The President's Daily Brief
PDB Situation Report | May 17th, 2025: Iran’s Secret Weapons Lab Revealed & Russia’s Battlefield Recovery
Sat, 17 May 2025
In this episode of The PDB Situation Report: Iran is caught red-handed. A new report reveals a previously unknown nuclear weapons development site, along with a covert missile production facility hidden behind oil and petrochemical operations. Alireza Jafarzadeh from the National Council of Resistance of Iran joins us to explain how the discovery was made. On the Eastern Front, Russian forces appear to be withstanding heavy casualties—and replacing losses fast enough to reinforce troop strength. George Barros from the Institute for the Study of War shares a new battlefield assessment and what it says about Moscow’s long-term strategy. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Beam: Visit https://shopbeam.com/MIKEand use code MIKE to get our exclusive discount of up to 40% off. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Chapter 1: What secret nuclear developments have been uncovered in Iran?
Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right. Let's get briefed. We'll start things off with a troubling new report out of Iran, a previously undisclosed nuclear weapons development site, who would have thought, and a covert missile production program hidden behind the facade of oil and petrochemical infrastructure.
Now, Alireza Jafrazadeh from the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the organization that helped expose this site, will join us to break it down. Later in the show, news from the battlefield in Ukraine. A new assessment suggests that Russian forces, though battered, are still managing to replace their losses and may even be growing in strength.
George Boros, friend of the show, and he's from the Institute for the Study of War, he'll join us with the latest. And George, by the way, just got back from Ukraine, so he'll have some interesting observations. But first, today's Situation Report Spotlight. A new report is raising alarms about Iran's nuclear ambitions.
An Iranian opposition group says it has uncovered a previously unknown nuclear weapons facility deep in Semnan province. That's far from the regime's established nuclear sites. Known internally as the Rainbow Site, well, doesn't that sound cheery? The compound spans nearly 2,500 acres and has operated for over a decade under the cover of a chemical company called Diba Energy Seba.
According to sources inside Iran, the facility's real purpose is the extraction of tritium, that's a radioactive material used to enhance nuclear weapons with no real legitimate civilian use. Now, the timing of this report is significant as it comes as the Trump administration engages in sensitive nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Joining us now is Ali Reza Jafrizadeh.
He's the deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the NCRI. His organization helped to expose this facility. Ali Reza, thank you very much for joining us here on The Situation Report. Thank you so much, Mike. Always a pleasure to be on your Situation Report. I appreciate you saying that. Well, let's get stuck into it.
Let's talk first of all about this newly identified facility inside Iran. How did your organization spot this? How did this come about?
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Chapter 2: How was the Iranian nuclear site discovered?
Well, this information came from the network inside Iran of the main Iranian opposition movement known as the MEK, which has a very large presence all over the country. They are very good in terms of the track record. This is the same movement that exposed the nuclear site in Natanz and Iraq in August of 2002, which triggered the IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear sites for the first time.
And then there were a host of other nuclear sites, experts, facilities, programs that this movement has exposed. The reason they're able to do it consistently is that they are all over the country. They are the movement for change in Iran. They have to monitor the activities of the Iranian regime, both for their own protection, but also in order to bring about change in the country.
And that's why this new information came from their sources. It took a while for them to process it, to go over the details, making sure that everything that they're putting out is accurate. And that's why they were ready to release it. And that's when we had the press conference just last week here in Washington, releasing that information.
Okay, so in your estimation, then the sources that are providing information on this newly discovered facility, those sources are credible?
Absolutely, they are proven to be credible over the past two, three decades. Interestingly, the information that released shows that the Iran regime has been working on building a new nuclear site that was unknown until we made the revelation.
Now the organization behind building this site is a entity known as the CEPAND, S-P-N-D, which is the entity that is run by the Minister of Defense, controlled by the Revolutionary Guards. and their sole task is to develop nuclear weapons. This is the organization that is the new form, new shape of the original organization that was part of what they called Ahmad Plan.
