Eric Czuleger

Now back to the show. We've got more maneuverability warfare and, of course, the nuclear bomb. So now you're talking about the industrialization of war. So suddenly you're able to absolutely annihilate a battlefield not only with industrialized weaponry from the sky but industrialized weaponry that's being driven across the land everywhere.

Now back to the show. We've got more maneuverability warfare and, of course, the nuclear bomb. So now you're talking about the industrialization of war. So suddenly you're able to absolutely annihilate a battlefield not only with industrialized weaponry from the sky but industrialized weaponry that's being driven across the land everywhere.

Now back to the show. We've got more maneuverability warfare and, of course, the nuclear bomb. So now you're talking about the industrialization of war. So suddenly you're able to absolutely annihilate a battlefield not only with industrialized weaponry from the sky but industrialized weaponry that's being driven across the land everywhere.

So if you think about Hitler's Blitzkrieg, that's sort of a good example of that maneuver warfare of the third generation of warfare. But as things go up towards the Cold War, we see this big characteristic change in how wars are fought. And obviously this happens because of the nuclear bomb. So at this point, we have the last iteration of great power conflict.

So if you think about Hitler's Blitzkrieg, that's sort of a good example of that maneuver warfare of the third generation of warfare. But as things go up towards the Cold War, we see this big characteristic change in how wars are fought. And obviously this happens because of the nuclear bomb. So at this point, we have the last iteration of great power conflict.

So if you think about Hitler's Blitzkrieg, that's sort of a good example of that maneuver warfare of the third generation of warfare. But as things go up towards the Cold War, we see this big characteristic change in how wars are fought. And obviously this happens because of the nuclear bomb. So at this point, we have the last iteration of great power conflict.

But with the nuclear bomb, it becomes far too dangerous to have direct nation-state on nation-state violence because at any point, somebody could drop the world-ending weapon, or so we thought at the time. And so suddenly war has to change again because the geopolitical aims aren't completely annihilating the world. It's just to get... strategic advantage over the adversary.

But with the nuclear bomb, it becomes far too dangerous to have direct nation-state on nation-state violence because at any point, somebody could drop the world-ending weapon, or so we thought at the time. And so suddenly war has to change again because the geopolitical aims aren't completely annihilating the world. It's just to get... strategic advantage over the adversary.

But with the nuclear bomb, it becomes far too dangerous to have direct nation-state on nation-state violence because at any point, somebody could drop the world-ending weapon, or so we thought at the time. And so suddenly war has to change again because the geopolitical aims aren't completely annihilating the world. It's just to get... strategic advantage over the adversary.

In this case, it would be, you know, the Soviet Union and the United States. So we go to proxy wars. We go to proxy wars and asymmetric conflict. So that can take us from basically the end of the Cold War all the way up to the global war on terror. And the global war on terror changes things massively because suddenly we have a unipolar world.

In this case, it would be, you know, the Soviet Union and the United States. So we go to proxy wars. We go to proxy wars and asymmetric conflict. So that can take us from basically the end of the Cold War all the way up to the global war on terror. And the global war on terror changes things massively because suddenly we have a unipolar world.

In this case, it would be, you know, the Soviet Union and the United States. So we go to proxy wars. We go to proxy wars and asymmetric conflict. So that can take us from basically the end of the Cold War all the way up to the global war on terror. And the global war on terror changes things massively because suddenly we have a unipolar world.

Essentially, Soviet Union has fallen and the United States is able to project power all around the world. But we haven't been able to project power all around the world without making quite a few enemies. And also training a lot of those enemies at the same time. So suddenly the global war on terror turns into really precise asymmetric combat with semi-state and non-state actors.

Essentially, Soviet Union has fallen and the United States is able to project power all around the world. But we haven't been able to project power all around the world without making quite a few enemies. And also training a lot of those enemies at the same time. So suddenly the global war on terror turns into really precise asymmetric combat with semi-state and non-state actors.

Essentially, Soviet Union has fallen and the United States is able to project power all around the world. But we haven't been able to project power all around the world without making quite a few enemies. And also training a lot of those enemies at the same time. So suddenly the global war on terror turns into really precise asymmetric combat with semi-state and non-state actors.

So Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and I mean, you know, the Islamic State, name your insurgent group, your favorite insurgent group, name them. Pick your flavor. Right, exactly. But now we have something different happening. And that's fifth generation warfare. We still have the same constraints of third generation warfare. We can't go directly into combat with each other with these world-ending weapons.

So Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and I mean, you know, the Islamic State, name your insurgent group, your favorite insurgent group, name them. Pick your flavor. Right, exactly. But now we have something different happening. And that's fifth generation warfare. We still have the same constraints of third generation warfare. We can't go directly into combat with each other with these world-ending weapons.

So Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and I mean, you know, the Islamic State, name your insurgent group, your favorite insurgent group, name them. Pick your flavor. Right, exactly. But now we have something different happening. And that's fifth generation warfare. We still have the same constraints of third generation warfare. We can't go directly into combat with each other with these world-ending weapons.

And in fact, there's so much economic entanglement in the world that it's very difficult to actually disrupt another nation so significantly because you're disrupting your own market. So that leads us to this new type, this new iteration of warfare, which is the cognitive domain. Essentially, it's a war of media, a war of ideas, and a war of attempting to divide populations against populations.

And in fact, there's so much economic entanglement in the world that it's very difficult to actually disrupt another nation so significantly because you're disrupting your own market. So that leads us to this new type, this new iteration of warfare, which is the cognitive domain. Essentially, it's a war of media, a war of ideas, and a war of attempting to divide populations against populations.