Dr. Stephen Hicks

So that centers now... What the postmoderns do, right, is that they take what I think is a virtue, right? That we can automate all of these things and we can learn to detect various things and focus on this, that, and the other thing. all of which are great strengths of the human consciousness, and they turn them into negatives, they turn them into vices.

So that centers now... What the postmoderns do, right, is that they take what I think is a virtue, right? That we can automate all of these things and we can learn to detect various things and focus on this, that, and the other thing. all of which are great strengths of the human consciousness, and they turn them into negatives, they turn them into vices.

So, what they say is, right, an interpretation then becomes, in their language, because they've already got an epistemological theory, a negative epistemological theory, as something that is necessarily subjective.

So, what they say is, right, an interpretation then becomes, in their language, because they've already got an epistemological theory, a negative epistemological theory, as something that is necessarily subjective.

So, what they say is, right, an interpretation then becomes, in their language, because they've already got an epistemological theory, a negative epistemological theory, as something that is necessarily subjective.

And the idea for them then is that somehow, if we were going to be actually aware of reality and not through this interpretation, we would have to not have any interpretations at all, that somehow reality would just have to stamp itself on our minds without any intermediary actions. Or what they will then do is to say, I can choose to prioritize this over that in my visual field.

And the idea for them then is that somehow, if we were going to be actually aware of reality and not through this interpretation, we would have to not have any interpretations at all, that somehow reality would just have to stamp itself on our minds without any intermediary actions. Or what they will then do is to say, I can choose to prioritize this over that in my visual field.

And the idea for them then is that somehow, if we were going to be actually aware of reality and not through this interpretation, we would have to not have any interpretations at all, that somehow reality would just have to stamp itself on our minds without any intermediary actions. Or what they will then do is to say, I can choose to prioritize this over that in my visual field.

They will say, and they're right to say this, that's a value judgment. I think this is more important now, and this is more important over that. But then by the time they start using the words value, they're coming at a very sophisticated negative judgment. Evaluative theories that say values are just subjective and have nothing to do with any sort of external reality.

They will say, and they're right to say this, that's a value judgment. I think this is more important now, and this is more important over that. But then by the time they start using the words value, they're coming at a very sophisticated negative judgment. Evaluative theories that say values are just subjective and have nothing to do with any sort of external reality.

They will say, and they're right to say this, that's a value judgment. I think this is more important now, and this is more important over that. But then by the time they start using the words value, they're coming at a very sophisticated negative judgment. Evaluative theories that say values are just subjective and have nothing to do with any sort of external reality.

Well, maybe it's worse than that. So for both of them, it's on the cognition side and on the evaluative side that they're deep into subjective territory and so those then become negative words for them. Instead, and this is my only hope as a philosopher, I think philosophers have a very small part of this project just attending to the language that we're using at the foundations of cognition.

Well, maybe it's worse than that. So for both of them, it's on the cognition side and on the evaluative side that they're deep into subjective territory and so those then become negative words for them. Instead, and this is my only hope as a philosopher, I think philosophers have a very small part of this project just attending to the language that we're using at the foundations of cognition.

Well, maybe it's worse than that. So for both of them, it's on the cognition side and on the evaluative side that they're deep into subjective territory and so those then become negative words for them. Instead, and this is my only hope as a philosopher, I think philosophers have a very small part of this project just attending to the language that we're using at the foundations of cognition.

All these metaphors of screens and filters and tabernacles and visual fields and so on. That's where we have to get that sorted out, because if we don't get those foundations correct, then we're going to be messed up.

All these metaphors of screens and filters and tabernacles and visual fields and so on. That's where we have to get that sorted out, because if we don't get those foundations correct, then we're going to be messed up.

All these metaphors of screens and filters and tabernacles and visual fields and so on. That's where we have to get that sorted out, because if we don't get those foundations correct, then we're going to be messed up.

Yeah, that's a good question. I think the postmodern use of the word power is another example of turning a virtue into a vice. Power properly conceived could be coextensive with our ability to get stuff done.

Yeah, that's a good question. I think the postmodern use of the word power is another example of turning a virtue into a vice. Power properly conceived could be coextensive with our ability to get stuff done.

Yeah, that's a good question. I think the postmodern use of the word power is another example of turning a virtue into a vice. Power properly conceived could be coextensive with our ability to get stuff done.