Ambassador John Negroponte

Yeah, and when you're trying to put, here's the issue, trying to put incident X into the context or perspective of the entire conflict. And, you know, then you get into fairly subjective judgments, I agree. But, you know, you still have to make the judgment as to whether or not it's the right thing for us to be in that conflict.

Well, maybe it tells you that these regional conflicts were not as important as we thought they were. You could make that argument, I guess. In other words, it may not have had much to do with the downfall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Afghanistan did have something to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, because The Soviets were sick and tired of their occupation of Afghanistan.

Well, maybe it tells you that these regional conflicts were not as important as we thought they were. You could make that argument, I guess. In other words, it may not have had much to do with the downfall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Afghanistan did have something to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, because The Soviets were sick and tired of their occupation of Afghanistan.

Well, maybe it tells you that these regional conflicts were not as important as we thought they were. You could make that argument, I guess. In other words, it may not have had much to do with the downfall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Afghanistan did have something to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, because The Soviets were sick and tired of their occupation of Afghanistan.

And they came to us in the late 1980s. I was on the National Security Council with Colin Powell. And they came to us and said, we want to discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I, being a hardcore Cold Warrior at the time, said, Colin, don't believe them. That's a trick. It's a trick. And his answer to me was really good. He said,

And they came to us in the late 1980s. I was on the National Security Council with Colin Powell. And they came to us and said, we want to discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I, being a hardcore Cold Warrior at the time, said, Colin, don't believe them. That's a trick. It's a trick. And his answer to me was really good. He said,

And they came to us in the late 1980s. I was on the National Security Council with Colin Powell. And they came to us and said, we want to discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I, being a hardcore Cold Warrior at the time, said, Colin, don't believe them. That's a trick. It's a trick. And his answer to me was really good. He said,

You know, John, if you had as many beers as I've had with Soviet generals and Soviet admirals, you would know they want to get the hell out of there.

You know, John, if you had as many beers as I've had with Soviet generals and Soviet admirals, you would know they want to get the hell out of there.

You know, John, if you had as many beers as I've had with Soviet generals and Soviet admirals, you would know they want to get the hell out of there.

Well, I mean, I'm sorry we lost Vietnam, frankly. I'm not in the school that thinks it was a travesty, nor do I think it was a great human rights situation. Because I knew all those government officials who ran down to the village and province level. I knew them all because of my experience as a provincial reporter.

Well, I mean, I'm sorry we lost Vietnam, frankly. I'm not in the school that thinks it was a travesty, nor do I think it was a great human rights situation. Because I knew all those government officials who ran down to the village and province level. I knew them all because of my experience as a provincial reporter.

Well, I mean, I'm sorry we lost Vietnam, frankly. I'm not in the school that thinks it was a travesty, nor do I think it was a great human rights situation. Because I knew all those government officials who ran down to the village and province level. I knew them all because of my experience as a provincial reporter.

A loss of political will. I think that we got to the point in... The fall of 1972, where if we had wanted to maintain a residual presence in South Vietnam with, let's say, 25,000 troops and continued air support and some continued economic assistance, we might have been able to pull that off. But I'm the first to admit that the political atmosphere had become poisonous, right?

A loss of political will. I think that we got to the point in... The fall of 1972, where if we had wanted to maintain a residual presence in South Vietnam with, let's say, 25,000 troops and continued air support and some continued economic assistance, we might have been able to pull that off. But I'm the first to admit that the political atmosphere had become poisonous, right?

A loss of political will. I think that we got to the point in... The fall of 1972, where if we had wanted to maintain a residual presence in South Vietnam with, let's say, 25,000 troops and continued air support and some continued economic assistance, we might have been able to pull that off. But I'm the first to admit that the political atmosphere had become poisonous, right?

I mean, it was just, it just became too hard. We'd spent our political capital with most, with many of the American people and certainly with the Congress.

I mean, it was just, it just became too hard. We'd spent our political capital with most, with many of the American people and certainly with the Congress.

I mean, it was just, it just became too hard. We'd spent our political capital with most, with many of the American people and certainly with the Congress.

But also that if Vietnam fell, there was the danger that then the Vietnamese might go on to other parts of Southeast Asia, which they in fact did not do.