bad shape. And the amazing thing is actually that he runs for re-election in 1944. Es ist unglaublich, wie furchtbar es ist. Es ist furchtbar. People on the whole treat FDR, I think, quite gently. And I think FDR had a number of very positive aspects as a war leader.

But his decision to run for re-election in 1944 is super hubris and it's irresponsible. Because not only does he decide to run for re-election with no prospect of living out the term, he chooses his vice president, someone he doesn't like and doesn't talk to. So he chooses Truman and then he spends no time preparing Truman for the presidency. Exactly.

He chooses Truman entirely for political reasons and he basically is sort of saying, if I die, okay, well then, you know, that's it. I don't care. And that's what happened. Truman is not prepared because Roosevelt doesn't do anything to help him get ready.

Yeah, basically I do a lot of writing on my substack, which is just Philips' newsletter substack. So that's where I write a lot about geopolitics and military history. Excellent. Thanks, Philips. Thanks for having me.

Thanks for having me, Don. Glad to be here.

Well, what Roosevelt's been trying to do since Pearl Harbor, really, is to set up a personal meeting with Stalin. So once they become formal allies, which, I mean, in some ways they become informal allies from the moment Hitler invades. So that Roosevelt sends Harry Hopkins to meet with Stalin and to set up getting USAID.

But really, they become formal allies in the war against Hitler in December 1941, when Germany and the United States go to war. Roosevelt has been very keen to have a meeting with Stalin. Roosevelt believes in personal relationships. He believes he is personally important to not only winning the war, but setting up a sort of a post-war world that will work.

Und so was er versucht zu tun, ist in vielen Fällen, Stalin zu ermutigen. Ich meine, Roosevelt ist ein sehr ermutigender Mann. Ja. Viele Leute werden von Roosevelt gewonnen und dann glauben sie, sie seien Roosevelt's Freunde. Er hatte einen Weg, dich zu machen, dass er dich liebte. Ich würde viel mehr argumentieren, als er es wirklich tat. Did Stalin feel the same way?

Is there any record of that? No, I don't think he did. I think there's two interesting things about Stalin. One, he was actually very respectful and a little nervous to meet Roosevelt. Stalin, I think, understood the power balance. He understood the United States was extremely powerful in the world in 1942, 3, 4 and 5.

und dass der amerikanische Macht etwas war, mit dem er leben musste, und dass Roosevelt der Exemplar des amerikanischen Machts war. Er war für so lange Präsident, weniger als jeder Mensch in der Geschichte. Ich denke, es gab diese grundlegende, man könnte sagen, Respekt und eine kleine Nervosität.

Die erste Zeit, als sie sich tatsächlich treffen, ist Stalin sehr nervös darüber, den Tisch richtig zu setzen für ein formelles Event. Die andere Sache ist, dass er sich überrascht bleibt. That Stalin is in some ways acting throughout the Second World War as being more friendly towards the United States and the United Kingdom than he really was.

That he hadn't gotten over and changed his basic ideological outlook that capitalism and communism were not going to be long-term friends. And so he was always playing a bit of a role of, I don't want to say a false friend, but you'd say a temporary friend. Ja, sie waren in seinem Geist Allies, um den Krieg zu gewinnen.

Yeah, I mean, he knows. I mean, he knows as much as people can know about it without being there. But on the other hand, I think what Roosevelt, this is what Roosevelt's not an ideological man. And I think that's an important thing to understand about him. He is a practical politician. In many ways, the New Deal is not ideologically motivated, it's practically motivated. He's just trying things.

And when it comes to dealing with Stalin, because he views Stalin, Stalin has been bloody, Stalin has been brutal, but heck, that's what happens in the 1930s. You have Nazi Germany, you have the Soviet Union, you have Imperial Japan. By the way, he's no fan of the British Empire, which he also believes can be very brutal.

So I think he views Stalin as pretty tough and pretty brutal, but not someone with whom he can't deal.

Well, there certainly was sympathy for the Soviet Union, particularly in the left wing of the Democratic Party. And Roosevelt is a Democrat and he is desperate to keep the party together. In the 20s, when the Republicans are in power, they're not going to recognize the Soviet Union. However, the Democrats have at least an element of their party that is more sympathetic. They're not communists.

And I think we need to be very careful about you calling people in the Democratic Party communists. They're not. But they are sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. They want good relations. Roosevelt's Vice President in his third term, Henry Wallace, who was Vice President in the time of Casablanca and Cairo and Tehran, is pacifist. Er ist sehr sympathisch mit der Sowjetunion.

Roosevelt ist auf der linken Seite der Partei. Er hat eine sehr gute Beziehung zu Stalin und der Sowjetunion. Jemand wie Harry Hopkins, auf den Roosevelt wirklich verlangt. Und Hopkins ist eine unglaublich starke Figur von 1938, 1939 bis 1943. Er ist auch sehr sympathisch mit Stalin und der Sowjetunion. Roosevelt hört von einer Seite seines Partei, Ja, aber Sie benutzen das Wort pragmatisch.

But Roosevelt always did it. When he recognizes the Soviet Union in 1933, this is while the Ukrainian famine is going on.

Ja, ich meine, er glaubt, dass der Deal wert ist, dass wir mit brutalen Ländern leben müssen. Er macht keinen Hinweis auf den ukrainischen Verbrechen, auch wenn es aufgehört ist und Millionen von Menschen sterben. Für Roosevelt, denke ich, sind das die Schmerzen der modernen Welt und sie werden damit leben müssen.

Well, what he did, I mean, if you remember, Roosevelt had had his career as an aristocrat, an elite. He had been making international trips since he was a young boy. His father used to like to go to Germany to spa. His father was a bit of a hypochondriac. And so he would drag Franklin across the Atlantic every, not every summer, but many summers to go to these spas.

So Roosevelt was used to international travel. He had done a lot of international travel during the First World War. He had represented the United States as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. By the way, what he learns from the First World War is a very healthy respect of German power, which is why he is always more afraid of Hitler than Stalin.

And one of the reasons I would argue he's more afraid of Hitler and Nazi Germany is that he really believes Germany is a threat. Germany almost wins the First World War and Russia loses it. And I think he never gets beyond that. And that has that imprint that Nazi Germany is always more of a threat to the United States in his mind than the Soviet Union.

Well, Tehran is a fascinating sign of how desperate Roosevelt is to meet Stalin. Where is Tehran? It's just over the border from the Soviet Union in Iran. It's actually not very far for Stalin to go. It really is close. It's about as close as one can go and leave the Soviet Union. Whereas for Roosevelt, it's a trip around the world.

dass er aus Washington nach Ägypten fliegt und dann nach Teheran fliegt. Es ist eine lange, lange Reise. Und Roosevelt macht das, weil das der einzige Weg ist, wie Stalin sich treffen wird. Stalin sagt wirklich, ich kann nicht reisen. Stalin ist, übrigens, Angst vor dem Reisen. Er ist Angst vor dem Fliegen. So he really doesn't want to travel far.

He also is personally always paranoid about his rule. So he doesn't want to, I think, leave Moscow for very long or leave the Soviet Union, because that's where his power is. But Roosevelt's willing, as an older, Roosevelt is a ill, not ill man, but he is growing weaker in 43, make this trip halfway around the world to meet Stalin. So that is really important to understand.

Die Power-Dynamik ist, Roosevelt ist versäumt, dieses Meeting zu haben. Stalin ist wirklich nicht so versäumt, aber er ist endlich bereit, es zu tun.