Antony Blinken

If there's going to be a ceasefire, it has to be one that holds. And that means that there has to be a credible deterrent because Putin will use any ceasefire to rest, refit, and then eventually re-attack.

If there's going to be a ceasefire, it has to be one that holds. And that means that there has to be a credible deterrent because Putin will use any ceasefire to rest, refit, and then eventually re-attack.

If there's going to be a ceasefire, it has to be one that holds. And that means that there has to be a credible deterrent because Putin will use any ceasefire to rest, refit, and then eventually re-attack.

Oh, I think they're different ways that each of them probably looks at it. They probably see some things that they like and some things that they have to be concerned about, too, because... How would you spell it out? You know... Look, a certain degree of unpredictability is... can be useful. And it may be that in the case of adversaries, competitors, that's something that does concern them.

Oh, I think they're different ways that each of them probably looks at it. They probably see some things that they like and some things that they have to be concerned about, too, because... How would you spell it out? You know... Look, a certain degree of unpredictability is... can be useful. And it may be that in the case of adversaries, competitors, that's something that does concern them.

Oh, I think they're different ways that each of them probably looks at it. They probably see some things that they like and some things that they have to be concerned about, too, because... How would you spell it out? You know... Look, a certain degree of unpredictability is... can be useful. And it may be that in the case of adversaries, competitors, that's something that does concern them.

But the real question is how that actually plays out in practice. What are the policies that the administration pursues? What's the effect of those policies? That's where the rubber meets the road. So at some point, you actually have to make decisions. You have to choose. You have to pursue a certain policy.

But the real question is how that actually plays out in practice. What are the policies that the administration pursues? What's the effect of those policies? That's where the rubber meets the road. So at some point, you actually have to make decisions. You have to choose. You have to pursue a certain policy.

But the real question is how that actually plays out in practice. What are the policies that the administration pursues? What's the effect of those policies? That's where the rubber meets the road. So at some point, you actually have to make decisions. You have to choose. You have to pursue a certain policy.

We've done everything possible to make sure that it didn't come to that point and that that was not a decision that anyone had to make. And I think we've been very successful in doing that for a number of reasons.

We've done everything possible to make sure that it didn't come to that point and that that was not a decision that anyone had to make. And I think we've been very successful in doing that for a number of reasons.

We've done everything possible to make sure that it didn't come to that point and that that was not a decision that anyone had to make. And I think we've been very successful in doing that for a number of reasons.

Look, we said, and I'll continue to say, that we would do everything possible to ensure that Taiwan had the means to defend itself. But part of that, though, is making sure that—and this gets back to Ukraine, among other things—

Look, we said, and I'll continue to say, that we would do everything possible to ensure that Taiwan had the means to defend itself. But part of that, though, is making sure that—and this gets back to Ukraine, among other things—

Look, we said, and I'll continue to say, that we would do everything possible to ensure that Taiwan had the means to defend itself. But part of that, though, is making sure that—and this gets back to Ukraine, among other things—

One of the reasons that our response to Ukraine was so important was because this aggression committed against Ukrainians and against the country was also an aggression against some pretty basic principles at the heart of the international system that everyone looks at. And had we allowed this to go forward with impunity, the message to would-be aggressors anywhere is open season.

One of the reasons that our response to Ukraine was so important was because this aggression committed against Ukrainians and against the country was also an aggression against some pretty basic principles at the heart of the international system that everyone looks at. And had we allowed this to go forward with impunity, the message to would-be aggressors anywhere is open season.

One of the reasons that our response to Ukraine was so important was because this aggression committed against Ukrainians and against the country was also an aggression against some pretty basic principles at the heart of the international system that everyone looks at. And had we allowed this to go forward with impunity, the message to would-be aggressors anywhere is open season.

You can get away with it. One of the most powerful moments in the aggression against Ukraine was when the Japanese prime minister, half a world away, Kishida, the then prime minister, who stood up almost immediately, put in his lot with Ukraine and said, what's happening in Ukraine today could be happening in East Asia tomorrow.

You can get away with it. One of the most powerful moments in the aggression against Ukraine was when the Japanese prime minister, half a world away, Kishida, the then prime minister, who stood up almost immediately, put in his lot with Ukraine and said, what's happening in Ukraine today could be happening in East Asia tomorrow.