Chuck begins with analysis of the Trump administration's tariff implementation and personnel changes, including Mike Waltz's removal as national security advisor and Marco Rubio's expanding role within the administration. Then, he’s joined by Oren Cass, a leading conservative economic thinker, on America's trade policy and the challenges of reindustrialization. Cass argues that while tariffs and reindustrialization may be sound concepts, the Trump administration's implementation has been completely counter-productive. They discuss how traditional right-of-center thinking on free trade has evolved, questions whether China's integration into global markets has delivered promised benefits, and explores the regional winners and losers of trade agreements like NAFTA.Cass tackles questions about America's trade deficit, consumer willingness to pay more for domestic products, and whether reshoring manufacturing is practical for the American economy. The conversation examines the national security implications of trade agreements, the potential for losing allies to China's influence, and what realistic reindustrialization might look like in today's economy.Finally, Chuck answers listener questions on the executive branch's guardrails, expectations for "Resistance 2.0," potential federal intervention in college sports, and whether media scrutiny of public officials' backgrounds has gone too far.00:00 Introduction02:00 If tariffs actually are a good idea, the way they’ve been implemented hasn’t given it a chance to succeed03:30 The administration is only interested in communicating to their base07:30 What should we take away from Mike Waltz being removed as national security advisor?08:55 Marco Rubio is now holding four jobs in the administration09:45 Rubio has earned Trump’s trust13:15 Is the new model to move staff to new roles rather than fire them?15:15 Abigail Spanberger may have had the best 100 days of any Democrat17:55 Wes Moore announces he won’t run in 202820:35 Oren Cass joins the Chuck ToddCast! 22:35 Tools for achieving re-industrialization 23:35 Tariffs and reindustrialization is a good idea, Trump's rollout has been disastrous 25:35 The U.S. needs credible and sustainable trade policy 27:20 Right of center thinking for 40 years was simply "Free trade is good" 29:05 Has free and open trade been a net positive worldwide? 30:35 Does trade policy of the early 20th century make sense in the 21st century 32:20 Bringing China into the world market didn't lead to liberalization 33:50 Will we be forced to cut an unfavorable trade deal with China? 36:35 Wouldn't it make sense that the US had a trade deficit based on our consumption? 38:35 If we aren't selling other countries goods we produce, they buy our assets and debt 40:50 NAFTA produced winners and losers regionally in the United States 41:50 What could we have done differently to minimize the negative impacts of NAFTA? 44:35 Production has shifted from country to country based on lower costs 46:05 Will American consumers actually be willing to pay more for American made products? 48:50 How can we unwind globalization without severely damaging the U.S. economy? 50:50 The Toyota Camry has more American made parts than the Detroit built cars 52:35 Does reshoring low-cost manufacturing make sense for consumers and American businesses? 53:50 Will poor implementation of policy hurt the goal of reshoring manufacturing? 56:35 How do you weigh the benefits of national security provided by trade agreements? 1:01:05 Does America risk losing allies to China's sphere of influence? 1:02:05 Should our allies get a better deal than those that are unaligned or adversarial? 1:04:15 Does more trade equal less war? 1:07:05 What type of reindustrialization is realistic and what isn't? 1:10:05 Lack of competition has led to problems with Boeing 1:12:35 How long will it take to reindustrialize? 1:13:35 Would TPP have furthered the goal of isolating China?1:16:35 Chuck's thoughts on the interview Oren Cass 1:17:27 Ask Chuck 1:17:35 Were the guardrails on the executive branch always this frail? 1:20:35 What do you expect out of Resistance 2.0? 1:21:30 Will the federal government intervene in college sports? 1:22:50 Does the media go too deep into the background of public officials prior to their public service?(Timestamps may vary based on advertisements)
Chapter 1: What are the key issues with Trump's tariffs?
