David Eagleman
๐ค SpeakerAppearances Over Time
Podcast Appearances
Slightly longer lag time if you're taller, yeah. It's a very funny hypothesis, by the way. So... Yeah, so we live a little bit in the past, and during that time, I totally concur, there can't be free will involved in any of the processing or certainly reflexes, but also ballistic movements that we're doing. There's no possibility for free will to operate there.
Slightly longer lag time if you're taller, yeah. It's a very funny hypothesis, by the way. So... Yeah, so we live a little bit in the past, and during that time, I totally concur, there can't be free will involved in any of the processing or certainly reflexes, but also ballistic movements that we're doing. There's no possibility for free will to operate there.
If we do have free will, the argument I made at the end of Incognito is that, you know, there may be free will. It's very difficult neuroscience-wise to nail this question of if there is or not. But if there is, it's a bit player in a much larger system. And so... You've got all this unconscious processing, most of what's happening in the brain.
If we do have free will, the argument I made at the end of Incognito is that, you know, there may be free will. It's very difficult neuroscience-wise to nail this question of if there is or not. But if there is, it's a bit player in a much larger system. And so... You've got all this unconscious processing, most of what's happening in the brain.
If we do have free will, the argument I made at the end of Incognito is that, you know, there may be free will. It's very difficult neuroscience-wise to nail this question of if there is or not. But if there is, it's a bit player in a much larger system. And so... You've got all this unconscious processing, most of what's happening in the brain.
I think of the conscious brain as a broom closet in the mansion of the brain. I should say the conscious mind is a broom closet in the mansion of the brain with very little access to what's going on. There may be free will, but it's going to be a small player if it's there.
I think of the conscious brain as a broom closet in the mansion of the brain. I should say the conscious mind is a broom closet in the mansion of the brain with very little access to what's going on. There may be free will, but it's going to be a small player if it's there.
I think of the conscious brain as a broom closet in the mansion of the brain. I should say the conscious mind is a broom closet in the mansion of the brain with very little access to what's going on. There may be free will, but it's going to be a small player if it's there.
Right. This doesn't answer the free will question, though, because if I choose this particular future, we can still question whether I had free will to choose that, or if I rewound history a thousand times, would I always choose that future?
Right. This doesn't answer the free will question, though, because if I choose this particular future, we can still question whether I had free will to choose that, or if I rewound history a thousand times, would I always choose that future?
Right. This doesn't answer the free will question, though, because if I choose this particular future, we can still question whether I had free will to choose that, or if I rewound history a thousand times, would I always choose that future?
One argument for this is that when you simulate a future, you then feel emotionally what that future feels like, and you compare that to the next future and the next future. There's obviously truth in that. Yeah, and maybe you need to simulate each one in order to make your evaluation. But the question is, you know, I say, oh, that future feels the best to me.
One argument for this is that when you simulate a future, you then feel emotionally what that future feels like, and you compare that to the next future and the next future. There's obviously truth in that. Yeah, and maybe you need to simulate each one in order to make your evaluation. But the question is, you know, I say, oh, that future feels the best to me.
One argument for this is that when you simulate a future, you then feel emotionally what that future feels like, and you compare that to the next future and the next future. There's obviously truth in that. Yeah, and maybe you need to simulate each one in order to make your evaluation. But the question is, you know, I say, oh, that future feels the best to me.
That's who I want to be in the long term. But was it a free choice? I don't know. Just for the record, I don't come down one way or the other on the free will because I don't know.
That's who I want to be in the long term. But was it a free choice? I don't know. Just for the record, I don't come down one way or the other on the free will because I don't know.
That's who I want to be in the long term. But was it a free choice? I don't know. Just for the record, I don't come down one way or the other on the free will because I don't know.
Yeah, that's right. That's right.
Yeah, that's right. That's right.
Yeah, that's right. That's right.