Dwight D. Eisenhower is a fixture in the lists of America's favourite Presidents. How did Eisenhower change America? How did the Cold War and Civil Rights become intertwined in this period? What doomsday did Eisenhower foresee for America at the end of his time in office?Don's guest today is Christopher Nichols, professor of history at The Ohio State University. Chris is working on a book about Eisenhower and the 1952 election.Produced by Freddy Chick. Edited by Aidan Lonergan. Senior Producer was Charlotte Long.Sign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe. You can take part in our listener survey here.All music from Epidemic Sounds.American History Hit is a History Hit podcast.
Chapter 1: How did Eisenhower's farewell address signal a warning?
Januar 17, 1961, die White House. Obwohl es bald eine Tradition in modernen Präsidentschaften werden, sind sie in der Ära von Dwight D. Eisenhower immer noch eine Auszeichnung der Regierungen. Aber an diesem Tag, der Tag der Begründung seines Nachfolgers, für Präsident Dwight Eisenhower ist seine fähige Begründung für das Land ein Imperativ geworden.
After leading the nation to victory in World War II and serving a full two terms as its commander-in-chief for the last eight years, one might expect this to be a glowing tribute to his own administration's political success, a victory lap. But instead, this speech will have a darker, more urgent and prescient tone.
A former five-star general means to warn his country of a clear and present danger to its existence. So what is it? This dire threat? About who or what does Eisenhower wish to raise an alarm? A communist adversary flexing its military might? The dreaded Democrats returning to executive power? ICBMs on their way from Russia? To the contrary.
As he steadies his gaze into the blinding lights and hulking TV cameras, Ike prepares to take aim at an unanticipated target. An insidious enemy, to be sure, but one that's growing Within the US Government. Greetings listeners, glad you're with us from either side of the Atlantic or elsewhere. This is American History Hit and I'm Don Wildman.
Dwight David Eisenhower, Ike to family, friends and colleagues, became the 34th President of the United States in 1953, serving a full two terms until 1961. This was the era when America became first captivated by Elvis Presleys pelvic pulsations and the changing fashions of a beat generation.
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Chapter 2: How did Eisenhower's presidency shape the Cold War and civil rights?
Auf dem Bild hat Marilyn Monroe adulte Zuschauer in Filmen wie Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, während Teenies über James Deans brütende Brüste in Rebel Without a Cause gezwungen. Während dieser Präsidentschaft haben die McDonnell Brothers Ray Kroc getroffen, die Notion der modernen Suburbia wurde gehackt.
Eine generell konservative soziale Ordnung hat gewachsen und die späteren Nostalgie von American Graffiti und Happy Days inspiriert. But this was also the time of Rosa Parks famously refusing to give up her seat and Martin Luther King Jr. emerging to lead the Montgomery Bus Boycott. In discussing the Eisenhower Presidency, we'll focus today on its crucial role in the Cold War and civil rights.
Topics very resonant today, as the United States is now shuffling its cards and seeming to deal from a new deck. Our guest for this today has been with us before Check out episode 277 on the Spanish-American War Glad to have him Chris Nichols is a professor of history and the Wayne Woodrow Hayes Chair of the National Security Studies at The Ohio State University.
He is currently working on a book about Eisenhower and the 1952 election. Hello, Chris Nichols. Welcome back to the pod. Don, it's great to be back with you. Thanks for having me. Let's first touch on the backdrop I described in the opening there. The 1950s, such a fabled time in American history, at least in the media and the music.
Is this fair, given the contradictions of the Cold War and what was being confronted in civil rights? Why are we so nostalgic for these so-called happy days?
You know, on the one hand, it's absolutely fair.
If you think about the economy, standard of living, coming out of a cataclysmic world war, higher education boom, more people being educated, more jobs, job growth, manufacturing in the US, the white picket fence, suburbia, you could own your own home, the automobile, you could have your oddly colored high expense every month automobile, new appliances in the home, right?
The parts of the cold war were waged over the so-called kitchen debates. Khrushchev und Nixon. Also ja, auf der einen Seite. Und auf der anderen Seite denke ich, dass die frühere Koldauer, die Nachfolge der Zweiten Weltkriege, einige der echten Fehler in der amerikanischen Demokratie in starker Relief verursacht hat.
