Jacob Howland

But we're universal, right? Yeah, right. And finally, you have this kind of divinization of man, because after all, you know, well, we're going to realize heaven on earth.

But we're universal, right? Yeah, right. And finally, you have this kind of divinization of man, because after all, you know, well, we're going to realize heaven on earth.

And... Where I want to go with this is that that kind of hubris about reason is, I think, well, first of all, it's a characteristic of the modern era. Because you have Descartes saying we're going to be masters and possessors of nature.

And... Where I want to go with this is that that kind of hubris about reason is, I think, well, first of all, it's a characteristic of the modern era. Because you have Descartes saying we're going to be masters and possessors of nature.

And... Where I want to go with this is that that kind of hubris about reason is, I think, well, first of all, it's a characteristic of the modern era. Because you have Descartes saying we're going to be masters and possessors of nature.

Right, right. But that's sort of the end of the whole kind of decay. But if we go back to the early moderns, Um, he even suggests in the discourse on method that maybe medicine will, will make all the infirmities of old age sort of disappear, which means we're not going to die. In which case, by the way, the religious question, uh, is gone.

Right, right. But that's sort of the end of the whole kind of decay. But if we go back to the early moderns, Um, he even suggests in the discourse on method that maybe medicine will, will make all the infirmities of old age sort of disappear, which means we're not going to die. In which case, by the way, the religious question, uh, is gone.

Right, right. But that's sort of the end of the whole kind of decay. But if we go back to the early moderns, Um, he even suggests in the discourse on method that maybe medicine will, will make all the infirmities of old age sort of disappear, which means we're not going to die. In which case, by the way, the religious question, uh, is gone.

Like from the, I mean, Descartes writing, he doesn't want his books to be placed on the index, which they were nonetheless, you know, um, and so they're read and they have to be, you know, the Roman Catholic church has to, has to, has to look at them. Um, But the fact is that Roman Catholicism is irrelevant if we're not going to die, right? I mean, in some fundamental sense. But, okay.

Like from the, I mean, Descartes writing, he doesn't want his books to be placed on the index, which they were nonetheless, you know, um, and so they're read and they have to be, you know, the Roman Catholic church has to, has to, has to look at them. Um, But the fact is that Roman Catholicism is irrelevant if we're not going to die, right? I mean, in some fundamental sense. But, okay.

Like from the, I mean, Descartes writing, he doesn't want his books to be placed on the index, which they were nonetheless, you know, um, and so they're read and they have to be, you know, the Roman Catholic church has to, has to, has to look at them. Um, But the fact is that Roman Catholicism is irrelevant if we're not going to die, right? I mean, in some fundamental sense. But, okay.

Right. But now I want to go back to Leo Strauss, who talks about the permanent questions. And what I've come to understand is the following, that the permanence of the questions arises from the necessity that Athens, so to speak, and now let's just take that to mean reason, like unaided reason, okay?

Right. But now I want to go back to Leo Strauss, who talks about the permanent questions. And what I've come to understand is the following, that the permanence of the questions arises from the necessity that Athens, so to speak, and now let's just take that to mean reason, like unaided reason, okay?

Right. But now I want to go back to Leo Strauss, who talks about the permanent questions. And what I've come to understand is the following, that the permanence of the questions arises from the necessity that Athens, so to speak, and now let's just take that to mean reason, like unaided reason, okay?

can't be separated from the biblical alternative, which is the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

can't be separated from the biblical alternative, which is the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

can't be separated from the biblical alternative, which is the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

Well, Strauss writes about this stuff. He writes about, this is not my ideas. He writes about Athens and Jerusalem. But what I'm claiming is this. In order for reason to function in a healthy way, it must conduct itself in the light of the alternative of religion, which is like you can't understand everything on your own. There are massive mysteries, right?

Well, Strauss writes about this stuff. He writes about, this is not my ideas. He writes about Athens and Jerusalem. But what I'm claiming is this. In order for reason to function in a healthy way, it must conduct itself in the light of the alternative of religion, which is like you can't understand everything on your own. There are massive mysteries, right?

Well, Strauss writes about this stuff. He writes about, this is not my ideas. He writes about Athens and Jerusalem. But what I'm claiming is this. In order for reason to function in a healthy way, it must conduct itself in the light of the alternative of religion, which is like you can't understand everything on your own. There are massive mysteries, right?