Colin Risdahl

For instance, all those new orders aren't because manufacturers are seeing skyrocketing demand for their products.

The difference now is instead of, oh, let's build up the finished goods, we're in addition to that seeing, let's also build up the components that we need for manufacturing that we might not have access to if this war continues on through the summer.

The really smaller firms may not be able to afford to do those really big forward buys.

And so if this ends up being really expensive, this is going to disproportionately hurt the smaller businesses in the economy.

If you've heard me say it once on this program, you have heard me say it, well, a lot.

History matters.

Truth is, though, I'm more of an armchair historian.

Here's an actual one.

Meg Jacobs.

I teach history and public affairs at Princeton University.

We called her to ask about something that's on everybody's mind of late, the high price of oil and what, if anything, governments might do to limit the economic pain that comes with it.

Jacobs wrote a whole book about the energy crisis of the 1970s.

Which was perhaps the last most chaotic time in terms of uncertainty on global oil markets.

There were actually two oil shocks in that decade.

The first one triggered by the Arab oil embargo in 1973.

Richard Nixon was in the White House.

Inflation at the start of that year was right around 8.5%.

Then came the oil shock and slowing growth.

Say it with me now.

Stagflation made all the worse by a series of price controls that Nixon had put into place starting in 1971.