Professor Peter Heather

The core areas left, and there are two functioning regimes, one by Majorian, 459 to 461, and then Anthemius in the later 460s. They have control of Italy, obviously, the nice Dalmatian coast, Sicily. They can still exert power north of the Alps. The landowning opinion in central and southern Gaul is still within their political compass.

The core areas left, and there are two functioning regimes, one by Majorian, 459 to 461, and then Anthemius in the later 460s. They have control of Italy, obviously, the nice Dalmatian coast, Sicily. They can still exert power north of the Alps. The landowning opinion in central and southern Gaul is still within their political compass.

The core areas left, and there are two functioning regimes, one by Majorian, 459 to 461, and then Anthemius in the later 460s. They have control of Italy, obviously, the nice Dalmatian coast, Sicily. They can still exert power north of the Alps. The landowning opinion in central and southern Gaul is still within their political compass.

And northeastern Spain, Taracanensis, it's the Roman province around Barcelona, that much is reasonably under control. That's their core territory.

And northeastern Spain, Taracanensis, it's the Roman province around Barcelona, that much is reasonably under control. That's their core territory.

And northeastern Spain, Taracanensis, it's the Roman province around Barcelona, that much is reasonably under control. That's their core territory.

My own answer is categorically that they are central to this. And I think for two reasons. First of all, the old model of social and economic dislocation in the third and fourth centuries, followed by political collapse in the fifth, which is intuitively convincing. The archaeological evidence makes it clear that that's no longer supportable. Economy and society are flourishing.

My own answer is categorically that they are central to this. And I think for two reasons. First of all, the old model of social and economic dislocation in the third and fourth centuries, followed by political collapse in the fifth, which is intuitively convincing. The archaeological evidence makes it clear that that's no longer supportable. Economy and society are flourishing.

My own answer is categorically that they are central to this. And I think for two reasons. First of all, the old model of social and economic dislocation in the third and fourth centuries, followed by political collapse in the fifth, which is intuitively convincing. The archaeological evidence makes it clear that that's no longer supportable. Economy and society are flourishing.

And indeed, actually, the cultural evidence, if you look at writings from the late third and fourth century, there's a ton of it, you know, very sophisticated. This doesn't look like a world in crisis at all. So we've got that.

And indeed, actually, the cultural evidence, if you look at writings from the late third and fourth century, there's a ton of it, you know, very sophisticated. This doesn't look like a world in crisis at all. So we've got that.

And indeed, actually, the cultural evidence, if you look at writings from the late third and fourth century, there's a ton of it, you know, very sophisticated. This doesn't look like a world in crisis at all. So we've got that.

And the second part is, while certainly civil war and tension is now systemically hardwired into the operations of the Roman imperial system because of the division between East and West, I don't see any narrative pathway that gets you from the kind of civil wars that we see in the fourth century to imperial collapse, and for this reason. So we see two kinds.

And the second part is, while certainly civil war and tension is now systemically hardwired into the operations of the Roman imperial system because of the division between East and West, I don't see any narrative pathway that gets you from the kind of civil wars that we see in the fourth century to imperial collapse, and for this reason. So we see two kinds.

And the second part is, while certainly civil war and tension is now systemically hardwired into the operations of the Roman imperial system because of the division between East and West, I don't see any narrative pathway that gets you from the kind of civil wars that we see in the fourth century to imperial collapse, and for this reason. So we see two kinds.

We either see conflict between Eastern and Western Roman emperors, usually for preeminence over the whole kit and caboodle. In other words, we're looking to pull the thing together, not to break it apart. The other type we see is that there's a kind of fault line in the Western Empire around the Alps, because we've got one army group in Gaul, and we've got another army group

We either see conflict between Eastern and Western Roman emperors, usually for preeminence over the whole kit and caboodle. In other words, we're looking to pull the thing together, not to break it apart. The other type we see is that there's a kind of fault line in the Western Empire around the Alps, because we've got one army group in Gaul, and we've got another army group

We either see conflict between Eastern and Western Roman emperors, usually for preeminence over the whole kit and caboodle. In other words, we're looking to pull the thing together, not to break it apart. The other type we see is that there's a kind of fault line in the Western Empire around the Alps, because we've got one army group in Gaul, and we've got another army group

In northern Italy or the western Balkans, protecting the sort of middle Danube frontier. And you get rival leaders. I mean, emperors are always generals, as it were. So these two army groups can put forward rival pretenders for control of the western empire. And we see conflict of that kind.

In northern Italy or the western Balkans, protecting the sort of middle Danube frontier. And you get rival leaders. I mean, emperors are always generals, as it were. So these two army groups can put forward rival pretenders for control of the western empire. And we see conflict of that kind.