Daniel Kokotajlo

It seems like in the whole scenario, a big part of why certain things happen is because of this race with China.

And if you read the scenarios, basically the difference between the one where things go well and the one where things don't go well is whether we decide to slow down despite that risk.

I guess the question I really want to know the answer to is like, one, it just seems like you're saying, well, it's a mistake to try to race against China or to race intensely against China.

it leads to nationalization and it leads to us not prioritizing alignment.

Maybe I should have asked you that at the beginning of the conversation.

Let's talk about geopolitics next.

So describe to me how you foresee the relationship between the government and the AI labs to proceed, how you expect that relationship in China to proceed, and how you expect the relationship between the US and China to proceed.

Three simple questions.

Yes, no, yes, no, yes, no.

Yeah.

So we were just getting lunch with a prominent Washington, D.C.

political journalist, and he was making the point that when he talks to these Congress people, when he talks to political leaders, none of them are at all awake to the possibility even of stronger AI systems, let alone HEI, let alone superhuman intelligence.

I think a lot of your...

forecast relies on at some point, not only the US president, but also Xi Jinping, wake up to the possibility of a super intelligence and the stakes involved there.

Why think that even when you show Trump the remote worker demo, he's going to be like, oh, and therefore in 2028, there will be a super intelligence.

Whoever controls that will be God Emperor forever.

Maybe not that extreme.

You see what I'm saying?

Like, why not?

Why wouldn't he just be like, oh, there'll be a stronger remote worker in 2029, a better remote worker in 2031.