Antony Blinken

But in terms of direct conflict, I don't think we've been close, but it's something that we've had to be very mindful of.

So first, if you look at the trajectory of the conflict, because we saw it coming, we were able to make sure that not only were we prepared and allies and partners were prepared, but that the Ukraine was prepared.

So first, if you look at the trajectory of the conflict, because we saw it coming, we were able to make sure that not only were we prepared and allies and partners were prepared, but that the Ukraine was prepared.

We made sure that well before the Russian aggression happened, starting in September, the Russian aggression happened in February, starting in September, and then again in December, we quietly got a lot of weapons to Ukraine to make sure that they had in hand what they needed to defend themselves.

We made sure that well before the Russian aggression happened, starting in September, the Russian aggression happened in February, starting in September, and then again in December, we quietly got a lot of weapons to Ukraine to make sure that they had in hand what they needed to defend themselves.

Things like stingers, javelins that they could use that were instrumental in preventing Russia from taking Kyiv, from rolling over the country, erasing it from the map, and indeed pushing the Russians back But I think what's so important to understand is at different points in time, people get focused on one weapon system or another. Is it an Abrams tank? Is it an F-16? Is it an Atacom, a missile?

Things like stingers, javelins that they could use that were instrumental in preventing Russia from taking Kyiv, from rolling over the country, erasing it from the map, and indeed pushing the Russians back But I think what's so important to understand is at different points in time, people get focused on one weapon system or another. Is it an Abrams tank? Is it an F-16? Is it an Atacom, a missile?

What we've had to look at each and every time is not only Should we give this particular system to the Ukrainians? But do they know how to use it? Do they have the requisite training? Can they maintain it? Is it part of a coherent plan? All of those things factored into the decisions we made on what to give them and when to give it.

What we've had to look at each and every time is not only Should we give this particular system to the Ukrainians? But do they know how to use it? Do they have the requisite training? Can they maintain it? Is it part of a coherent plan? All of those things factored into the decisions we made on what to give them and when to give it.

But in each and every time, it was to make sure that they had what they needed to defend themselves. In terms of diplomacy, we've exerted extraordinary diplomacy in bringing and keeping together more than 50 countries, not only in Europe, but well beyond, in support of Ukraine and in defense of these principles that Russia also attacked back in February of that year.

But in each and every time, it was to make sure that they had what they needed to defend themselves. In terms of diplomacy, we've exerted extraordinary diplomacy in bringing and keeping together more than 50 countries, not only in Europe, but well beyond, in support of Ukraine and in defense of these principles that Russia also attacked back in February of that year.

Look, I worked very hard in the lead up to the war, including meetings with my Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Geneva a couple of months before the war, trying to find a way to see if we could prevent it, trying to test the proposition

Look, I worked very hard in the lead up to the war, including meetings with my Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Geneva a couple of months before the war, trying to find a way to see if we could prevent it, trying to test the proposition

whether this was really about Russia's concerns for its security, concerns somehow about Ukraine and the threat that it posed, or NATO and the threat that it posed, or whether this was about what it in fact is about, which is Putin's imperial ambitions and the desire to recreate a greater Russia, to subsume Ukraine back into Russia.

whether this was really about Russia's concerns for its security, concerns somehow about Ukraine and the threat that it posed, or NATO and the threat that it posed, or whether this was about what it in fact is about, which is Putin's imperial ambitions and the desire to recreate a greater Russia, to subsume Ukraine back into Russia.

But we had to test that proposition, and we were intensely engaged diplomatically with Russia. Since then, Since then, had there been any opportunity to engage diplomatically in a way that could end the war on just and durable terms, we would have been the first to seize them. Unfortunately, at least till this moment, we haven't seen any signs that Russia's been genuinely prepared to engage.

But we had to test that proposition, and we were intensely engaged diplomatically with Russia. Since then, Since then, had there been any opportunity to engage diplomatically in a way that could end the war on just and durable terms, we would have been the first to seize them. Unfortunately, at least till this moment, we haven't seen any signs that Russia's been genuinely prepared to engage.

I hope that that changes.

I hope that that changes.

Well, first, what we've left is Ukraine, which was not self-evident because Putin's ambition was to erase it from the map. We stopped that. Putin has failed. His strategic objective in regaining Ukraine has failed and will not succeed. Ukraine is standing. And I believe it also has extraordinary potential, not only to have survived, but actually to thrive going forward.