Arthur Kroeber

All of these have sufficiently large revenue streams and access to capital that they can move independently and will be able to leverage their

their connections within the system, both at the central level and the local government level where they get a lot of their support to do their own thing.

So, yeah, it will be – yeah, you will not have a national monopoly solution to this.

That almost never occurs in China.

I think one of their key advantages would have been- Because you think the fragmentation becomes an obstacle.

Right.

So the ability to concentrate your limited compute resources in one thing instead of scattered around.

Yeah, no, I think that's a fair point, right?

And then, so that then comes back to how fast can they solve the chip problem domestically?

Yeah.

Because if they can solve that really fast, then that constraint goes away.

I think that really gets to the heart of a lot of stuff.

And I don't have a great answer to that, right?

Because fundamentally, what you're saying is that there needs to be a communication system, a network of interactions between two highly competitive zones, the US and China, basically, where they have to...

you know, be able to operate with some degree of trust, right?

And I think the problem that we face in trying to analyze this is a lot of the analogies that you might reach for, you know, break down at some point.

So you brought up the red telephone, which basically is a reference to the line of communication that the U.S.

and Soviet Union had during the Cold War, where the threat that you were trying to avert was nuclear holocaust, basically.

You know, and

In some ways, I think that's an apt analogy, and we kind of need to think broadly along those terms.