David Kipping

And you have to add that in because that conditional isn't guaranteed.

And so in a Bayesian framework, you can kind of make that explicit.

You see mathematically explicitly that's a conditional in your equation.

And the opposite side of the coin is basically in the trilemma that Bostrom originally put forward, it's options one and two.

So option one is that you basically never develop the ability to do that.

Option two is you never choose to execute that.

So we kind of group those together as sort of the non-simulation scenario, let's call it.

And so you've got non-simulation scenario and simulation scenario.

And agnostically, we really have to give the, you know, how do you assess the model, the a priori model probability of those two scenarios?

It's very difficult and we can, I think people would probably argue about how you assign those priors.

In the paper, we just assigned 50-50.

We just said, this hasn't been demonstrated yet.

There's no evidence that this is actually technically possible.

but nor is it that it's not technically possible.

So we're just gonna assign 50-50 probability to these two hypotheses.

And then in the hypothesis where you have a simulated reality, you have a base reality set at the top.

So even in the simulated hypothesis, there's a probability you still live in base reality.

And then there's a whole myriad of universes beneath that, which are all simulated.

And so you have a very slim probability of being in base reality if this is true.

And you have a 100% probability of living in base reality, on the other hand, if it's not true and we never develop that ability or choose never to use it.