Ezra Klein

Is it possible in any tariff regime to do the reindustrialization of manufacturing that I think is the most emotionally resonant of their arguments? There are two levels to that. One is...

Is it possible in any tariff regime to do the reindustrialization of manufacturing that I think is the most emotionally resonant of their arguments? There are two levels to that. One is...

Well, that gets to, though, there are two things you might want to restore in manufacturing. One, which I think you hear a lot of in politics, is manufacturing jobs. You want to go back to the economy of 1965 or something. The other is that what you want to restore is manufacturing capacity. Right.

Well, that gets to, though, there are two things you might want to restore in manufacturing. One, which I think you hear a lot of in politics, is manufacturing jobs. You want to go back to the economy of 1965 or something. The other is that what you want to restore is manufacturing capacity. Right.

My colleague, your former colleague, Tom Friedman, was just in China and was really astonished at the kind of campuses that Huawei is building, the speed with which phone companies are becoming car companies. And basically, everybody I know who goes to China or writes seriously about their manufacturing sector will now tell you that what they're doing is not just...

My colleague, your former colleague, Tom Friedman, was just in China and was really astonished at the kind of campuses that Huawei is building, the speed with which phone companies are becoming car companies. And basically, everybody I know who goes to China or writes seriously about their manufacturing sector will now tell you that what they're doing is not just...

low-wage labor leading to cheap manufactured consumer goods, that they now have incredible levels of supply chain expertise that allow them to do things we maybe can't at a speed we certainly can't. And that in terms of the balance of geopolitical power is a very dangerous thing for us in the long run.

low-wage labor leading to cheap manufactured consumer goods, that they now have incredible levels of supply chain expertise that allow them to do things we maybe can't at a speed we certainly can't. And that in terms of the balance of geopolitical power is a very dangerous thing for us in the long run.

And so very high costs are worth paying to rebuild that capacity, even if it's all automated, right? Because you do not want to be so dependent and for the world to be so dependent on Chinese manufacturing. What do you think of that argument? I mean,

And so very high costs are worth paying to rebuild that capacity, even if it's all automated, right? Because you do not want to be so dependent and for the world to be so dependent on Chinese manufacturing. What do you think of that argument? I mean,

Although those are exempted from the tariffs.

Although those are exempted from the tariffs.

So if one of the things you're trying to do is as a national security play, make our sort of supply chains more robust from China, it seems you wouldn't want to be tariffing our friends and allies in a way that pushes them to pull away from us and integrate more and move into sort of common economic defense with China.

So if one of the things you're trying to do is as a national security play, make our sort of supply chains more robust from China, it seems you wouldn't want to be tariffing our friends and allies in a way that pushes them to pull away from us and integrate more and move into sort of common economic defense with China.

I mean, this policy does look to me like what happens when nobody will tell the king no. Yeah. And worse than that may be that when the king begins to favor the people who he knows aren't suppressing the no. There are people in any room who you can kind of tell don't really agree with you and are trying to humor you.

I mean, this policy does look to me like what happens when nobody will tell the king no. Yeah. And worse than that may be that when the king begins to favor the people who he knows aren't suppressing the no. There are people in any room who you can kind of tell don't really agree with you and are trying to humor you.

And then there's, you know, the intern, the mid-level person who you can tell is really into what you want to do and maybe you charge them with it. This just doesn't feel to me like a constructed policy. And it's hard because I think that like our tools are usually to try to track back the policy rationale. But there's too many policy rationales. None of them actually fit.

And then there's, you know, the intern, the mid-level person who you can tell is really into what you want to do and maybe you charge them with it. This just doesn't feel to me like a constructed policy. And it's hard because I think that like our tools are usually to try to track back the policy rationale. But there's too many policy rationales. None of them actually fit.

And in Trump 1, it's Jared Kushner. And Kushner brings in very mainstream people. You're Gary Cohns, you know, is a Goldman Sachs president. You're H.R. McMasters. People who act as inhibitors of the very disinhibited Donald Trump. And in Trump 2, it's not Jared Kushner. It's Don Jr., who's been marinating in the fever swamps of MAGA in the interim years, who helped bring in people like J.D.

And in Trump 1, it's Jared Kushner. And Kushner brings in very mainstream people. You're Gary Cohns, you know, is a Goldman Sachs president. You're H.R. McMasters. People who act as inhibitors of the very disinhibited Donald Trump. And in Trump 2, it's not Jared Kushner. It's Don Jr., who's been marinating in the fever swamps of MAGA in the interim years, who helped bring in people like J.D.