Annie Jacobsen

The missiles start hitting when the bombs start going off. And that is about getting yourself out of the Pentagon, let's say, getting yourself to one of these nuclear bunkers that I write about at length in the book. So how much can you ask of a human, right? Because it comes down to a human. The Secretary of Defense is a human. And imagine that job while trying to advise the president.

The missiles start hitting when the bombs start going off. And that is about getting yourself out of the Pentagon, let's say, getting yourself to one of these nuclear bunkers that I write about at length in the book. So how much can you ask of a human, right? Because it comes down to a human. The Secretary of Defense is a human. And imagine that job while trying to advise the president.

And again, you're the president who's not really been paying attention to this because he has many other things to deal with. Speed is not conducive to wisdom.

And again, you're the president who's not really been paying attention to this because he has many other things to deal with. Speed is not conducive to wisdom.

And again, you're the president who's not really been paying attention to this because he has many other things to deal with. Speed is not conducive to wisdom.

That is a term in sort of the national security, nuclear command and control, historical documentation that many of the people that you might call the more dovish type people are, you know, worried about. That the more hawkish people are going to, the military advisors, right, are going to be jamming the president to make these decisions about which targets. Not if.

That is a term in sort of the national security, nuclear command and control, historical documentation that many of the people that you might call the more dovish type people are, you know, worried about. That the more hawkish people are going to, the military advisors, right, are going to be jamming the president to make these decisions about which targets. Not if.

That is a term in sort of the national security, nuclear command and control, historical documentation that many of the people that you might call the more dovish type people are, you know, worried about. That the more hawkish people are going to, the military advisors, right, are going to be jamming the president to make these decisions about which targets. Not if.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Well, you've raised a really important question that we look to the historical record for that answer, right? Because astonishingly, all of this began – like when Russia first got the bomb in 1949 – The powers that be, and I write about them in the book in a setup to the first, you know, for the moment of launch, right? Like, it's called how we got here, right?

Well, you've raised a really important question that we look to the historical record for that answer, right? Because astonishingly, all of this began – like when Russia first got the bomb in 1949 – The powers that be, and I write about them in the book in a setup to the first, you know, for the moment of launch, right? Like, it's called how we got here, right?

Well, you've raised a really important question that we look to the historical record for that answer, right? Because astonishingly, all of this began – like when Russia first got the bomb in 1949 – The powers that be, and I write about them in the book in a setup to the first, you know, for the moment of launch, right? Like, it's called how we got here, right?

And you see, and I cite, you know, declassified documents from some of these early meetings where nuclear war plans were being laid out. And absolutely, back in the 1950s, the generals and the admirals that were running the nuclear command and control system believed that we could fight and win a nuclear war, despite hundreds of millions of people dying. This was the prevailing thought.

And you see, and I cite, you know, declassified documents from some of these early meetings where nuclear war plans were being laid out. And absolutely, back in the 1950s, the generals and the admirals that were running the nuclear command and control system believed that we could fight and win a nuclear war, despite hundreds of millions of people dying. This was the prevailing thought.

And you see, and I cite, you know, declassified documents from some of these early meetings where nuclear war plans were being laid out. And absolutely, back in the 1950s, the generals and the admirals that were running the nuclear command and control system believed that we could fight and win a nuclear war, despite hundreds of millions of people dying. This was the prevailing thought.

And only over time did the kind of concept come into play that, no, we can never have a nuclear war. It's the famous Gorbachev and Reagan joint statement, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But before that, many people believed that it could be won, and they were preparing for that.

And only over time did the kind of concept come into play that, no, we can never have a nuclear war. It's the famous Gorbachev and Reagan joint statement, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But before that, many people believed that it could be won, and they were preparing for that.

And only over time did the kind of concept come into play that, no, we can never have a nuclear war. It's the famous Gorbachev and Reagan joint statement, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But before that, many people believed that it could be won, and they were preparing for that.