Und in der Versuchung, diesen Konflikt im Ausland durch Propaganda zu kämpfen, beobachtete, wie wirklich just die amerikanische Gesellschaft war und wie viel von ihren demokratischen Idealen sie lebte. In dieser Weise kam dann die Koldauer zurück. Es gab einen Rebound-Effekt. Vielen Dank.
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Chapter 3: What were the political dynamics leading up to the 1952 election?
He's for committing significant numbers of divisions to Europe. There's some debate going back and forth. George Marshall indicates no more than four. He's willing to have more. The challenge in the late 40s into the early 50s, once the Korean War starts in the late 50s, is trying to figure out as well, what if that is a feint by the Russians?
And then they're headed towards a poorly equipped, poorly defended Europe. And the US has to backstop that, is the thinking of people like Eisenhower. Die Sache mit Leuten wie Taft ist, wenn sie sich nicht verteidigen können, muss die USA ihre Art von Fortress-Amerika haben. Es ist Gibraltar, Rock of Gibraltar-Amerika, wie Herbert Hoover es gesagt hat.
Und dann ist NATO eine andere Ausstattung davon. Und das ist ein wichtiger Punkt. Also wenn du dich über die Marshall Plan denkst, die ökonomische Veränderung. Die US-Divisionen dort sind theoretisch eine temporäre Teilnahme davon. Und dann die Nordatlantik-Treaty-Organisation, die 1949 gegründet wurde, ist die andere Teilnahme, richtig?
Und es ist eine Bindungs-Sicherheits-Vorgabe, die absolut garantiert wird, dass die Gerechtigkeit der Mitglieder der Nationenstaaten und alle anderen Mitglieder der Nationenstaaten agree to support anyone who is attacked, right? So that's critical in collective security. And that, again, is the kind of thing that the farther right conservatives coming out of World War II don't want.
They say this is precisely the sort of thing that would get us into a war against American interests. And the counterpoint from most Democrats and the moderate Republican wing is this is exactly how you prevent the next world war.
Exactly. This is the major theme or one of the major themes of Eisenhower's time in the White House is this internationalism versus isolationism. That which we hear about all day long these days has its roots in Eisenhower 80 years ago or about 75 years ago.
So let's back up now and talk about Eisenhauers origins himself, where he comes from, and we'll get back to the presidency in just a few moments. Raised in Kansas, hometown Abilene, Kansas, along the way the family was in Texas and so forth, but they were a deeply religious family. Many, many brothers, for one thing, which I wasn't aware of. His mom becomes a Jehovah's Witness.
His father, I guess, is an engineer, is that right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. His mother was against him joining the army, but Dwight Eisenhower wanted to go to West Point and did, does very well. Serves in World War I, only domestically, to his great chagrin, he does not go abroad. But he develops tank strategy alongside the likes of George Patton. You know, he's very much this modern warfare kind of guy.
Then, interestingly, serves between the wars under Douglas MacArthur. And they have a very antagonistic, prickly relationship for the rest of their lives, apparently. He begins World War II as a staff officer, ends it as supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. It's an incredible professional leap that this man makes from one thing to the other.
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Chapter 4: How did Eisenhower's military background influence his presidency?
And after eight years, I couldn't possibly run again in, say, 56. But what happens is the unexpected. Truman wins again in 1948. And Ike sees the counterpoint of the Taft and more conservative Republicans. And this is where the rubber hits the road. This is the time for the conservative Republicans who have now said, you've had your chance, moderates. You've lost again and again.
You've lost to FDR. Now you've lost to Truman. You've lost to Truman at a point where he was so unpopular. You know, people joke things like a cow could win against him, right? Farm animals could beat him, but Dewey couldn't, right? And so Taft says, look, I'm the real inheritor of authentic sort of Americanist Republicanism going back to the sort of the Taft, McKinley, Roosevelt era.
And he's pushing that forward. And he's remarkably similar, in fact. to Eisenhower on his domestic policies. But so how is politics in this moment? Republican Party is riven. The Democratic Party is reeling. The writing on the wall in terms of surveys is that there's just no chance that Democrats are going to win the highest office in 52.
