Daryl Levinson

but now do have a clear partisan kind of tilt, but lots of parts of the structural structure of government don't like, you know, you don't see Democrats and Republicans argue about whether we should switch to being a parliamentary system instead of a presidential system. Cause no one has any idea whether that would be good for them or bad for their opponents.

but now do have a clear partisan kind of tilt, but lots of parts of the structural structure of government don't like, you know, you don't see Democrats and Republicans argue about whether we should switch to being a parliamentary system instead of a presidential system. Cause no one has any idea whether that would be good for them or bad for their opponents.

And so those parts of the constitutional structure just get left alone and they're treated as sort of neutral coordination things instead of, uh, partisan inflected things to fight about. And the Supreme Court at some points has been more of a kind of neutral coordination thing, but now clearly is not.

And so those parts of the constitutional structure just get left alone and they're treated as sort of neutral coordination things instead of, uh, partisan inflected things to fight about. And the Supreme Court at some points has been more of a kind of neutral coordination thing, but now clearly is not.

The closest I can get is qualified immunity.

The closest I can get is qualified immunity.

which i don't think anyone should care about will cares about that will cares about that as much as anybody i know that's why that's why i came up with it i was trying to think something that either you or will would actually care about that i could say something about but it turns out that the only thing i could come up with is qualified immunity and the only thing that i can say about it is that he shouldn't care about it and i actually have my one new york times op-ed

which i don't think anyone should care about will cares about that will cares about that as much as anybody i know that's why that's why i came up with it i was trying to think something that either you or will would actually care about that i could say something about but it turns out that the only thing i could come up with is qualified immunity and the only thing that i can say about it is that he shouldn't care about it and i actually have my one new york times op-ed

Okay, we're running out of things to fight about. Here's something else that I can't fight with you guys about. I actually love the turn to general law and fundamental law for a number of reasons. But one is that that really is a vindication of the basic point of the book, that international law and constitutional law are not really very different. They're just two parts of one bigger thing.

Okay, we're running out of things to fight about. Here's something else that I can't fight with you guys about. I actually love the turn to general law and fundamental law for a number of reasons. But one is that that really is a vindication of the basic point of the book, that international law and constitutional law are not really very different. They're just two parts of one bigger thing.

And of course, that's an idea that goes back to Hobbes and Baudin and Grotius and but also goes to both of your work and the work Will's done with Steve Sachs and Judd Campbell, showing that American law at the time of the founding and maybe to some extent into the 19th century didn't draw such a sharp line between constitutional law and the law of nations, among other bodies of law.

And of course, that's an idea that goes back to Hobbes and Baudin and Grotius and but also goes to both of your work and the work Will's done with Steve Sachs and Judd Campbell, showing that American law at the time of the founding and maybe to some extent into the 19th century didn't draw such a sharp line between constitutional law and the law of nations, among other bodies of law.

They were amalgamated together as part of this brooding omnipresence of fundamental or general law. And it's kind of an interesting question of intellectual history, like how the two got pried apart so decisively in American legal thought, which isn't something that's happened everywhere.

They were amalgamated together as part of this brooding omnipresence of fundamental or general law. And it's kind of an interesting question of intellectual history, like how the two got pried apart so decisively in American legal thought, which isn't something that's happened everywhere.

You know, British legal theorists have continued to develop this sort of overarching conception of public law, scholars like Martin Laughlin.

You know, British legal theorists have continued to develop this sort of overarching conception of public law, scholars like Martin Laughlin.

have written amazing books about this thing that doesn't exist in the American legal consciousness, really, but which seems more natural in a constitutional culture that's not so strongly fixated on maybe some combination of textual interpretation, writtenness, and judicial review.

have written amazing books about this thing that doesn't exist in the American legal consciousness, really, but which seems more natural in a constitutional culture that's not so strongly fixated on maybe some combination of textual interpretation, writtenness, and judicial review.

Completely agree. So plugging Marco Basile's work, he has the fascinating and I think to some extent plausible suggestion that the split had a lot to do with the rise of judicial supremacy and the centrality of courts and constitutional interpretation in the late 19th century. while courts were more hands-off with regard to international law and weren't as strong a positivizing force.

Completely agree. So plugging Marco Basile's work, he has the fascinating and I think to some extent plausible suggestion that the split had a lot to do with the rise of judicial supremacy and the centrality of courts and constitutional interpretation in the late 19th century. while courts were more hands-off with regard to international law and weren't as strong a positivizing force.