Ezra Klein

So in my view, you've actually had, driven by housing scarcity and the need for decarbonization, a turn in the Democratic Party over the past five or 10 years towards building things, not just creating social insurance, not that there's anything in my view wrong with social insurance, but having begun to make that turn.

So in my view, you've actually had, driven by housing scarcity and the need for decarbonization, a turn in the Democratic Party over the past five or 10 years towards building things, not just creating social insurance, not that there's anything in my view wrong with social insurance, but having begun to make that turn.

So in my view, you've actually had, driven by housing scarcity and the need for decarbonization, a turn in the Democratic Party over the past five or 10 years towards building things, not just creating social insurance, not that there's anything in my view wrong with social insurance, but having begun to make that turn.

they have begun to confront, as I've had to begun to confront covering it, how ill-suited the architecture of procedural liberalism is to achieving those goals. And so what's, I think the really difficult confrontation now is not whether this stuff is needed, but the confrontation that liberals are having

they have begun to confront, as I've had to begun to confront covering it, how ill-suited the architecture of procedural liberalism is to achieving those goals. And so what's, I think the really difficult confrontation now is not whether this stuff is needed, but the confrontation that liberals are having

they have begun to confront, as I've had to begun to confront covering it, how ill-suited the architecture of procedural liberalism is to achieving those goals. And so what's, I think the really difficult confrontation now is not whether this stuff is needed, but the confrontation that liberals are having

with the overhang of their own past legislative achievements, things that might have made sense at one time but are now not the right processes, not the right laws for the kinds of things that we are now trying to achieve and promising to achieve, and that it's in that space that a lot of the very, very difficult policy work and, frankly, coalitional confrontations are going to have to happen.

with the overhang of their own past legislative achievements, things that might have made sense at one time but are now not the right processes, not the right laws for the kinds of things that we are now trying to achieve and promising to achieve, and that it's in that space that a lot of the very, very difficult policy work and, frankly, coalitional confrontations are going to have to happen.

with the overhang of their own past legislative achievements, things that might have made sense at one time but are now not the right processes, not the right laws for the kinds of things that we are now trying to achieve and promising to achieve, and that it's in that space that a lot of the very, very difficult policy work and, frankly, coalitional confrontations are going to have to happen.

I would say the great failure of the Biden administration was to be too coalitional and have too little, at least on domestic policy, strong executive leadership. And I think that has to do with Biden's particular issues and his age and where his focus was. And I think that has to do with the culture of the Democratic Party that had sort of evolved over a period of time.

I would say the great failure of the Biden administration was to be too coalitional and have too little, at least on domestic policy, strong executive leadership. And I think that has to do with Biden's particular issues and his age and where his focus was. And I think that has to do with the culture of the Democratic Party that had sort of evolved over a period of time.

I would say the great failure of the Biden administration was to be too coalitional and have too little, at least on domestic policy, strong executive leadership. And I think that has to do with Biden's particular issues and his age and where his focus was. And I think that has to do with the culture of the Democratic Party that had sort of evolved over a period of time.

And now that's going to have to change. I think it's quite widely acknowledged that that was a problem. And look, I think if Donald Trump proves anything in American politics for all of his flaws, what he proves is that the coalitions and the cultures of the coalitions are malleable. Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican coalition, not by kicking everybody who is in it out.

And now that's going to have to change. I think it's quite widely acknowledged that that was a problem. And look, I think if Donald Trump proves anything in American politics for all of his flaws, what he proves is that the coalitions and the cultures of the coalitions are malleable. Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican coalition, not by kicking everybody who is in it out.

And now that's going to have to change. I think it's quite widely acknowledged that that was a problem. And look, I think if Donald Trump proves anything in American politics for all of his flaws, what he proves is that the coalitions and the cultures of the coalitions are malleable. Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican coalition, not by kicking everybody who is in it out.

In part, it's persuasion. People have come to believe things they did not believe before, you know, It's a cottage industry on X to retweet old Mike Waltz or Marco Rubio tweets that seem to have a high level of contradiction to what they are now carrying out in the current administration. But look, Trump changed his party on immigration, on trade, on isolationism, on Europe, on Russia. Right.

In part, it's persuasion. People have come to believe things they did not believe before, you know, It's a cottage industry on X to retweet old Mike Waltz or Marco Rubio tweets that seem to have a high level of contradiction to what they are now carrying out in the current administration. But look, Trump changed his party on immigration, on trade, on isolationism, on Europe, on Russia. Right.

In part, it's persuasion. People have come to believe things they did not believe before, you know, It's a cottage industry on X to retweet old Mike Waltz or Marco Rubio tweets that seem to have a high level of contradiction to what they are now carrying out in the current administration. But look, Trump changed his party on immigration, on trade, on isolationism, on Europe, on Russia. Right.

I am not saying that I want to see a Trump arise on the left. I don't. But it is a mistake to think that these things are too settled. Barack Obama changed the way the Democratic Party worked and functioned. And I think, frankly, a lot of the problem ended up being that Biden was the fumes of the Obama coalition, but he didn't have the control over it that Obama himself had.

I am not saying that I want to see a Trump arise on the left. I don't. But it is a mistake to think that these things are too settled. Barack Obama changed the way the Democratic Party worked and functioned. And I think, frankly, a lot of the problem ended up being that Biden was the fumes of the Obama coalition, but he didn't have the control over it that Obama himself had.