Bill Ackman

The battle comes when they don't want you down. Okay. And a lot of that has to do with... I would say pride, normal human kind of stuff. You know, a lot of times a board of an underperforming company doesn't want to admit that they've underperformed. And boards of directors 20 years ago when we started Pershing Square were pretty cushy jobs.

The battle comes when they don't want you down. Okay. And a lot of that has to do with... I would say pride, normal human kind of stuff. You know, a lot of times a board of an underperforming company doesn't want to admit that they've underperformed. And boards of directors 20 years ago when we started Pershing Square were pretty cushy jobs.

The battle comes when they don't want you down. Okay. And a lot of that has to do with... I would say pride, normal human kind of stuff. You know, a lot of times a board of an underperforming company doesn't want to admit that they've underperformed. And boards of directors 20 years ago when we started Pershing Square were pretty cushy jobs.

Sit on a board of a company, you play golf with the CEO, you know, at nice golf courses. You make a few hundred thousand dollars a year to go to four meetings. It was kind of a rubber stamp world where boards, you know, at the end of the day, the CEO really ran the show.

Sit on a board of a company, you play golf with the CEO, you know, at nice golf courses. You make a few hundred thousand dollars a year to go to four meetings. It was kind of a rubber stamp world where boards, you know, at the end of the day, the CEO really ran the show.

Sit on a board of a company, you play golf with the CEO, you know, at nice golf courses. You make a few hundred thousand dollars a year to go to four meetings. It was kind of a rubber stamp world where boards, you know, at the end of the day, the CEO really ran the show.

Once shareholders could actually dislodge board members and they could lose their seats, and that's really the rise of shareholder activism, boards started taking their responsibilities much more seriously because directors are typically, you know, there are many cases they're retired CEOs. This is kind of how they're making a living in the later part of their career. They sit on four boards.

Once shareholders could actually dislodge board members and they could lose their seats, and that's really the rise of shareholder activism, boards started taking their responsibilities much more seriously because directors are typically, you know, there are many cases they're retired CEOs. This is kind of how they're making a living in the later part of their career. They sit on four boards.

Once shareholders could actually dislodge board members and they could lose their seats, and that's really the rise of shareholder activism, boards started taking their responsibilities much more seriously because directors are typically, you know, there are many cases they're retired CEOs. This is kind of how they're making a living in the later part of their career. They sit on four boards.

They collect a million, a million and a half dollars a year in director's fees. If they get thrown off the board by the shareholders, that's embarrassing, obviously, and it affects their ability to get on other boards. Again, incentives, as I said earlier, drive all human behavior. The incentives of directors, they want to preserve their board seats.

They collect a million, a million and a half dollars a year in director's fees. If they get thrown off the board by the shareholders, that's embarrassing, obviously, and it affects their ability to get on other boards. Again, incentives, as I said earlier, drive all human behavior. The incentives of directors, they want to preserve their board seats.

They collect a million, a million and a half dollars a year in director's fees. If they get thrown off the board by the shareholders, that's embarrassing, obviously, and it affects their ability to get on other boards. Again, incentives, as I said earlier, drive all human behavior. The incentives of directors, they want to preserve their board seats.

So if you have a director, now the directors on board serve in various roles. The most vulnerable ones are ones who, for example, chair a compensation committee. And if they put in a bad plan or they overpaid management, you know, they're subject to attack by shareholders.

So if you have a director, now the directors on board serve in various roles. The most vulnerable ones are ones who, for example, chair a compensation committee. And if they put in a bad plan or they overpaid management, you know, they're subject to attack by shareholders.

So if you have a director, now the directors on board serve in various roles. The most vulnerable ones are ones who, for example, chair a compensation committee. And if they put in a bad plan or they overpaid management, you know, they're subject to attack by shareholders.

But, you know, these contests are not dissimilar to political contests, whereas mudslinging and other side puts out false information about you. You have to respond and they're spending the shareholders money. So they have sort of unlimited resources and you're spending your and your investors money.

But, you know, these contests are not dissimilar to political contests, whereas mudslinging and other side puts out false information about you. You have to respond and they're spending the shareholders money. So they have sort of unlimited resources and you're spending your and your investors money.

But, you know, these contests are not dissimilar to political contests, whereas mudslinging and other side puts out false information about you. You have to respond and they're spending the shareholders money. So they have sort of unlimited resources and you're spending your and your investors money.

You know, when you're a small firm, finite resources, so they can outspend you, they can sue you, they can try to, you know, jigger the mechanics in such a way that you're going to lose. There's some unfortunate stuff that's happened in the past, you know, manipulative stuff.

You know, when you're a small firm, finite resources, so they can outspend you, they can sue you, they can try to, you know, jigger the mechanics in such a way that you're going to lose. There's some unfortunate stuff that's happened in the past, you know, manipulative stuff.