Donald Hoffman

And he basically, you know, discusses what I was just explaining, but in a more philosophical and detailed sense, in terms of what different types of organisms might experience in the world, having vastly different sensory modalities, inputs, brains, that type of thing. And there's a great German word, umwelt, to describe, and that kind of covers everything

all of the types of conscious experiences a given organism has. So we have a human umwelt and bats would experience a different umwelt because they're experiencing sonar and navigating the world through a different sense than vision. Yeah.

all of the types of conscious experiences a given organism has. So we have a human umwelt and bats would experience a different umwelt because they're experiencing sonar and navigating the world through a different sense than vision. Yeah.

all of the types of conscious experiences a given organism has. So we have a human umwelt and bats would experience a different umwelt because they're experiencing sonar and navigating the world through a different sense than vision. Yeah.

Yeah. And that phrase comes from David Chalmers, the philosopher. Although the hard problem, you know, as a problem has been expressed many, many times throughout history, he kind of coined this great term and now we have this shorthand.

Yeah. And that phrase comes from David Chalmers, the philosopher. Although the hard problem, you know, as a problem has been expressed many, many times throughout history, he kind of coined this great term and now we have this shorthand.

Yeah. And that phrase comes from David Chalmers, the philosopher. Although the hard problem, you know, as a problem has been expressed many, many times throughout history, he kind of coined this great term and now we have this shorthand.

So the quote unquote easy problems of the brain and neuroscience and consciousness are what we're really at the beginning stages of now in neuroscience, which is understanding and learning which brain states correlate with which types of conscious experiences. The hard problem is why there would be any felt experience of any processing, brain processing or otherwise at all.

So the quote unquote easy problems of the brain and neuroscience and consciousness are what we're really at the beginning stages of now in neuroscience, which is understanding and learning which brain states correlate with which types of conscious experiences. The hard problem is why there would be any felt experience of any processing, brain processing or otherwise at all.

So the quote unquote easy problems of the brain and neuroscience and consciousness are what we're really at the beginning stages of now in neuroscience, which is understanding and learning which brain states correlate with which types of conscious experiences. The hard problem is why there would be any felt experience of any processing, brain processing or otherwise at all.

And this is very intuitive for some people. For other people, it's not. Seeing how mysterious this actually is. But when you start to compare things that human beings do,

And this is very intuitive for some people. For other people, it's not. Seeing how mysterious this actually is. But when you start to compare things that human beings do,

And this is very intuitive for some people. For other people, it's not. Seeing how mysterious this actually is. But when you start to compare things that human beings do,

to things that other systems do, whether they're artificial intelligence systems or plant systems or insect systems, it's easy for us to see how other systems, or we intuit that other systems may not have a felt experience associated with processing. And it seems natural that human beings and maybe mammals do. But when you look more closely at

to things that other systems do, whether they're artificial intelligence systems or plant systems or insect systems, it's easy for us to see how other systems, or we intuit that other systems may not have a felt experience associated with processing. And it seems natural that human beings and maybe mammals do. But when you look more closely at

to things that other systems do, whether they're artificial intelligence systems or plant systems or insect systems, it's easy for us to see how other systems, or we intuit that other systems may not have a felt experience associated with processing. And it seems natural that human beings and maybe mammals do. But when you look more closely at

what that entails and what differences there are or that there really are a lack of to point to why some systems or some processing would not entail an experience from the inside and others would. It's actually very hard. to come up with a reason for it. It's also in terms of the sciences, science studies everything from the outside. And this isn't true beyond science.

what that entails and what differences there are or that there really are a lack of to point to why some systems or some processing would not entail an experience from the inside and others would. It's actually very hard. to come up with a reason for it. It's also in terms of the sciences, science studies everything from the outside. And this isn't true beyond science.

what that entails and what differences there are or that there really are a lack of to point to why some systems or some processing would not entail an experience from the inside and others would. It's actually very hard. to come up with a reason for it. It's also in terms of the sciences, science studies everything from the outside. And this isn't true beyond science.

This is true in our daily lives, just our understanding of the world, of each other. We are only able to study, observe, try to understand, experience other things in the world from the outside, from their behavior, from their physical characteristics.