Pierre Asselin

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So Nixon had a very clear understanding of the situation in Vietnam. I think for all of his flaws, we really need to give Nixon credit for understanding what was happening in Vietnam and what that meant for the larger international global Cold War context.

So Nixon had a very clear understanding of the situation in Vietnam. I think for all of his flaws, we really need to give Nixon credit for understanding what was happening in Vietnam and what that meant for the larger international global Cold War context.

So Nixon had a very clear understanding of the situation in Vietnam. I think for all of his flaws, we really need to give Nixon credit for understanding what was happening in Vietnam and what that meant for the larger international global Cold War context.

From the moment he assumes the presidency, Nixon is cognizant of the fact that the American military enterprise in Vietnam is not going to meet its stated objective of effectively providing for a South Vietnam that will be forever protected from the communist menace. Nixon understands that in light of previous failures, the U.S.

From the moment he assumes the presidency, Nixon is cognizant of the fact that the American military enterprise in Vietnam is not going to meet its stated objective of effectively providing for a South Vietnam that will be forever protected from the communist menace. Nixon understands that in light of previous failures, the U.S.

From the moment he assumes the presidency, Nixon is cognizant of the fact that the American military enterprise in Vietnam is not going to meet its stated objective of effectively providing for a South Vietnam that will be forever protected from the communist menace. Nixon understands that in light of previous failures, the U.S.

is likely to lose in South Vietnam, to not meet its political objective of, again, preserving the South as a non-communist entity. So then the question becomes how to end the commitment while salvaging American credibility and honor so that the U.S. can continue fighting the Cold War in other parts of the world.

is likely to lose in South Vietnam, to not meet its political objective of, again, preserving the South as a non-communist entity. So then the question becomes how to end the commitment while salvaging American credibility and honor so that the U.S. can continue fighting the Cold War in other parts of the world.

is likely to lose in South Vietnam, to not meet its political objective of, again, preserving the South as a non-communist entity. So then the question becomes how to end the commitment while salvaging American credibility and honor so that the U.S. can continue fighting the Cold War in other parts of the world.

So for the U.S., right, Vietnam is certainly important, but it's one battle within the larger context of this global Cold War. So for Nixon, the idea here is to deal with defeat in Vietnam, but deal with it in such a way that the United States will have the staying power to remain in the larger context Cold War fight against the Soviet Union, China, and other rivals.

So for the U.S., right, Vietnam is certainly important, but it's one battle within the larger context of this global Cold War. So for Nixon, the idea here is to deal with defeat in Vietnam, but deal with it in such a way that the United States will have the staying power to remain in the larger context Cold War fight against the Soviet Union, China, and other rivals.

So for the U.S., right, Vietnam is certainly important, but it's one battle within the larger context of this global Cold War. So for Nixon, the idea here is to deal with defeat in Vietnam, but deal with it in such a way that the United States will have the staying power to remain in the larger context Cold War fight against the Soviet Union, China, and other rivals.

Exactly, exactly. And that's the thing, right? I mean, credibility, prestige, those are really, really important currencies in international relations. You know, it doesn't matter if you have big guns or a powerful economy. It's always about how you use these things. Right. And where are the people believe that you're going to use your economic might, your military might to meet your objectives?

Exactly, exactly. And that's the thing, right? I mean, credibility, prestige, those are really, really important currencies in international relations. You know, it doesn't matter if you have big guns or a powerful economy. It's always about how you use these things. Right. And where are the people believe that you're going to use your economic might, your military might to meet your objectives?

Exactly, exactly. And that's the thing, right? I mean, credibility, prestige, those are really, really important currencies in international relations. You know, it doesn't matter if you have big guns or a powerful economy. It's always about how you use these things. Right. And where are the people believe that you're going to use your economic might, your military might to meet your objectives?

And that's how Nixon approaches it. The other element, I think, Don, that that accounts for the length of the disengagement is the model that Nixon is using. Nixon was always a big fan of Charles de Gaulle. And specifically, he admired the way de Gaulle had gotten France out of Algeria. Algeria was such a mess, right, for the French.

And that's how Nixon approaches it. The other element, I think, Don, that that accounts for the length of the disengagement is the model that Nixon is using. Nixon was always a big fan of Charles de Gaulle. And specifically, he admired the way de Gaulle had gotten France out of Algeria. Algeria was such a mess, right, for the French.