Chris Madel

And this indeed is exactly what eventually happens.

And it's assumed that the Red Army would mount a strong defence of the Western Soviet Union to protect the mass of the Red Army air bases, which are being furiously built throughout 1940.

And because the regime wouldn't allow an 1812 scale retreat,

So they assume that the Red Army can be expected to try and hold the line, which would allow Germany to defeat them before an orderly withdrawal is possible.

This obviously worked in favour of the German lines of supply and the shortcomings of the German military, i.e.

their lack of motorisation.

So, you know, the only way, in fact, they could possibly win in the Soviet Union is

is if they defeat the mass of the Red Army within, let's say, 500 kilometres of their start point.

And if the Soviet Union doesn't play ball, they've got a problem.

Lossberg definitely appreciates the immense scale of the Soviet Union more so than Marx and absolutely stresses the importance of capturing Soviet broad gauge trains.

He states that a transport system based only on roads will be insufficient.

And this is something that goes back and forth, back and forth, back and forth.

right up to the wire about what can they do about railway transport or not, and how much are they dependent on motor transport.

Anyway, Lossberg also highlights the internal dissent as a source of support.

He says, the Ukrainians, they've got no love for the Russians.

They've had the famine, which has been entirely induced by Moscow in the 1930s, which has killed anything up from sort of two to

9 million people.

And he writes about it would be good to establish an independent Ukrainian government, obviously subservient to Germany, but independent.

And like Marx, Lossberg's plan never once questions the ability of the Wehrmacht to achieve victory.

and only really goes into studying the best method of achieving that goal.