Bryan Cantrill

And this has always been in x86. I mean, other architectures have done, like Spark did things differently with address space identifiers.

And this has always been in x86. I mean, other architectures have done, like Spark did things differently with address space identifiers.

And to be clear, the way you would do that is because you can, what you are controlling, you should not have been able to control, but you are able to get this thing to do a load for you, but you can't see the results. So the trick is how do I exploit the side effects of that load, namely allocating in the cache and, And then what can I go do to exploit those?

And to be clear, the way you would do that is because you can, what you are controlling, you should not have been able to control, but you are able to get this thing to do a load for you, but you can't see the results. So the trick is how do I exploit the side effects of that load, namely allocating in the cache and, And then what can I go do to exploit those?

And the things you can go support, as it turns out, you can have a conditional branch that then also gets executed speculatively. And then that can do something else in the cache that you can then go observe the side effects of. So you can kind of chain together.

And the things you can go support, as it turns out, you can have a conditional branch that then also gets executed speculatively. And then that can do something else in the cache that you can then go observe the side effects of. So you can kind of chain together.

People may want to know, because I think one question people have is like, well, wait a minute, why didn't someone discover this a lot earlier? And the answer is like, it's sophisticated in that you... You do have to kind of chain these things together. And I think that this had been kind of in the abstract. We knew that kind of speculative attacks could happen.

People may want to know, because I think one question people have is like, well, wait a minute, why didn't someone discover this a lot earlier? And the answer is like, it's sophisticated in that you... You do have to kind of chain these things together. And I think that this had been kind of in the abstract. We knew that kind of speculative attacks could happen.

I don't think anyone thought that they were going to be this brazen. And in particular, it is really bad that it would speculatively execute on these addresses that you don't have the ability to read. The chip should never have done that.

I don't think anyone thought that they were going to be this brazen. And in particular, it is really bad that it would speculatively execute on these addresses that you don't have the ability to read. The chip should never have done that.

You really can't speculate. I mean, with Eagle Air for you in particular, and this is like fast forward now, I don't know, maybe nine months or 10 months, and we're having kind of like these constant calls with Intel where they're reviewing yet more. Because it is also true that like once the group discovered Spectrum Meltdown,

You really can't speculate. I mean, with Eagle Air for you in particular, and this is like fast forward now, I don't know, maybe nine months or 10 months, and we're having kind of like these constant calls with Intel where they're reviewing yet more. Because it is also true that like once the group discovered Spectrum Meltdown,

And I mean, we knew this was going to be just like, oh, my God, it's going to be an absolute bonanza because now people know this is a target rich environment and I can now go explore every unit in the part. And Robert, I think it was eager FPU when I had missed the call with Intel because of another another conflict. And you said, well, we've got another disclosure.

And I mean, we knew this was going to be just like, oh, my God, it's going to be an absolute bonanza because now people know this is a target rich environment and I can now go explore every unit in the part. And Robert, I think it was eager FPU when I had missed the call with Intel because of another another conflict. And you said, well, we've got another disclosure.

What is the one unit we have not yet heard about from them? And I'm like, we've not heard anything about the FPU. You're like, yes, it's the FPU. It's like, oh my God, literally every unit.

What is the one unit we have not yet heard about from them? And I'm like, we've not heard anything about the FPU. You're like, yes, it's the FPU. It's like, oh my God, literally every unit.

Yeah, I think that the, because I agree, Adam, and I think that like, I don't know, Robert, sorry to speak about you in the third person, but I feel like that is something that I feel I've kind of have seen more at like at Oxide where it's like at Joint, like you dove deep into so many different domains and then coming to Oxide, maybe it's a good opportunity to kind of fast forward to Oxide a little bit.

Yeah, I think that the, because I agree, Adam, and I think that like, I don't know, Robert, sorry to speak about you in the third person, but I feel like that is something that I feel I've kind of have seen more at like at Oxide where it's like at Joint, like you dove deep into so many different domains and then coming to Oxide, maybe it's a good opportunity to kind of fast forward to Oxide a little bit.

But, you know, when we started the company, and able to raise money and were able to convince you to join us. And you'd been thinking about a lot of these, you'd gone deep in a lot of these disparate areas to the point that you were now really beginning to synthesize them. And maybe it was just that Oxide gave us the opportunity to do that synthesis.

But, you know, when we started the company, and able to raise money and were able to convince you to join us. And you'd been thinking about a lot of these, you'd gone deep in a lot of these disparate areas to the point that you were now really beginning to synthesize them. And maybe it was just that Oxide gave us the opportunity to do that synthesis.