We exposed this organization back in July of 2011, and three years later, the State Department in 2014 designated this entity, and now everyone knows about it. Now, the structure of this facility was started back in 2009 and originated by, overseen by a person known as Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who is known also as the father of the Iran regime's nuclear weapons program.
He was behind a lot of the other sites and he's the one that was assassinated in October 2020, actually not too far from this site. Now the site was completed by 2013 and has been operational ever since. There's three facilities, we had the details of those sites and we said that
this whole place is controlled by Saban, but also we showed how they place it a very unusual way, guarded and protected by radar system, by air defense system. And while in order to keep it secret, they portrayed this as a site that is related to a paint factory. I'm not aware of any paint factory that would have this level of hiding and camouflage.
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Chapter 3: Is Iran's nuclear program solely for peaceful purposes?
For any of our viewers who are out there considering setting up front companies, you probably ought to be a little smarter than that. If you set up a front company and the people running that front company are IRGC officers known for their involvement in proliferation, eh, you could probably argue that's not the best backstop cover there. What was the primary function?
of this facility, which, again, according to reports that we've seen, had the odd name of the Rainbow Site. But what was the primary function?
The primary function, actually, they said on the surface that it's all about the oil and petrochemical facilities that are used to some chemical activities there. These are like benign looking things. But in fact, that's a new way, new camouflage to actually operate doing nuclear research, nuclear activities related to the development of nuclear warheads.
The reason we know that what they're doing there is not what they're announcing or they're telling the locals is that CEPAND, which is the organization whose job only is to work on the nuclear weapons program, has been heavily involved. Just two days ago, the US government again designated
a number of experts that are associated with Sapant, specifically working on detonation, which is another aspect that we exposed back in December of 2024. So, there's a whole host of, activities, sites, and operations by the Iran regime that the IAEA cannot keep up with them. The way the whole thing is structured, is built, there's no way you can really actually monitor this whole situation.
And that's why we're calling for the dismantlement of all of these sites, saying the entire nuclear program of the regime is all about the weapons. It has nothing to do with nuclear energy. Anything related to this must be shut down.
I take your point. I just don't think that in the real world that's going to happen. I don't think we're going to get to that point. But you're absolutely right. Look, if what you're saying is we're making a deal based on trust but verify, and yet there's no transparency in the inspection process, then you can't verify, then you don't have an agreement that means anything.
Ali Reza, there are a lot more questions here on my list of questions for Ali Reza. But if you could stay right where we are, right where you are, we have a break that we have to go to, and then we'll be right back with a situation report. Thanks very much for sticking around. Struggling with sleepless nights and exhausting days? Well, I hope not because that'd be miserable.
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Chapter 4: What is the current status of US-Iran nuclear negotiations?
But if you're a pragmatic individual, you should possibly look at this and go, I can't adhere to any agreement, so why am I pursuing some sort of negotiation to say that they're going to? And if you're not going to do that, then what's the alternative?
Well, the alternative is that first of all, you definitely want to emphasize and keep your position that there should be no enrichment capability on the part of the Iranian regime and understand that the other side is weaker. This is not 2015, this is not 2003. And third, this regime, because they're so desperate,
The one thing that would really move them, the one thing that would get them more worried is their existential threat, the possibility to be overthrown. They're aware of it. They know the population is not on their side. They know, and I think the whole world would understand that the real ultimate resolution of this issue, which is ending the nuclear threat of Iran,
is ending the rule of the clinics, that's of course the responsibility of the people of Iran and the organized resistance. But that's also a leverage. Unless the mullahs feel that the outside world is not going to just look at the ruling Mullahs is the only partner in Iran. They will look at the people of Iran. They will look at the organized resistance.
They will look at those who actually exposed these nuclear sites for years and decades. Those who are behind the uprisings in Iran, who are acting as engine for change. That's the real partner for the outside world, whether it's the United States or Europe. That's where you really need to invest. You need to open up. You need to explore that opportunity.
