Brian Carter

you can't really freeze or manage a conflict that runs the risk of being surprised in this way. And, you know, I talked a little bit at the beginning of the program about how ISIS is is strengthening in some of these regime held areas. Well, U.S. Central Command and policymakers weren't willing to strike in those areas very often to really get at ISIS there.

So now you have a problem where ISIS knew it could be interfered with the regime, but the regime is far less effective than the United States and the SDF. And so it strengthened there. And now we got surprised. And I think we're going to have to really do some hard thinking about what our policy objectives are in Iraq and Syria going forward.

So now you have a problem where ISIS knew it could be interfered with the regime, but the regime is far less effective than the United States and the SDF. And so it strengthened there. And now we got surprised. And I think we're going to have to really do some hard thinking about what our policy objectives are in Iraq and Syria going forward.

So now you have a problem where ISIS knew it could be interfered with the regime, but the regime is far less effective than the United States and the SDF. And so it strengthened there. And now we got surprised. And I think we're going to have to really do some hard thinking about what our policy objectives are in Iraq and Syria going forward.

especially as it relates to ISIS, that if you look at Iraq, we're saying, oh, we're going to withdraw in 2026. Do you really want to withdraw in 2026 now, having seen what's happening in Syria? So I think this policy of, oh, we can just manage and keep chugging along is really a failed policy. And it was the easy policy to take, but it was the wrong one.

especially as it relates to ISIS, that if you look at Iraq, we're saying, oh, we're going to withdraw in 2026. Do you really want to withdraw in 2026 now, having seen what's happening in Syria? So I think this policy of, oh, we can just manage and keep chugging along is really a failed policy. And it was the easy policy to take, but it was the wrong one.

especially as it relates to ISIS, that if you look at Iraq, we're saying, oh, we're going to withdraw in 2026. Do you really want to withdraw in 2026 now, having seen what's happening in Syria? So I think this policy of, oh, we can just manage and keep chugging along is really a failed policy. And it was the easy policy to take, but it was the wrong one.

Yeah, sure. So it's not entirely clear to me why they chose to go now. I have a feeling that they probably had some sense that the regime around the Aleppo area was hollowing out and they thought they might have an opportunity to do this. I don't think they thought they would be as successful as they were.

Yeah, sure. So it's not entirely clear to me why they chose to go now. I have a feeling that they probably had some sense that the regime around the Aleppo area was hollowing out and they thought they might have an opportunity to do this. I don't think they thought they would be as successful as they were.

Yeah, sure. So it's not entirely clear to me why they chose to go now. I have a feeling that they probably had some sense that the regime around the Aleppo area was hollowing out and they thought they might have an opportunity to do this. I don't think they thought they would be as successful as they were.

The initial objectives of the campaign, insofar as I understand, was actually to push the regime a little further away from the HTS-controlled zone in northwestern Syria, centered around Idlib province, and push back regime artillery to prevent the regime from shelling civilian areas. Now, once the regime kind of just collapsed, they took advantage of that.

The initial objectives of the campaign, insofar as I understand, was actually to push the regime a little further away from the HTS-controlled zone in northwestern Syria, centered around Idlib province, and push back regime artillery to prevent the regime from shelling civilian areas. Now, once the regime kind of just collapsed, they took advantage of that.

The initial objectives of the campaign, insofar as I understand, was actually to push the regime a little further away from the HTS-controlled zone in northwestern Syria, centered around Idlib province, and push back regime artillery to prevent the regime from shelling civilian areas. Now, once the regime kind of just collapsed, they took advantage of that.

They exploited that situation, HTS did, capturing Aleppo and then driving towards Hama and capturing Hama. And now they're well on their way to Homs. So, you know, I think it started as kind of like a small scale, a relatively small scale campaign, of course, in a Syria that's had static lines of control for so many years, it would have been a big deal.

They exploited that situation, HTS did, capturing Aleppo and then driving towards Hama and capturing Hama. And now they're well on their way to Homs. So, you know, I think it started as kind of like a small scale, a relatively small scale campaign, of course, in a Syria that's had static lines of control for so many years, it would have been a big deal.

They exploited that situation, HTS did, capturing Aleppo and then driving towards Hama and capturing Hama. And now they're well on their way to Homs. So, you know, I think it started as kind of like a small scale, a relatively small scale campaign, of course, in a Syria that's had static lines of control for so many years, it would have been a big deal.

But it really exploited it and it's become something much larger, much quicker than anybody could have expected. Do we have any real credible or accurate sense of troop strength for the rebels? No, not to my knowledge, at least. The rebel coalition was forged by HTS over several years, and they had basically put together a conglomeration of different rebel groups.

But it really exploited it and it's become something much larger, much quicker than anybody could have expected. Do we have any real credible or accurate sense of troop strength for the rebels? No, not to my knowledge, at least. The rebel coalition was forged by HTS over several years, and they had basically put together a conglomeration of different rebel groups.

But it really exploited it and it's become something much larger, much quicker than anybody could have expected. Do we have any real credible or accurate sense of troop strength for the rebels? No, not to my knowledge, at least. The rebel coalition was forged by HTS over several years, and they had basically put together a conglomeration of different rebel groups.

And I'm not exactly sure the exact size of those forces. How well armed are they? They're pretty well-armed. They've been doing some things in recent years to kind of prepare for something like this. So, for example, they established a night fighting unit that's really been giving the Syrian Arab Army a lot of trouble.