Jean-Paul Faguet

We take the subset of data on Columbia that measures and catalogs all the ravines, the rivers, the forests, the valleys, all of this geographic stuff. And we use that to calculate the least cost path for between all the places that we know this 1560 imperial agent went to who was trying to recreate their steps.

We take the subset of data on Columbia that measures and catalogs all the ravines, the rivers, the forests, the valleys, all of this geographic stuff. And we use that to calculate the least cost path for between all the places that we know this 1560 imperial agent went to who was trying to recreate their steps.

So a very long-winded way of saying that our instrument in this case is the path of the conquistadores through Colombia that they took founding all of these encomiendas. And then we measure the distance from each municipality to the closest point on that path. And that's our instrument, which we argue is highly correlated to where the encomienda is or was in 1560.

So a very long-winded way of saying that our instrument in this case is the path of the conquistadores through Colombia that they took founding all of these encomiendas. And then we measure the distance from each municipality to the closest point on that path. And that's our instrument, which we argue is highly correlated to where the encomienda is or was in 1560.

But it should be the distance to the path should be uncorrelated to education, health, infant mortality or GDP per capita. There's no reason for that distance variable to map on to modern development outcomes.

But it should be the distance to the path should be uncorrelated to education, health, infant mortality or GDP per capita. There's no reason for that distance variable to map on to modern development outcomes.

It's a very strong statistical correlation across 20 different measures of development outcomes, human capital, social capital, institutional development, and crucially economic outcomes today. And all of these outcomes today are around 2005-2010. So modern 21st century outcomes are being driven by the encomienda in 1560.

It's a very strong statistical correlation across 20 different measures of development outcomes, human capital, social capital, institutional development, and crucially economic outcomes today. And all of these outcomes today are around 2005-2010. So modern 21st century outcomes are being driven by the encomienda in 1560.

And this, you know, by itself is a kind of a stunning outcome because you think, okay, this thing in 1560 was really important and it structured the Spanish empire in lots of important ways in 1560. How can it be having an effect in the 21st century? And yet, you know, this is what we find.

And this, you know, by itself is a kind of a stunning outcome because you think, okay, this thing in 1560 was really important and it structured the Spanish empire in lots of important ways in 1560. How can it be having an effect in the 21st century? And yet, you know, this is what we find.

And again, seven years trying to break it down and make it go away and it doesn't go away regardless of what we throw at it.

And again, seven years trying to break it down and make it go away and it doesn't go away regardless of what we throw at it.

Yeah, so that paper is about the stunning collapse of Bolivia's political party system around 2003, 2004, which was a political party system in a country with chronically weak democratic institutions and many coups and general institutional instability, but a political party system, meaning a set of political parties competing in a given country

Yeah, so that paper is about the stunning collapse of Bolivia's political party system around 2003, 2004, which was a political party system in a country with chronically weak democratic institutions and many coups and general institutional instability, but a political party system, meaning a set of political parties competing in a given country

ideological and political space against each other that was remarkably stable between 1952 and 2002. This system got set up after the revolution of 1952 and the system persisted. The same political parties came back After coups, after macroeconomic shocks, after guerrilla uprisings, Che Guevara didn't die in Cuba and he didn't die in Argentina.

ideological and political space against each other that was remarkably stable between 1952 and 2002. This system got set up after the revolution of 1952 and the system persisted. The same political parties came back After coups, after macroeconomic shocks, after guerrilla uprisings, Che Guevara didn't die in Cuba and he didn't die in Argentina.

He died in Bolivia where he was trying to stoke revolution. And the political party system was completely robust to this.

He died in Bolivia where he was trying to stoke revolution. And the political party system was completely robust to this.

Yeah, exactly. You still have the political parties that were still there. Some of them would have been cooperating with the dictator who happened to be there in power at the moment. And in any event, when the dictator fell, the same parties, even the same individuals would come back.

Yeah, exactly. You still have the political parties that were still there. Some of them would have been cooperating with the dictator who happened to be there in power at the moment. And in any event, when the dictator fell, the same parties, even the same individuals would come back.