Donald Hoffman

Yes. So that phrasing comes from Thomas Nagel, the philosopher Thomas Nagel, who wrote a famous article, at least within the world of philosophy called, what is it like to be a bat?

Yes. So that phrasing comes from Thomas Nagel, the philosopher Thomas Nagel, who wrote a famous article, at least within the world of philosophy called, what is it like to be a bat?

Yes. So that phrasing comes from Thomas Nagel, the philosopher Thomas Nagel, who wrote a famous article, at least within the world of philosophy called, what is it like to be a bat?

And he basically, you know, discusses what I was just explaining, but in a more philosophical and detailed sense, in terms of what different types of organisms might experience in the world, having vastly different sensory modalities, inputs, brains, that type of thing. And there's a great German word, umwelt, to describe, and that kind of covers everything

And he basically, you know, discusses what I was just explaining, but in a more philosophical and detailed sense, in terms of what different types of organisms might experience in the world, having vastly different sensory modalities, inputs, brains, that type of thing. And there's a great German word, umwelt, to describe, and that kind of covers everything

And he basically, you know, discusses what I was just explaining, but in a more philosophical and detailed sense, in terms of what different types of organisms might experience in the world, having vastly different sensory modalities, inputs, brains, that type of thing. And there's a great German word, umwelt, to describe, and that kind of covers everything

all of the types of conscious experiences a given organism has. So we have a human umwelt and bats would experience a different umwelt because they're experiencing sonar and navigating the world through a different sense than vision. Yeah.

all of the types of conscious experiences a given organism has. So we have a human umwelt and bats would experience a different umwelt because they're experiencing sonar and navigating the world through a different sense than vision. Yeah.

all of the types of conscious experiences a given organism has. So we have a human umwelt and bats would experience a different umwelt because they're experiencing sonar and navigating the world through a different sense than vision. Yeah.

Yeah. And that phrase comes from David Chalmers, the philosopher. Although the hard problem, you know, as a problem has been expressed many, many times throughout history, he kind of coined this great term and now we have this shorthand.

Yeah. And that phrase comes from David Chalmers, the philosopher. Although the hard problem, you know, as a problem has been expressed many, many times throughout history, he kind of coined this great term and now we have this shorthand.

Yeah. And that phrase comes from David Chalmers, the philosopher. Although the hard problem, you know, as a problem has been expressed many, many times throughout history, he kind of coined this great term and now we have this shorthand.

So the quote unquote easy problems of the brain and neuroscience and consciousness are what we're really at the beginning stages of now in neuroscience, which is understanding and learning which brain states correlate with which types of conscious experiences. The hard problem is why there would be any felt experience of any processing, brain processing or otherwise at all.

So the quote unquote easy problems of the brain and neuroscience and consciousness are what we're really at the beginning stages of now in neuroscience, which is understanding and learning which brain states correlate with which types of conscious experiences. The hard problem is why there would be any felt experience of any processing, brain processing or otherwise at all.

So the quote unquote easy problems of the brain and neuroscience and consciousness are what we're really at the beginning stages of now in neuroscience, which is understanding and learning which brain states correlate with which types of conscious experiences. The hard problem is why there would be any felt experience of any processing, brain processing or otherwise at all.

And this is very intuitive for some people. For other people, it's not. Seeing how mysterious this actually is. But when you start to compare things that human beings do,

And this is very intuitive for some people. For other people, it's not. Seeing how mysterious this actually is. But when you start to compare things that human beings do,

And this is very intuitive for some people. For other people, it's not. Seeing how mysterious this actually is. But when you start to compare things that human beings do,

to things that other systems do, whether they're artificial intelligence systems or plant systems or insect systems, it's easy for us to see how other systems, or we intuit that other systems may not have a felt experience associated with processing. And it seems natural that human beings and maybe mammals do. But when you look more closely at

to things that other systems do, whether they're artificial intelligence systems or plant systems or insect systems, it's easy for us to see how other systems, or we intuit that other systems may not have a felt experience associated with processing. And it seems natural that human beings and maybe mammals do. But when you look more closely at