Antony Blinken

No, I disagree with that. And again, I— mentioned how we've gone at humanitarian assistance from day one, and that's been a perennial and ongoing effort throughout this time. When it comes to Rafah, we had deep concerns about a direct attack and the use of the 2,000-pound munitions in densely populated areas.

What Israel wound up doing in Rafah was very different from what they were planning to do before we engaged with them. So... So you feel like you've been effective in shaping the conduct of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's— I think the question we had was how can we most effectively both shape the conflict but also bring an end to the conflict.

What Israel wound up doing in Rafah was very different from what they were planning to do before we engaged with them. So... So you feel like you've been effective in shaping the conduct of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's— I think the question we had was how can we most effectively both shape the conflict but also bring an end to the conflict.

And the focus on getting a ceasefire hostage agreement was what was, in our estimation, the quickest and most durable way to get an end. And as I said, Hamas won. When they saw Israel under pressure publicly, they pulled back. The other thing that got Hamas to pull back—

And the focus on getting a ceasefire hostage agreement was what was, in our estimation, the quickest and most durable way to get an end. And as I said, Hamas won. When they saw Israel under pressure publicly, they pulled back. The other thing that got Hamas to pull back—

was their belief, their hope, that there'd be a wider conflict, that Hezbollah would attack Israel, that Iran would attack Israel, that other actors would attack Israel, and that Israel would have its hands full and Hamas could continue what it was doing. So we've worked very hard to make sure that that didn't happen.

was their belief, their hope, that there'd be a wider conflict, that Hezbollah would attack Israel, that Iran would attack Israel, that other actors would attack Israel, and that Israel would have its hands full and Hamas could continue what it was doing. So we've worked very hard to make sure that that didn't happen.

Part of that was making sure that Israel had what it needed to defend itself to deter broader aggression. The second part of that was when we were on the precipice on multiple occasions of having the wider war that Hamas wanted, we found ways through diplomacy and through defense and deterrence to avert it.

Part of that was making sure that Israel had what it needed to defend itself to deter broader aggression. The second part of that was when we were on the precipice on multiple occasions of having the wider war that Hamas wanted, we found ways through diplomacy and through defense and deterrence to avert it.

No, that's not accurate. What we've seen time and again is Hamas not concluding a deal that it should have concluded. There have been times when actions that Israel has taken have, yes, made it more difficult, but there's been a rationale for those actions, even if they've sometimes made getting to a conclusion more difficult. For example, the killing of Sinwar.

No, that's not accurate. What we've seen time and again is Hamas not concluding a deal that it should have concluded. There have been times when actions that Israel has taken have, yes, made it more difficult, but there's been a rationale for those actions, even if they've sometimes made getting to a conclusion more difficult. For example, the killing of Sinwar.

In the absence of SINWAR, where you had basically a single decider, that happened just at a point where we thought we might be able to bring this agreement over the finish line. All of a sudden, there's not a single decider, and it's a lot harder to get a decision out of Hamas. So all of these actions have second and third order effects that you have to calculate. But fundamentally, look...

In the absence of SINWAR, where you had basically a single decider, that happened just at a point where we thought we might be able to bring this agreement over the finish line. All of a sudden, there's not a single decider, and it's a lot harder to get a decision out of Hamas. So all of these actions have second and third order effects that you have to calculate. But fundamentally, look...

One of the things that I found a little astounding throughout is that for all of the understandable criticism of the way Israel has conducted itself in Gaza, you hear virtually nothing from anyone since October 7th about Hamas. Why there hasn't been a unanimous chorus around the world for Hamas to put down its weapons, to give up the hostages, to surrender.

One of the things that I found a little astounding throughout is that for all of the understandable criticism of the way Israel has conducted itself in Gaza, you hear virtually nothing from anyone since October 7th about Hamas. Why there hasn't been a unanimous chorus around the world for Hamas to put down its weapons, to give up the hostages, to surrender.

I don't know what the answer is to that. Israel on various occasions has offered safe passage to Hamas's leadership and fighters out of Gaza. Where is the world? Where is the world in saying, yeah, do that. End this. Stop the suffering of people that you brought on. Now, again, that doesn't absolve Israel of the way of its actions in conducting the war.

I don't know what the answer is to that. Israel on various occasions has offered safe passage to Hamas's leadership and fighters out of Gaza. Where is the world? Where is the world in saying, yeah, do that. End this. Stop the suffering of people that you brought on. Now, again, that doesn't absolve Israel of the way of its actions in conducting the war.

But I do have to question how it is we haven't seen a greater sustained condemnation and pressure on Hamas to stop what it started and to end the suffering of people that it initiated.

But I do have to question how it is we haven't seen a greater sustained condemnation and pressure on Hamas to stop what it started and to end the suffering of people that it initiated.

I have... inordinate respect for the people in this department who've not only had different views of the policies that we pursued, but have expressed those views, including in what's been a time-honored tradition of the department, which is something called a descent channel cable. This is the ability of any officer in the department.