Daryl Levinson

Sure. So I think the basic way that constitutionalists think about balancing power and checks and balances is doubly dumb, as you put it. It's dumb in that it's a poor description of how branches of government and government office holders and their constituents actually behave.

Sure. So I think the basic way that constitutionalists think about balancing power and checks and balances is doubly dumb, as you put it. It's dumb in that it's a poor description of how branches of government and government office holders and their constituents actually behave.

And as a normative ideal, it's hard to understand why anyone actually cares about balancing power at the level of branches and government or between the states and the national government. So on the behavioral side, uh,

And as a normative ideal, it's hard to understand why anyone actually cares about balancing power at the level of branches and government or between the states and the national government. So on the behavioral side, uh,

in international relations, it's at least easy to understand why states might do the thing that realist balance of powers theorists think that states are doing, which is competing with one another for power, because that's the way that states ensure their survival. And everyone in the state has at least some interest in not losing wars and being invaded or and being killed.

in international relations, it's at least easy to understand why states might do the thing that realist balance of powers theorists think that states are doing, which is competing with one another for power, because that's the way that states ensure their survival. And everyone in the state has at least some interest in not losing wars and being invaded or and being killed.

So it's important for the state to either have enough of its own power to enter into alliances with other states to balance the power of states that serve as a threat. When we switch the theory to what happens between Congress and the president, none of the same things are true.

So it's important for the state to either have enough of its own power to enter into alliances with other states to balance the power of states that serve as a threat. When we switch the theory to what happens between Congress and the president, none of the same things are true.

So why is it that Congress and the president will have some natural incentive to treat each other as enemies and to worry about which one of them becomes more powerful? Is it because the president's going to invade Congress?

So why is it that Congress and the president will have some natural incentive to treat each other as enemies and to worry about which one of them becomes more powerful? Is it because the president's going to invade Congress?

I mean, I know January 6th, but generally not the thing that constitutionalists are worried about when they're thinking about the balance of power between the branches of government. And it's not true that Congress and the president are enemies. in the way that the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were enemies, they may be allies.

I mean, I know January 6th, but generally not the thing that constitutionalists are worried about when they're thinking about the balance of power between the branches of government. And it's not true that Congress and the president are enemies. in the way that the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were enemies, they may be allies.

And a lot of that may depend on who the president is and which political party has the majority in Congress, in the House, and in the Senate. And when it's the same political party, or at least the same wing of the same political party,

And a lot of that may depend on who the president is and which political party has the majority in Congress, in the House, and in the Senate. And when it's the same political party, or at least the same wing of the same political party,

then the president and one or both chambers of Congress are going to act as allies and they're going to cooperate or collude and not compete with one another for power and regard each other as mutual threats.

then the president and one or both chambers of Congress are going to act as allies and they're going to cooperate or collude and not compete with one another for power and regard each other as mutual threats.

So the basic Madisonian constitutional dynamic that's now written into 8,000 Supreme Court opinions and we're all taught to believe of ambition, counteracting ambition and the way we're going to prevent one branch from becoming dangerously aggrandized is that the other branches are naturally going to have an incentive to push back and guard their own power.

So the basic Madisonian constitutional dynamic that's now written into 8,000 Supreme Court opinions and we're all taught to believe of ambition, counteracting ambition and the way we're going to prevent one branch from becoming dangerously aggrandized is that the other branches are naturally going to have an incentive to push back and guard their own power.

Jealousy just isn't a realistic description of political behavior in our system. And it's not clear why anyone ever thought that would be a realistic description of political behavior. So that's the behavioral part. The normative part is, why do constitutionalists, why does constitutional law, why does the Supreme Court care about what the balance of power is between Congress and the president?

Jealousy just isn't a realistic description of political behavior in our system. And it's not clear why anyone ever thought that would be a realistic description of political behavior. So that's the behavioral part. The normative part is, why do constitutionalists, why does constitutional law, why does the Supreme Court care about what the balance of power is between Congress and the president?