Carl Robichaud

And so they actually sent both weapons, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, out to the local commanders in the Pacific.

This is a time where communications took longer as well.

And there were preparations to use both of them when the weather conditions permitted.

And especially with the use of the bomb on Nagasaki, there was not a well-considered strategic decision to use that.

The bomb was used just three days after the initial bombing of Hiroshima.

Yeah, yeah.

But at the time the weapon was dropped, the Japanese were still making sense of what had happened with the first weapon.

And we're still processing that.

And as we know now, the Soviet Union was preparing to enter the war.

Truman knew this at the time, and he knew when the Soviet Union entered, it would be the end for Japan.

And he wrote that in his memoirs and his communications.

But there was a real interest in demonstrating the power of the bomb to the Soviet Union and in shaping the post-war balance.

The US had demanded unconditional surrender from Japan.

So the use of the bomb in some ways was to ensure an unconditional surrender without the invasion of the home islands.

And nobody knows exactly what would have happened if those weapons were not used.

But the consequences were just devastating.

So this was briefly considered.

And one of the considerations was that a demonstration in a harbor or off the coast may not show the full magnitude of the weapon and would not impress upon the Japanese and the Soviets the effect of this weapon.

There was also a concern, what if it didn't go off?

And then now you have a device that is in the water and could be retrievable by the enemy.