Dr. Shashi Tharoor

Whereas in the past and right up to then, these goods had to go all the way around India through the Straits of Malacca into the South China Sea, be offloaded in ports like Guangzhou in southeastern China, and then transported laboriously overland all the way across to western China. They saved 90 percent of the cost and 95 percent of the time.

Whereas in the past and right up to then, these goods had to go all the way around India through the Straits of Malacca into the South China Sea, be offloaded in ports like Guangzhou in southeastern China, and then transported laboriously overland all the way across to western China. They saved 90 percent of the cost and 95 percent of the time.

Whereas in the past and right up to then, these goods had to go all the way around India through the Straits of Malacca into the South China Sea, be offloaded in ports like Guangzhou in southeastern China, and then transported laboriously overland all the way across to western China. They saved 90 percent of the cost and 95 percent of the time.

by just being able to use Pakistan as a conduit for their goods into Western China. So China has a huge interest in keeping Pakistan safe and secure and an obedient vassal state, which Pakistan is indeed happy to be. And China also has its own problems with India, which it would dearly like to cut down to size as a potential geopolitical rival in the area.

by just being able to use Pakistan as a conduit for their goods into Western China. So China has a huge interest in keeping Pakistan safe and secure and an obedient vassal state, which Pakistan is indeed happy to be. And China also has its own problems with India, which it would dearly like to cut down to size as a potential geopolitical rival in the area.

by just being able to use Pakistan as a conduit for their goods into Western China. So China has a huge interest in keeping Pakistan safe and secure and an obedient vassal state, which Pakistan is indeed happy to be. And China also has its own problems with India, which it would dearly like to cut down to size as a potential geopolitical rival in the area.

So when you talk about the power gap between India and Pakistan, the difficulty we have is we have two fronts we need to be worried about. We have a Pakistan front and a China front. And cumulatively, I'm sorry to say, we are not in a position, most unfortunately, to fight a two-front war. So we have a very complicated mix of diplomatic, military, and geopolitical calculations to make.

So when you talk about the power gap between India and Pakistan, the difficulty we have is we have two fronts we need to be worried about. We have a Pakistan front and a China front. And cumulatively, I'm sorry to say, we are not in a position, most unfortunately, to fight a two-front war. So we have a very complicated mix of diplomatic, military, and geopolitical calculations to make.

So when you talk about the power gap between India and Pakistan, the difficulty we have is we have two fronts we need to be worried about. We have a Pakistan front and a China front. And cumulatively, I'm sorry to say, we are not in a position, most unfortunately, to fight a two-front war. So we have a very complicated mix of diplomatic, military, and geopolitical calculations to make.

every time Pakistan triggers a problem with us. We've got to make sure we hit Pakistan hard so that they learn a lesson, but we also have to make sure we don't go to such a point that China feels obliged to come directly to Pakistan's rescue. The overwhelming majority of Pakistani weaponry which means, I believe, as high as 90 odd percent of Pakistani weaponry comes from China.

every time Pakistan triggers a problem with us. We've got to make sure we hit Pakistan hard so that they learn a lesson, but we also have to make sure we don't go to such a point that China feels obliged to come directly to Pakistan's rescue. The overwhelming majority of Pakistani weaponry which means, I believe, as high as 90 odd percent of Pakistani weaponry comes from China.

every time Pakistan triggers a problem with us. We've got to make sure we hit Pakistan hard so that they learn a lesson, but we also have to make sure we don't go to such a point that China feels obliged to come directly to Pakistan's rescue. The overwhelming majority of Pakistani weaponry which means, I believe, as high as 90 odd percent of Pakistani weaponry comes from China.

That includes China's latest 4.5 generation J-10 fighter aircraft, their PL-15 missiles, and various other kinds of ammunition. So India's problem is, that it is essentially having to juggle a number of geopolitical, diplomatic, as well as military considerations when it reacts to Pakistani provocations. We want to send the terrorists a message.

That includes China's latest 4.5 generation J-10 fighter aircraft, their PL-15 missiles, and various other kinds of ammunition. So India's problem is, that it is essentially having to juggle a number of geopolitical, diplomatic, as well as military considerations when it reacts to Pakistani provocations. We want to send the terrorists a message.

That includes China's latest 4.5 generation J-10 fighter aircraft, their PL-15 missiles, and various other kinds of ammunition. So India's problem is, that it is essentially having to juggle a number of geopolitical, diplomatic, as well as military considerations when it reacts to Pakistani provocations. We want to send the terrorists a message.

We want to hit back whenever Pakistan hits us, but we don't want to get to a situation where we might end up quite frankly, provoking a more direct Chinese involvement because India is not particularly keen on entering into a two front war with both Pakistan and China. So it's a complication. When you look at the power asymmetry, as you mentioned, you are not just comparing India and Pakistan.

We want to hit back whenever Pakistan hits us, but we don't want to get to a situation where we might end up quite frankly, provoking a more direct Chinese involvement because India is not particularly keen on entering into a two front war with both Pakistan and China. So it's a complication. When you look at the power asymmetry, as you mentioned, you are not just comparing India and Pakistan.

We want to hit back whenever Pakistan hits us, but we don't want to get to a situation where we might end up quite frankly, provoking a more direct Chinese involvement because India is not particularly keen on entering into a two front war with both Pakistan and China. So it's a complication. When you look at the power asymmetry, as you mentioned, you are not just comparing India and Pakistan.

You're comparing India against both Pakistan and China. And then the comparison doesn't look that good for India.

You're comparing India against both Pakistan and China. And then the comparison doesn't look that good for India.