Andrew Marantz

Great episode. And so what I sort of see that political order thing as doing is trying to get outside, trying to get on a much bigger timeline. And I sort of see, I don't know if Gerstle would co-sign this, I might be out on a limb here, but I sort of see it as like a structure of scientific revolutions of politics. Mm-hmm.

The structure of scientific revolutions where we get paradigm shift from, it's not like... Is it the book by Thomas Kuhn that coins the term paradigm shift? The philosopher of science who, when he's talking about a paradigm shift, he's not talking about... oh, we didn't have microscopes and now we do. What a paradigm shift. That's really useful.

The structure of scientific revolutions where we get paradigm shift from, it's not like... Is it the book by Thomas Kuhn that coins the term paradigm shift? The philosopher of science who, when he's talking about a paradigm shift, he's not talking about... oh, we didn't have microscopes and now we do. What a paradigm shift. That's really useful.

He's talking about ideas that are inconceivable, unthinkable, not allowed by... Like, you don't even form them in your mind because they're unthinkable. And so if you take that into the structure of political orders and how they shift... Things that were unthinkable as an Eisenhower Republican or a Nixon Republican, you know, you don't just attack and defund the welfare state.

He's talking about ideas that are inconceivable, unthinkable, not allowed by... Like, you don't even form them in your mind because they're unthinkable. And so if you take that into the structure of political orders and how they shift... Things that were unthinkable as an Eisenhower Republican or a Nixon Republican, you know, you don't just attack and defund the welfare state.

That's not how politics works. Then after the Reagan Revolution, all you do is different degrees of attack the welfare state, right? So in that sense, if we want to talk about the timeline of what it would mean for Trump to be winning and reshifting, I think you said, the constitutional order, part of what I think about is if the neoliberal order is cracked, as Gerstle says it is,

That's not how politics works. Then after the Reagan Revolution, all you do is different degrees of attack the welfare state, right? So in that sense, if we want to talk about the timeline of what it would mean for Trump to be winning and reshifting, I think you said, the constitutional order, part of what I think about is if the neoliberal order is cracked, as Gerstle says it is,

Then the question is, what will succeed it? It could just be that we just sort of muddle through with nothing to replace it, and it's just what Gramsci would call the time of monsters, like, indefinitely. Or it could be... Abundance? It could be abundance. Right. But so, you need a vision for what will replace it, as you know. The whole conclusion of the book is about political orders. Right.

Then the question is, what will succeed it? It could just be that we just sort of muddle through with nothing to replace it, and it's just what Gramsci would call the time of monsters, like, indefinitely. Or it could be... Abundance? It could be abundance. Right. But so, you need a vision for what will replace it, as you know. The whole conclusion of the book is about political orders. Right.

And so... If abundance liberalism is what succeeds neoliberalism, that's an answer. If Trumpist competitive authoritarianism is what succeeds it, that is an answer. And in a way, this is like a little sort of weird to think about, but it may be the case that it's already happened and we just don't know it yet. This is kind of the Schrodinger's cat thing.

And so... If abundance liberalism is what succeeds neoliberalism, that's an answer. If Trumpist competitive authoritarianism is what succeeds it, that is an answer. And in a way, this is like a little sort of weird to think about, but it may be the case that it's already happened and we just don't know it yet. This is kind of the Schrodinger's cat thing.

I mean, when the rise and fall of the New Deal order came out, The book's introduction said, the New Deal order is over, but we don't yet know what will replace it. That book came out in 1989. So we might be sitting here in a timeline where Trumpism has replaced neoliberalism in 2016, and we just don't know it.

I mean, when the rise and fall of the New Deal order came out, The book's introduction said, the New Deal order is over, but we don't yet know what will replace it. That book came out in 1989. So we might be sitting here in a timeline where Trumpism has replaced neoliberalism in 2016, and we just don't know it.

Yeah, I don't disagree that there are fissures and tensions within the Republican coalition. I mean, one thing about the BAP and Yarvin and all this stuff, the cadres are interested in reading them, but the, you know, chief ideologists in the White House are retweeting them.

Yeah, I don't disagree that there are fissures and tensions within the Republican coalition. I mean, one thing about the BAP and Yarvin and all this stuff, the cadres are interested in reading them, but the, you know, chief ideologists in the White House are retweeting them.

And not only is the vice president reading them, but he's saying things like, when the Supreme Court gives us an order we don't like, we should say, the justice has made his order, now let him enforce it, right? So I think you could put together some worrisome signs. I also think the strength or weakness of the opposition matters enormously in this too.

And not only is the vice president reading them, but he's saying things like, when the Supreme Court gives us an order we don't like, we should say, the justice has made his order, now let him enforce it, right? So I think you could put together some worrisome signs. I also think the strength or weakness of the opposition matters enormously in this too.

So in every place in India, in Hungary, in Israel, the reactionary right is able to rampage to victory precisely because of the weakness and division within the opposition. So none of this, I agree, is foretold. One of the things I worry about is it kind of overly rigid reliance on the kind of playbook stuff, like this isn't how it's supposed to be done.

So in every place in India, in Hungary, in Israel, the reactionary right is able to rampage to victory precisely because of the weakness and division within the opposition. So none of this, I agree, is foretold. One of the things I worry about is it kind of overly rigid reliance on the kind of playbook stuff, like this isn't how it's supposed to be done.

Because I agree, he's doing different things than what Orban is doing. He's doing some Bukele stuff. He's doing some improvisation. I just woke up today and thought of something weird and put it on Truth Social. It's a hodgepodge of stuff.