You need to emphasize publicly that the people of Iran have the right to confront the revolutionary guards, have the right to overthrow the repressive rulers. That's when you get the Ayatollahs to comply and to act based on that. Otherwise, they will continue dragging this issue. Okay.
Yeah, no, I think your point is sound. If I'm playing devil's advocate here, I would push back on the idea that there would be a popular uprising only because I think that a lot of the international community has been hoping for internal change for quite some time. And I think you're right. Again, I take your point that when there have been protests, when there has been unrest internally,
then I think the international community has done a terrible job of getting behind it, of supporting it, right? Not militarily, but being forceful in their other ways of supporting that unrest that takes place. So, what's your perception, or I guess, what's your opinion of the Trump administration's current actions in terms of their discussions, their rounds of talks with the Iranian regime?
Well, one thing I want to say is that they definitely need to stick to what they have said in the beginning. The stated goal is to prevent the Iran regime from obtaining nuclear weapons. And in order to achieve that, the enrichment program must be entirely shut down. It's very possible, it's very doable, only if you stick to it.
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Chapter 5: Why is internal resistance crucial to Iran's future?
The Ukrainians have provided their accounts for the casualties aggregated over the course of a year, which roughly equates to a number similar to that. We know that in previous months, about six months ago, the Russians were recruiting closer to 35 to 45,000 per month, about a one-to-one for their replacement.
But then, of course, in his Senate testimony a few weeks ago, the commander of American UCOM, General Cavoli, mentioned that the Russians were reconstituting and generating forces at a faster rate than what most Western analysts had expected. So, this higher number is sort of consistent with those various different factors. But I want to make a very clear point here.
The Russians, in our assessment, are not going to be able to recruit 60,000 guys per month indefinitely. The Russians are employing some very clever tactics to try to maximize the number of recruits that they can get. And they're doing things like putting forward these insane, very expensive one-time recruitment bonuses, the current being about $35,000 to $40,000 a pop just for your signup.
And oftentimes, what they'll do is they'll employ them with these temporary surges. So, you're only eligible to get that signup bonus if you sign up, say, between May 16th and May 27th. They'll put it up there for like a week. And so, if you sign up during this time, then you can take advantage of that juicy deal.
And look, you can certainly try to squeeze the juice that way, but in terms of a sustainable training pipeline, a sustainable force generation pipeline that can do this for many years on end, this is not looking particularly financially feasible, especially as we watch the damage this is doing to the Russian economy and their sovereign wealth fund.
Now, first of all, well done you for using the phrase concrete integer. That's the very first time that's been uttered on the Situation Report. And while you were talking, I was busy looking up what it meant. And I realized you were just referencing a number. So, yeah. Kudos to you.
But then I want to talk about the, in relation to the numbers that we're talking about in terms of replenishing those troops, 60,000 or so, any sense of whether we're talking about recruits or are there also conscripts? I mean, how many of these folks are volunteering and how many are being encouraged to volunteer?
Sure. They're all being encouraged to volunteer, that's for sure, but they're not conscripts. In the Russian military, there is a mandatory military service, a lottery that begins when you're at the age of 18 and you are liable to be conscripted and serve for up to a year. Conscripts by Russian law cannot fight in Russian wars outside of Russian territory. The Russians have
made legal amendments to have that include the parts of Ukraine that they've annexed that the Russians legally define as Russia. So conscripts can't fight in Ukraine. And this is a big red line for the Kremlin.
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Chapter 6: How is Russia maintaining its military strength in Ukraine?
I think that's about right. There's the combat footage, there's classified documents that one can collect or the table of contents of organization of Russian units when they go get wrecked. How many times have Russian units been reconstituted? We know what the doctrinal end strength of what a Russian battalion should be, what a Russian brigade should be.
