Daryl Levinson

You know, some of those ideas are medium term ideas about political geography and which groups are going to be more represented in the House versus the Senate or the presidency. And some of them are ideas about, you know, liberals like more government.

You know, some of those ideas are medium term ideas about political geography and which groups are going to be more represented in the House versus the Senate or the presidency. And some of them are ideas about, you know, liberals like more government.

And so if you add if you make government harder by not allowing unilateral executive action at a time when Congress is dysfunctional and gridlocked, then that's going to be anti-regulatory. And so that's going to generate political divides.

And so if you add if you make government harder by not allowing unilateral executive action at a time when Congress is dysfunctional and gridlocked, then that's going to be anti-regulatory. And so that's going to generate political divides.

But I think these predictions about structure and their relationship to the kinds of substantive outcomes that people care about in a partisan way are just really attenuated and hard to predict in anything but the very short term.

But I think these predictions about structure and their relationship to the kinds of substantive outcomes that people care about in a partisan way are just really attenuated and hard to predict in anything but the very short term.

Having more divisions will make it harder for government to do things. If there are more veto points that are at least potentially occupiable by people, officials with different interests, then it'll make it harder for government to act. And that will mean that it will be harder to change the status quo. Now, the status quo might be liberal or it might be conservative.

Having more divisions will make it harder for government to do things. If there are more veto points that are at least potentially occupiable by people, officials with different interests, then it'll make it harder for government to act. And that will mean that it will be harder to change the status quo. Now, the status quo might be liberal or it might be conservative.

And the direction of change might be liberal and it might be conservative. But here we're operating on a level of abstraction above left versus right kinds of politics. It's like, do we have libertarian inclinations towards government doing less? even understanding that government doing less preserves the status quo that was created by government having already done quite a lot?

And the direction of change might be liberal and it might be conservative. But here we're operating on a level of abstraction above left versus right kinds of politics. It's like, do we have libertarian inclinations towards government doing less? even understanding that government doing less preserves the status quo that was created by government having already done quite a lot?

Or do we have small p progressive inclinations toward government doing stuff, which is not the fighting ground typically of Republicans versus Democrats?

Or do we have small p progressive inclinations toward government doing stuff, which is not the fighting ground typically of Republicans versus Democrats?

Yeah, what would be best about it? So it would be best in that it would remove one dimension of political contestation, which is political contestation over the powers of the branches and perhaps changing them in directions that would be advantageous, at least in the short term, for one side or the other.

Yeah, what would be best about it? So it would be best in that it would remove one dimension of political contestation, which is political contestation over the powers of the branches and perhaps changing them in directions that would be advantageous, at least in the short term, for one side or the other.

It would be disadvantageous to freeze the structure of government in place that we had at the founding or that we have now because the structure of government adapts sometimes in useful and functional ways to changes in the world.

It would be disadvantageous to freeze the structure of government in place that we had at the founding or that we have now because the structure of government adapts sometimes in useful and functional ways to changes in the world.

In one view of the rise and rise of the administrative state, the rise was driven by broad-based political demands for effective governance that could only be provided with more expertise and more ability to act quickly and to revise than could be generated by Congress and then maybe especially Congress in a polarized era. And that's what people still believe about the administrative state.

In one view of the rise and rise of the administrative state, the rise was driven by broad-based political demands for effective governance that could only be provided with more expertise and more ability to act quickly and to revise than could be generated by Congress and then maybe especially Congress in a polarized era. And that's what people still believe about the administrative state.

Like, it's a functional adaptation. And the same with, you know, broad shifts in power to the national government from the states and from localities as a result of externalities and the needs for coordination with economic integration. And a greater global role that has shifted power to the presidency. So you give up a lot of functional adaptation in exchange for less to fight about.

Like, it's a functional adaptation. And the same with, you know, broad shifts in power to the national government from the states and from localities as a result of externalities and the needs for coordination with economic integration. And a greater global role that has shifted power to the presidency. So you give up a lot of functional adaptation in exchange for less to fight about.