Charles Maines

So here, Polovtaev says this is what Russia secured to battle, what it gained by force, not anything Trump, quote, gave us. And Polovtaev, I think, reflects a common view here in Russia that there's not a whole lot Trump can do to change the current battlefield dynamics unless Trump is willing to get more involved in Ukraine.

And based on everything he's done and said, that looks very, very unlikely.

And based on everything he's done and said, that looks very, very unlikely.

And based on everything he's done and said, that looks very, very unlikely.

Not entirely, because in Moscow's eyes, Trump can deliver some things quicker through diplomacy than Moscow can achieve militarily, which is why I think you see Putin offering proposals like this recent Easter Day ceasefire or possible direct talks with Ukraine to stop attacks on civilians. You know, is that real progress? Probably most would say no.

Not entirely, because in Moscow's eyes, Trump can deliver some things quicker through diplomacy than Moscow can achieve militarily, which is why I think you see Putin offering proposals like this recent Easter Day ceasefire or possible direct talks with Ukraine to stop attacks on civilians. You know, is that real progress? Probably most would say no.

Not entirely, because in Moscow's eyes, Trump can deliver some things quicker through diplomacy than Moscow can achieve militarily, which is why I think you see Putin offering proposals like this recent Easter Day ceasefire or possible direct talks with Ukraine to stop attacks on civilians. You know, is that real progress? Probably most would say no.

But Russia's continuance attacks and also it's shown almost no flexibility in the actual negotiations towards ending the war.

But Russia's continuance attacks and also it's shown almost no flexibility in the actual negotiations towards ending the war.

But Russia's continuance attacks and also it's shown almost no flexibility in the actual negotiations towards ending the war.

Because they want more, you know, including a change of leadership in Kiev, perhaps with U.S. backing. So Moscow is happy to amplify White House frustrations with Zelenskyy. You know, Putin's other approach here has been to expand negotiations.

Because they want more, you know, including a change of leadership in Kiev, perhaps with U.S. backing. So Moscow is happy to amplify White House frustrations with Zelenskyy. You know, Putin's other approach here has been to expand negotiations.

Because they want more, you know, including a change of leadership in Kiev, perhaps with U.S. backing. So Moscow is happy to amplify White House frustrations with Zelenskyy. You know, Putin's other approach here has been to expand negotiations.

You know, he's inflexible on Ukraine, but extremely flexible when it comes to other deals with the U.S., whether that's investment opportunities, prisoner exchanges, even helping with negotiations with Iran. So Putin is making himself very useful to Trump and making it very hard to walk away. You know, think of it as Putin's own version of the art of the deal.

You know, he's inflexible on Ukraine, but extremely flexible when it comes to other deals with the U.S., whether that's investment opportunities, prisoner exchanges, even helping with negotiations with Iran. So Putin is making himself very useful to Trump and making it very hard to walk away. You know, think of it as Putin's own version of the art of the deal.

You know, he's inflexible on Ukraine, but extremely flexible when it comes to other deals with the U.S., whether that's investment opportunities, prisoner exchanges, even helping with negotiations with Iran. So Putin is making himself very useful to Trump and making it very hard to walk away. You know, think of it as Putin's own version of the art of the deal.

Thank you, Michelle.

Thank you, Michelle.

Thank you, Michelle.

Morning, Michelle.