In fact, he did a New York Times op-ed, which is what inspired me to put him on. As I've promised to you, even if I'm skeptical of an idea, that doesn't mean I don't want to have somebody on here making their case and let's workshop it and, you know, let's have a back and forth. I think the conversation that I have with Oren Kass about
the tariffs as they've been implemented versus perhaps how he would have implemented. We'll see. Look, it's a tough argument to make, which is you got to sort of take some medicine for a while before the goal of what these tariffs are, which is to return some manufacturing back to the United States. It's going to take a while. And the question is whether you can
get enough patience from the public to put this off and whether the theory is right. You know, can you really motivate certain industries that have decided to manufacture outside the United States to come back? Is there enough incentive to do that? I think we're all about to find out, obviously. Now, a little point of order here.
We did this interview before Donald Trump sort of flippantly said, well, Maybe kids for Christmas are going to have to go with fewer toys and the dolls might cost a little bit much. I will tell you, that is what I think is going to be the most fascinating part. And I don't want to prejudge the conversation I have with Oren Kass for you.
But if I were in his shoes, I'd be worried that my theory of the case is may never get a chance to to be tested because of the poor implementation by this administration, the haphazard way that they've been dealing with the tariffs and the fact that there's, I think the signal has been sent, everything's kind of negotiable.
And if that's the case, then how do you, when does a company decide, okay, I'm finally going to bring everything here. But I do think politically, this White House has done a terrible job communicating the tariffs in general, a terrible job sort of preparing the country, preparing business for this. When you listen to Mr. Cass, there was another way this could have been done.
And in an alternative universe, perhaps in a more transparent and methodical way that you try to implement something like this, there may have been more political support. But it actually brings me to where I want to focus most of my opener here, which is Look, I've certainly given this Trump White House a hard time. I think it's been a terrible 100 days for them politically.
And a lot of Americans seem to agree that that's the case. I think that this White House has another huge problem and blind spot, and that is they only know how to communicate with their base, and they only seem interested in communicating with their base. Own the libs is still seems to be the mindset worrying about catering to the base and making them happy.
I could argue that this firing of Mike Waltz in some ways is more of a response to the base than it is anything else. I guess he hasn't been fired. I should I should correct myself. He just was simply moved to another position, which you got to, you know, I whatever you think of Donald Trump is at least he's showing.
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Chapter 2: How has the Trump administration's tariff policy evolved?
You know, poor old Reince Priebus was fired by tweet and was essentially it appeared essentially abandoned on air after Air Force One landed at Andrews. Now, I don't think that's the way he felt at the end of the day, but it certainly looked that way. And that certainly seemed to be a look that the president back then didn't seem to mind.
The fact that he gave Waltz a sort of a consolation prize, I think, shows that he would like to have some loyalty. And it's probably smarter, right? If you don't do that, who knows who Waltz may talk to? Ask Pete Hegseth what it's like when you fire former staffers and what happens when they start talking to the press. So I am intrigued by the decision that they have. And they have this extra...
They had this extra job that they hadn't filled because of the narrow House majority and the decision to pull back the nomination, which, of course, U.N. ambassador was originally supposed to go to Elise Stefanik. But what's interesting, and as my one of my producers, Lauren Gardner, put it to me, says, I hope you can keep track of all of Marco Rubio's titles right now.
He is the Senate-confirmed Secretary of State, but he's also the acting administrator of the USAID. He's also the acting archivist, and now he's also the National Security Advisor. Now, a lot of people are making Kissinger comparisons because the last person to hold both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor was Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon.
And that'll be an interesting question, whether— Rubio keeps this for a while or whether the president decides to reward Witkoff, his sort of personal negotiator from around the world, his special envoy for everything. Right. It wasn't just one thing. He sent him to Putin. He sent him to Iran. He sent him to Israel. So I think right now Witkoff is sort of his personal envoy.
I can tell you from my understanding is that Marco Rubio really has earned a lot of trust Donald Trump. You know, when you start to look at why, why was Waltz sort of pushed out? Was he pushed out because of the Jeffrey Goldberg signal incident? Or was he pushed out because MAGA never trusted him anyway, because he was a well-known sort of conventional or traditional national security Republican?
What do I mean by that? Somebody pre-Trump, right, where the Republican establishment was pre-Trump. Now, Marco Rubio is somebody that I think a lot of people, including myself, would have put him in that track, even the way he the way he ran the Intel committee with Mark Warner when they were one would be chair, one vice chair, depending on which party was in charge.
