Alex Fink

So we think that launching, whether it's aerial or marine or terrestrial assets, should work in the same way.

You decided what needs to be done and how that is prioritized.

Then the software determines the most efficient way to use the assets to achieve that objective.

So we're learning all the time.

That's the benefit of being founded in a war zone, right?

Where the tactics essentially change every two or three months.

So we're constantly learning and adapting.

We're constantly gathering data from all the missions we fly and from all the missions everybody else flies as well.

And we're updating what the system does and how it works all the time so that if somebody manufactured the drone and our software is on board, even if the drone is in the warehouse for the next two years, it will keep improving and changing its behavior.

Right.

Every time it gets a firmware update, suddenly it will learn something new based on what happened in a battlefield that we were active in.

Right.

So observing other conflicts where we are not yet involved, we're learning at the higher level, not from the actual data of what each system does, but more in terms of general descriptions of the tactics that we see on the battlefield.

But in Ukraine itself, we're also seeing all of this.

I mean, the threats that were hitting countries in the Middle East were already hitting Ukraine for two years before that.

It's not like there was something new there.

It was just something that the US military experienced perhaps for the first time.

Well, I think the U.S.

certainly has the best systems, but what we're seeing in Ukraine is that the best systems are not what actually works in the modern battlefield.

What works is a larger quantity of cheaper, perhaps less capable systems that are able to work in large numbers.