Curt Weldon

She did a three-hour interview for my oral history, which has never been released. I'm the only one that has the interview.

She did a three-hour interview for my oral history, which has never been released. I'm the only one that has the interview.

The bigger story in the Congress is that I was funding their program as the chairman of the R&D subcommittee. I would go down to Fort Belvoir because all the services were standing up information-dominant centers, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army, the Army to Fort Belvoir. I was impressed with what they were doing.

The bigger story in the Congress is that I was funding their program as the chairman of the R&D subcommittee. I would go down to Fort Belvoir because all the services were standing up information-dominant centers, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army, the Army to Fort Belvoir. I was impressed with what they were doing.

They were using software like Starlight and Spires and others that no one else was using. John Hamry was the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I suggested, John, you go down and see what your people are doing. He went down. They'll tell you he went down because of me. He looked at it and he called me and said, Mr. Chairman, you're absolutely right. We need this capability.

They were using software like Starlight and Spires and others that no one else was using. John Hamry was the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I suggested, John, you go down and see what your people are doing. He went down. They'll tell you he went down because of me. He looked at it and he called me and said, Mr. Chairman, you're absolutely right. We need this capability.

Far beyond what the Army is using it for, we need this capability. I proposed establishing a data fusion center that would not just be for the Army or DOD. It would be for the entire government. So John Henry suggested to me, Congressman, I will support and manage it either at the White House or at the Pentagon.

Far beyond what the Army is using it for, we need this capability. I proposed establishing a data fusion center that would not just be for the Army or DOD. It would be for the entire government. So John Henry suggested to me, Congressman, I will support and manage it either at the White House or at the Pentagon.

But you've got to convince the FBI and the CIA to allow us to use their raw data because of the big behemoths. There are 33 classified systems. So on November the 4th of 1999, a date I'll never forget, I had John Henry in my office. I had the deputy director of the FBI, the deputy director of the CIA, and I handed them a proposal to create the NOAA. National Operations and Analysis Hub.

But you've got to convince the FBI and the CIA to allow us to use their raw data because of the big behemoths. There are 33 classified systems. So on November the 4th of 1999, a date I'll never forget, I had John Henry in my office. I had the deputy director of the FBI, the deputy director of the CIA, and I handed them a proposal to create the NOAA. National Operations and Analysis Hub.

Policymaker and warfighter's toll to deal with emerging transnational terrorist threats. I didn't write that. Friends in Intel wrote it for me. John Hamry said it's a great idea. We need it. I'll manage it. I said I'll get it funded. The FBI said it's great. We'll support it. And the CIA said we don't want it. We're doing something called CI-21.

Policymaker and warfighter's toll to deal with emerging transnational terrorist threats. I didn't write that. Friends in Intel wrote it for me. John Hamry said it's a great idea. We need it. I'll manage it. I said I'll get it funded. The FBI said it's great. We'll support it. And the CIA said we don't want it. We're doing something called CI-21.

The big question for 9-11 is why did the CIA not want to be a part of a fusion center that the Deputy Secretary of Defense wanted? I was going to fund. FBI was supporting two years before 9-11. The biggest criticism after 9-11 was the lack of fusion of intelligence data. That's what they were doing. And that recommendation was two years prior.

The big question for 9-11 is why did the CIA not want to be a part of a fusion center that the Deputy Secretary of Defense wanted? I was going to fund. FBI was supporting two years before 9-11. The biggest criticism after 9-11 was the lack of fusion of intelligence data. That's what they were doing. And that recommendation was two years prior.

And that recommendation was based on what these folks were doing. Eric, Tony, Eileen Pricer, Scott Philpott, and all the others, J.D. Smith, that were a part of the Able Danger team. That's the big story. And he didn't know about us. I didn't know the details until 9-11. They brought the charts in, and I took them right to the White House.

And that recommendation was based on what these folks were doing. Eric, Tony, Eileen Pricer, Scott Philpott, and all the others, J.D. Smith, that were a part of the Able Danger team. That's the big story. And he didn't know about us. I didn't know the details until 9-11. They brought the charts in, and I took them right to the White House.

I didn't get ready for the program. I didn't need to. I knew they were using software to do, you know. So when's the first time you guys met?

I didn't get ready for the program. I didn't need to. I knew they were using software to do, you know. So when's the first time you guys met?

Well, you didn't come to me. Yes, I did. No, you didn't. I was funding it through the annual R&D budget. Later, later, later. Yeah, later. And I plussed up their funding, whatever they wanted. But I didn't need to get read in. It wasn't until 9-11 I get these frantic phone calls on my cell phone. From him, from Eileen Pricer, from Scott Philpott, we have to meet you right away.

Well, you didn't come to me. Yes, I did. No, you didn't. I was funding it through the annual R&D budget. Later, later, later. Yeah, later. And I plussed up their funding, whatever they wanted. But I didn't need to get read in. It wasn't until 9-11 I get these frantic phone calls on my cell phone. From him, from Eileen Pricer, from Scott Philpott, we have to meet you right away.