Arthur Kroeber

And it was completely different than the old central planning regime, which was autarkic and inward-looking.

Second, you had this domestic competition environment, which was really cutthroat and which involved a lot of international companies, right?

And this is a little bit of a difference to Japan, which always kept the foreign companies out of its domestic market.

Their companies operated globally, right?

very, very well, but the domestic market was very protected.

China's domestic market was not that protected.

And so they were always willing to bring in companies that they thought would be able to spark some technological change.

And again,

You can say – so what this did is it created a field in which maybe the government has the right ideas, maybe they don't.

But you have a crucible in which their ideas can be tested.

You know, very competitive domestic market where you have a lot of the big international players doing their own thing as well.

And so that the things that work get some validation and you can keep building on those successes.

So I think that's a really important – and then just the sheer –

scale at which they were able and willing to support what appeared to be losing bets for a long time does matter, right?

And you could contrast their view, for example, in solar energy, where they said, look,

We want to be big in solar energy.

And again, they started thinking about this in 2005.

What do we need to do?

So they identified the whole supply chain from the raw silicon inputs through all of the modules into the finished panels.

And they said, we want to be in every stage of that.