Seemed to also indicate that he really was sort of more on the conventional side of where of American foreign policy, which which I'd say center left and center right, you know, both share share that philosophy. But as as people have told me who are close to this situation, that that the more time that Trump has spent with Rubio and Rubio had proximity going for him. Right.
Obviously, we know this was a nasty primary fight in 2016 and there was no love lost between Marco Rubio, little Marco and Donald Trump and the hands comment, all that business. But that over the four years, Rubio became, you know, worked really hard to regain Trump's trust. Now, for some of you, that might be a huge turnoff. Some of you might think he's just being a hypocrite. And you know what?
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Chapter 3: What are the implications of NAFTA on American industries?
Chapter 4: How can reindustrialization benefit the U.S. economy?
They had this extra job that they hadn't filled because of the narrow House majority and the decision to pull back the nomination, which, of course, U.N. ambassador was originally supposed to go to Elise Stefanik. But what's interesting, and as my one of my producers, Lauren Gardner, put it to me, says, I hope you can keep track of all of Marco Rubio's titles right now.
He is the Senate-confirmed Secretary of State, but he's also the acting administrator of the USAID. He's also the acting archivist, and now he's also the National Security Advisor. Now, a lot of people are making Kissinger comparisons because the last person to hold both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor was Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon.
And that'll be an interesting question, whether— Rubio keeps this for a while or whether the president decides to reward Witkoff, his sort of personal negotiator from around the world, his special envoy for everything. Right. It wasn't just one thing. He sent him to Putin. He sent him to Iran. He sent him to Israel. So I think right now Witkoff is sort of his personal envoy.
I can tell you from my understanding is that Marco Rubio really has earned a lot of trust Donald Trump. You know, when you start to look at why, why was Waltz sort of pushed out? Was he pushed out because of the Jeffrey Goldberg signal incident? Or was he pushed out because MAGA never trusted him anyway, because he was a well-known sort of conventional or traditional national security Republican?
What do I mean by that? Somebody pre-Trump, right, where the Republican establishment was pre-Trump. Now, Marco Rubio is somebody that I think a lot of people, including myself, would have put him in that track, even the way he the way he ran the Intel committee with Mark Warner when they were one would be chair, one vice chair, depending on which party was in charge.
Seemed to also indicate that he really was sort of more on the conventional side of where of American foreign policy, which which I'd say center left and center right, you know, both share share that philosophy. But as as people have told me who are close to this situation, that that the more time that Trump has spent with Rubio and Rubio had proximity going for him. Right.
Obviously, we know this was a nasty primary fight in 2016 and there was no love lost between Marco Rubio, little Marco and Donald Trump and the hands comment, all that business. But that over the four years, Rubio became, you know, worked really hard to regain Trump's trust. Now, for some of you, that might be a huge turnoff. Some of you might think he's just being a hypocrite. And you know what?
None of us know the motive for sure. But he became secretary of state not because Donald Trump thought he owed the establishment wing of the party somebody to give a place to. He gave it to him because over time he started leaning on Rubio when it certainly came to do with anything having to do with policy, foreign policy in Latin America.
I mean, Donald Trump doesn't make any decision on Venezuela without running it by Rubio. And it was the case towards the end of his first term. So. I won't be surprised if this relationship of national security advisor and secretary of state is something that lasts a good six to nine months, which in a Trump White House would be a long time.
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Chapter 5: What are the challenges of reshoring manufacturing?
And no Westmore, that's a whole bunch of donors that are up for grabs. That's a whole bunch of operatives that are up for grabs. So an interesting decision, but I will promise you, Governor Moore, no one's really going to believe you've taken yourself out of 28 until you say it again. After after your your your 26 race, assuming you're successful in your reelection. All right.
Just wanted to get a couple of those things off off my little my my notepad of stuff that I keep. Hey, I got to mention this. Hey, I got to mention that my pause for a break. When we come back, my conversation with Orrin Cass. All right. And joining me now is Oren Kass. He is the chief economist and I guess founder of American Compass is their chief economist. I hope I have that correctly.
Oren and former Manhattan Institute fellow. Is that also correct? Also true. which has been a long time sort of economic. How would you describe the Manhattan Institute? It's always been to me where a lot of what I would call center-right conservatives end up, you know, sort of more in line with AEI for those that follow that world in D.C. Is that a fair comparison?
