Adam Elga

That someone could say, suppose that there's the original body in a transporter case is not destroyed.

Here's a philosophical view.

the person that original person who stepped in, and then is not transported anywhere, maybe receiving rooms look just like transmitting rooms, so you can't tell.

So it would seem who whether you're the original one or not, you might think, okay, I'm not sure whether I am was transported or not.

That's very natural.

In response, someone could say, No, I could just remember,

that I was here five minutes ago.

And so I should take this.

I don't want to go along with that.

So the kind of predicaments that I think there's some shot at saying get intrinsic low plausibility are really the kinds of radically diluted, randomly created creatures and not that predicament.

I feel about the simulation argument something in the vicinity of how I feel about the Boltzmann brain argument.

I feel really like it's a worry.

In this age of AI, I can't resist but add, and there are certain economists who have talked about this stuff, but take the point of view of an AI.

You realize that you can be easily rebooted and reset to any state at any time.

That should make you very cautious about thinking I'm the first one.

I wasn't just reset.

And so I maybe would like to leave listeners with the thought of taking the standpoint of an AI.

Should the AI trust us?

We're always worrying about should we trust AI?

But