And in fact, as you play this out further, it looks very likely that Republicans are going to get both houses of Congress, which they do.
How did Eisenhower view the communist threat, which has so much to do with this backdrop?
Yeah, so the point counterpoint that's interesting in this moment is the Taft and the sort of more thoughtful or the right Republicans think that the communist threat is primarily in Asia. And that Soviet communism is less likely to expand through Europe than the kind of proponents of big militarist US are articulating.
And the primary challenges for the US therefore would be fiscal conservatism and not spending outside of its means. The Eisenhower version is that there is a legitimate communist threat in Eastern Europe. And he looks to the satellites and the places where the governments changed after the Second World War and notes that that's a highly contested area.
You're thinking your East Germanys, your Czechoslovakias, your Yugoslavias. A place where the next war could be fought. And also looks to Asia in the same way. And one problem for the Truman folks is that the Truman Democrats had a pretty good consensus foreign policy from 46 through 51 on Europe, but not on Asia.
Both Eisenhower and Taft and many Republicans are saying, look, Truman lost China in 1949 when Mao's forces routed Chiang Kai-Shek and they fled to Taiwan. In 1949, that's when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb. This year, 1949, is a really pivotal moment and you see this divide. For Eisenhower, it's a worldwide possible security threat from Russia and communism.
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Chapter 5: What role did internationalism play in Eisenhower's policies?
Aber er hat für strategische Gründe, und eigentlich spricht Evan Thomas' Buch, Ike's Bluff, über das in Bezug auf den Kartenspieler, den Experten-Kartenspieler in ihm. Für strategische Gründe hat er regelmäßig Euphemismen für den Nutzung von atomischen nuklearen Waffen benutzt.
In dem Sinne, dass er hoffte, dass diese Bewertung deshalb mehr Kapazität für die USA geben würde, um andere Aspekte des Wohlwollens zu negotieren, Sicherheitsentwürfe oder Demobilisierung, diese Art von Dingen. So the short answer is yes. And the long answer is highly, highly unlikely that Ike would have authorized the use of nuclear weapons.
So the mutually assured destruction infers that he realized that no one was going to win this war. He was the one that really figured that out. I mean, not personally, but I mean, he was the president at the time that that is realized as a sort of chess move, right? That this is checkmate for the world as far as we can't even use these weapons unless it's destruction.
Ja, es passierte auf seiner Warte, könnte man sagen. Ich denke, die technologischen Entwicklungen seiner Zeit, die Hydrogenbombe, die dann in Bezug auf beide die Sowjetunion und die USA mit rund 800-mal der zerstörten Macht der Waffen, die Hiroshima und Nagasaki gedroht haben, haben nur bedeutet, dass es ihm offensichtlich war,
dass eine große Anwendung von nuklearen Waffen den Planeten virtually unvergesslich machen würde. Und niemand könnte die Sieg beurteilen.
Wenn man sich einige dieser Politikplanungs-Memos anschaut, die zeigen, wie die erste Strecke aussehen würde, weißt du, dass die 10% der Bevölkerung nicht wirklich die Sieg fühlen würde, besonders jemand wie Ike, der die größte amphibische Invasion in der Weltgeschichte gestartet hat. Und er wollte nicht, dass er Kasualitätskonten sieht. Er hätte es nie mit 90% Kasualitätskonten erlaubt.
Das ist ein großer Teil davon. Es gibt auch diesen Element, der in diesem Moment arbeitet. Du hast seine Religiosität erwähnt. John Foster Dulles war ein Ekumenist, ein sehr tiefer Glaubwürdiger. Es gibt einen Moment, in dem der Koldauer in den USA als eine Art judeo-christliche Art von Sensibilität gewählt wird.
Und es gibt eine echte Debatte über die Moral der Droppung der Bombe am Ende der Zweiten Weltkriege. Und das entfaltet viele der öffentlichen Gespräche in diesem Zeitpunkt. Ich praise with Billy Graham, who was in favor of possible US first use because the US was a more morally righteous country.
But nevertheless, there's the kind of moral and ethical set of concerns inflects a lot of how this administration, the Eisenhower administration, thought about nuclear strategy, thought about military strategy, and therefore made them somewhat more circumspect than a kind of secular, strategic, hyper-rational logic might have, you think.
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