Yeah, I think that's right. They're outside the beltway. So they're a little more eclectic, do a lot on urban policy and so forth. But definitely in that conservative think tank world.
Chapter 6: How does trade policy affect national security?
Um, and, uh, it, it, how would I was going to describe you as sort of the, one of the authors or godfathers of this tariff policy, or at least the initial policy that, that, uh, president Trump rolled out. But instead of me doing it, describe it in your words, what is you, what was your role in this during the campaign and how much ownership do you take of this policy?
Well, it's an issue that American Compass has been working on since we started in 2020. Generally speaking, we sort of see the excesses of globalization as one of the major problems with the U.S. economy, something that has harmed a lot of workers and communities, something that both political parties, that economists ignored for much too long.
And so, you know, I think it's very important just to have a clear diagnosis of why this is a problem, right? Everybody said free trade was going to be great. And why might that not be the case? And then to have a clear idea of, okay, well, then what would you actually do about it?
Because it's, you know, some people would say you sort of have a toothpaste out of the tube situation where you can't just go back on what we may have decided, even if it was a bad decision. And so-
You know, we have developed sort of a broad range of policies and a pretty comprehensive agenda, I think, for what we call reindustrialization, which is the idea that we have to rebuild American industry for the sake of communities and good jobs, but also for the sake of economic growth, also for the sake of national security. And tariffs are an important piece of that.
So the idea of a global tariff is one. The idea of confronting China in particular and decoupling from China is another. And then there's a lot of other stuff. So conceptually, I would say we are very much on the same page and have been very encouraged by the direction the Trump administration has gone. In the specifics, I think as we've seen, there have been a lot of costs that I think are
are too high and higher than they need to be. And that's where we would depart on the specifics.
Look, the motivation for me to book you was your New York Times op-ed that, you know, You know, look, I'm a skeptic that we can re-industrialize the way you say it is. But the way you outlined how you would have implemented this versus how it was done, you had a very sensible thing. You were trying, you frankly were trying to take into account there would be some shock to the supply chain.
There'd be shock to business planning. And in some ways you wanted to telegraph everything that was gonna happen, but essentially by six months,
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Chapter 7: What lessons can we learn from the Trump administration's trade strategy?
Chapter 8: What future trade agreements should the U.S. pursue?
So how did you get, how did you get to where you've gotten intellectually?
Well, it's interesting. I would say that's just wrong about Romney. I think on a lot of issues, that's absolutely right. I think he was a very sort of conventional pre-Trump conservative. On the trade issue, he wasn't. And that was really my entry point into it. I still remember the meeting when we brought him the sort of standard briefing on, OK, here's what a Republican says about trade.
And he kind of looked through it and said, yeah, that's fine. But what are we going to do about China? And at that time, that was sort of a very strange question to ask. I remember the senior economic advisors said, well, you don't do anything about China. What's the problem? We have free trade.
And I think Romney brought a much more sort of pragmatic business view to the issue, which in many cases argues for a very free market approach. But when it comes to China, it really doesn't. That the kind of economic relationship we had with China was clearly just not... a functional one, if what you cared about was business success in the United States.
And so that kind of got me sent off on a journey to figure out, okay, what can we say about this? How would we approach it? And what I found was that in the right of center, there was just nothing.
That what had begun back in Reagan's day as some kind of very thoughtful economic reforms had just sort of ossified into this kind of market fundamentalism that just said, well, free trade is always good and we don't have to think about it any more than that. It's interesting.
One of the few guys- Is the size of our economy, though, over the last- basically since Reagan, right? And you go, and in many ways, the Democratic, you know, this is one of those cases, you know what, you know somebody's won an argument when somebody from the other political party starts making the same argument, right?
And so, right, the Democrats have essentially, at least Clinton and Obama, been more on the side of opening trade barriers and things like that. So, and certainly George W. Bush, I think, was part of that movement too, right? How do you, do you believe we, does the size of our economy indicate that that from a macro level was a good idea?
No, maybe I'm confused by the question. I don't know what the size.
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