Eric Levitz

And, you know, this connection between the nostalgia for manufacturing and the nostalgia for a kind of different set of gender relations was made really explicit by a speech from Republican Senator Josh Hawley in 2021, where he said...

And, you know, this connection between the nostalgia for manufacturing and the nostalgia for a kind of different set of gender relations was made really explicit by a speech from Republican Senator Josh Hawley in 2021, where he said...

And so they tell this story that you hear in a lot of Trump's speeches, in the speeches of other right-wing nationalists, in which deindustrialization, the closing of factories, is synonymous with both economic devastation and decline and moral rot.

And so they tell this story that you hear in a lot of Trump's speeches, in the speeches of other right-wing nationalists, in which deindustrialization, the closing of factories, is synonymous with both economic devastation and decline and moral rot.

And so they tell this story that you hear in a lot of Trump's speeches, in the speeches of other right-wing nationalists, in which deindustrialization, the closing of factories, is synonymous with both economic devastation and decline and moral rot.

So I think that there actually is some evidence that there is a link there. I think that there's even stronger evidence that there is something to be nostalgic about in the economics here because during the time in the 1950s when America had kind of its peak of manufacturing as a share of the labor force, you also did really see high rates of wage growth, high rates of social mobility.

So I think that there actually is some evidence that there is a link there. I think that there's even stronger evidence that there is something to be nostalgic about in the economics here because during the time in the 1950s when America had kind of its peak of manufacturing as a share of the labor force, you also did really see high rates of wage growth, high rates of social mobility.

So I think that there actually is some evidence that there is a link there. I think that there's even stronger evidence that there is something to be nostalgic about in the economics here because during the time in the 1950s when America had kind of its peak of manufacturing as a share of the labor force, you also did really see high rates of wage growth, high rates of social mobility.

People born into the bottom of the American class hierarchy were more likely to move up than they are today. And you also saw just a lot of opportunity for blue collar workers. In absolute terms, Americans are much better off materially today than they are in the 1950s. But in terms of the level of progress, the pace of moving up, this was better back in that era.

People born into the bottom of the American class hierarchy were more likely to move up than they are today. And you also saw just a lot of opportunity for blue collar workers. In absolute terms, Americans are much better off materially today than they are in the 1950s. But in terms of the level of progress, the pace of moving up, this was better back in that era.

People born into the bottom of the American class hierarchy were more likely to move up than they are today. And you also saw just a lot of opportunity for blue collar workers. In absolute terms, Americans are much better off materially today than they are in the 1950s. But in terms of the level of progress, the pace of moving up, this was better back in that era.

There is some research from the economists David Autour, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson who looked at localities that suffered trade shocks

There is some research from the economists David Autour, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson who looked at localities that suffered trade shocks

There is some research from the economists David Autour, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson who looked at localities that suffered trade shocks

that resulted in massive manufacturing job losses, and they found that those trade shocks do reduce the earnings of young men relative to young women, and that those places then see a drop in marriage and fertility rates that similar places without those shocks did not see. So there's some evidence that there is some truth to this, you know.

that resulted in massive manufacturing job losses, and they found that those trade shocks do reduce the earnings of young men relative to young women, and that those places then see a drop in marriage and fertility rates that similar places without those shocks did not see. So there's some evidence that there is some truth to this, you know.

that resulted in massive manufacturing job losses, and they found that those trade shocks do reduce the earnings of young men relative to young women, and that those places then see a drop in marriage and fertility rates that similar places without those shocks did not see. So there's some evidence that there is some truth to this, you know.

Which doesn't mean that we should value high marriage and birth rates over women's autonomy, but it just reinforces why the right is so fixated about this.

Which doesn't mean that we should value high marriage and birth rates over women's autonomy, but it just reinforces why the right is so fixated about this.

Which doesn't mean that we should value high marriage and birth rates over women's autonomy, but it just reinforces why the right is so fixated about this.