James Manyika

work implications of that or the impacts on work and workers.

And that's been one of the challenges that we've had.

I mean, we've all seen the hollowing out, if you like, of the middle class in advanced economies like America, where a big part of that is that much of that middle class or middle income workers have been working in these sectors and occupations where the impact of

technology and productivity have actually had a huge impact on those jobs and those incomes.

And so even though we have work in the economy,

the occupations and jobs and sectors that are growing have tended to be in the service sectors and less in places like manufacturing.

I mean, it's the reason why I love it when, you know, politicians talk about good manufacturing jobs.

I mean, they have a point in the sense that historically those have been good, well-paying jobs, but manufacturing today is only, what, 8% of the labor force in America, right?

It's diminished.

At its peak, it's probably at best close to,

you know, the mid 40s, 40% as a share of the labor markets back in the 50s.

Right.

It's been going down ever since.

Right.

And yet the service sector economy has been growing dramatically.

And many, not all, but many of the jobs in the service sector economy don't pay as much.

My point is, we have to think about not just incentives, but the structure of our economy.

So if you look forward, for example, over the next few decades, what are the jobs that are going to grow as a function of both demand for that work in the economy, but also as a result of

what's less likely to be automated by technology and AI and so forth, you end up with a list that includes care work, for example, and so forth.

And even work that we say is valuable, which it is, like teachers and others that are harder to automate.