And so, when you see a unit have been sent back to a training ground or be reconstituted or filled with replacement a certain number of times, that gives you a sense for how many casualties has been taken. But there's also a great repository of Russian publicly available information that can be exploited as well.
There are Russian legal documents, for example, that have to do with things like wills, so you can count the number of wills that have been processed. There are cemeteries that exist that have had additional annexes built onto them. There are entirely brand new military cemeteries that have been established since 2022, which you can see from space.
You can also look at the number of obituaries that are posted online. The British BDC's Russian service has an excellent, I mean, truly excellent research, investigative research program where they look and they scour the Russian language social media internet to look for obituaries of service members posted by friends and family.
And last I checked, if I recall correctly, they've identified at least 90,000 plus confirmed obituaries. And of course, this is a sliver of the number of full casualties because not everyone gets a written obituary. But it's another data point that you can use to confirm to build towards the whole picture.
Okay, so it's really an all-source effort, but still, as you pointed out, those numbers on both sides, Ukrainian and Russian casualties, losses in the course of this three-year effort, you have to take it with a grain of salt. Listen, George, I want to talk to you about your recent trip. You've just returned from Ukraine.
I'd like to get your impressions from that trip and also would like to talk to you about the negotiations, if you can even call them that, that were theoretically going to take place in Turkey. And at one point, there was some thought that it would be direct talks between Putin and Zelensky. But first, we have to take a quick break. All right.
So, if you wouldn't mind, George, if you'd stay right where you are, we'll be right back with George Boros and the Situation Report. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining me once again is the Russia team leader at the Institute for the Study of War, George Boros. George, thank you for sticking around. Now, you just got back from Ukraine. Talk to me about that trip.
Yeah, thank you. So, it was a very quick trip. Just spent a couple days in Kyiv with some meetings, some officials, some military officials, some warfighters, and it was great. My first trip in Ukraine this year and got to go meet with some very interesting warfighters that are innovating, changing the nature of contemporary land warfare.
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Chapter 7: What are the implications of Russia's recruitment strategy?
It is pretty much how do you manage to move a squad, 10 guys? How do you move a platoon, 20 to 50 guys and get them from point A on a battlefield, 800 meters or 1200 meters to point B?
That has become incredibly difficult because the Russians and the Ukrainians within about a maybe 15 to 20 kilometer distance from the zero line, it is incredibly difficult to maneuver because the drone game that both sides are bringing out there is so aggressive.
Basically, anything that has a signature larger than a vehicle gets schwacked immediately and is resulting with some very interesting technological and tactical adaptations to try to overcome it.
Talk to me about what those innovations look like.
Sure. So, both sides are trying to figure out how to be able to restore tactical maneuver, restore operational maneuver. So, on the Russian side, for example, they're experimenting now with new types of specialized units. So, these drones can fly very fast and they hit stuff. So, the Russians for the most part have greatly reduced
their use of armored personnel carriers and even providing vehicles for basic infantry maneuver as one would expect them to do by the Russian and Soviet textbook. They're now using motorcycles and they're actually building out a tactical doctrine for motorcycle platoons, motorcycle battalions, or how many motorcycles should be in an infantry battalion, for example.
And there's a coherent table of equipment for how many ATVs, how many buggies, how many motorcycles should these tactical units have? And the concept of operations is this, Mike. Because a armored personnel carrier has a big signature and it moves relatively slowly than a drone, it's an easy target for a drone.
But if you could put a guy on a motorcycle, with two guys on a motorcycle, and if they can blitz a line very quickly, if they can simply get to a glintage or a field fortification, like a trench or something, then there's about a 50-50 chance that those Russian infantrymen can take the trench.
And so, what they're doing now is they're trying to use vehicles that enable less protection, but more speed to carry a fewer number of people, but in a dispersed manner. That is the Russian tactical innovation, which is interesting. Mixed success rate, but it's the bleeding edge.
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