Dan Epps

This is footnote one in her concurrence in the judgment, which kind of gets at the kind of mode of analysis in these kinds of cases, where she says, to the extent that the court suggests that the federal rules, plain text is all that matters when answering the eerie question, that is not what our precedents hold.

And she cites a case called Gasparini and-

The dissent in Shady Grove and Justice Stevens' concurrence in the judgment in Shady Grove that sort of said, no, you should interpret the federal rules in context.

So you kind of are bringing a sort of a more of a loosey-goosey interpretive framework that is sensitive to important state interests and regulatory policies.

Yeah.

So, I mean, that suggests that you would interpret federal rules narrowly to be less likely to conflict with state rules?

Yeah.

Which apparently eight justices agree with now, this kind of plain text.

No.

Which is interesting because you could imagine, you know, let's say some of the other justices.

I mean, it doesn't even necessarily have to be a left-right issue, right?

If you're really pro-federalism.

Yeah.

You might want to say we should really strive to minimize these kinds of conflicts.

Are both of them wrong?

Well, why?

Because Steve's alive?

I'm probably out over my skis, but... I mean, but you can describe everything as a state substantive right that way.

Don't you have a state substantive right not to be sued in a class action, you know, for statutory damages or, you know?

Because I still feel like whether it's a substantive state right, I still would want to say, okay, but does it make sense to say you have a substantive right not to be sued unless this procedure is followed?