Jeffrey Sachs

That's how you do it.

You know, we've talked – about I think an uncle of yours, who's one of my favorite politicians of American history, J. William Fulbright. And he wrote a book in the 1960s called The Arrogance of Power. And I was a kid then, and I read that book like it was the coolest thing imaginable. This was the chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee saying, we're too arrogant to think clearly.

You know, we've talked – about I think an uncle of yours, who's one of my favorite politicians of American history, J. William Fulbright. And he wrote a book in the 1960s called The Arrogance of Power. And I was a kid then, and I read that book like it was the coolest thing imaginable. This was the chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee saying, we're too arrogant to think clearly.

You know, we've talked – about I think an uncle of yours, who's one of my favorite politicians of American history, J. William Fulbright. And he wrote a book in the 1960s called The Arrogance of Power. And I was a kid then, and I read that book like it was the coolest thing imaginable. This was the chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee saying, we're too arrogant to think clearly.

That was amazing. He was an amazing person. Now, I think that's the fundamental problem. I'm not sure we're properly over it, but I have to say that in 1990-91, we had the chance for global peace, really for global peace. That doomsday clock of the atomic scientists, which I...

That was amazing. He was an amazing person. Now, I think that's the fundamental problem. I'm not sure we're properly over it, but I have to say that in 1990-91, we had the chance for global peace, really for global peace. That doomsday clock of the atomic scientists, which I...

That was amazing. He was an amazing person. Now, I think that's the fundamental problem. I'm not sure we're properly over it, but I have to say that in 1990-91, we had the chance for global peace, really for global peace. That doomsday clock of the atomic scientists, which I...

like to refer to so much, which measures how close or far are we from nuclear war, was the farthest away it was ever in its history because the Cold War had ended. So I was there as a young economist who actually knew something about economic stabilization. And I made proposals. And interestingly, just as a footnote, I advised the Polish government in 1989.

like to refer to so much, which measures how close or far are we from nuclear war, was the farthest away it was ever in its history because the Cold War had ended. So I was there as a young economist who actually knew something about economic stabilization. And I made proposals. And interestingly, just as a footnote, I advised the Polish government in 1989.

like to refer to so much, which measures how close or far are we from nuclear war, was the farthest away it was ever in its history because the Cold War had ended. So I was there as a young economist who actually knew something about economic stabilization. And I made proposals. And interestingly, just as a footnote, I advised the Polish government in 1989.

I just, long story, but suddenly as a kid, I happened to be there and I helped write their plan. And I, everything I recommended, for Poland was immediately accepted by the White House. It's a very odd thing. In fact, I went one day, I had an idea of mobilizing some finance to help Poland stabilize, and I

I just, long story, but suddenly as a kid, I happened to be there and I helped write their plan. And I, everything I recommended, for Poland was immediately accepted by the White House. It's a very odd thing. In fact, I went one day, I had an idea of mobilizing some finance to help Poland stabilize, and I

I just, long story, but suddenly as a kid, I happened to be there and I helped write their plan. And I, everything I recommended, for Poland was immediately accepted by the White House. It's a very odd thing. In fact, I went one day, I had an idea of mobilizing some finance to help Poland stabilize, and I

Called the Polish finance minister, said, do you mind if I try to raise a billion dollars for you today? Which was a lot of money in those days. And he said, if you raise a billion dollars, that would be great. So I called Bob Dole, our Senate majority leader, whom I knew because of the Poland work that I was doing. And he invited me immediately into his office. And he said, come back in an hour.

Called the Polish finance minister, said, do you mind if I try to raise a billion dollars for you today? Which was a lot of money in those days. And he said, if you raise a billion dollars, that would be great. So I called Bob Dole, our Senate majority leader, whom I knew because of the Poland work that I was doing. And he invited me immediately into his office. And he said, come back in an hour.

Called the Polish finance minister, said, do you mind if I try to raise a billion dollars for you today? Which was a lot of money in those days. And he said, if you raise a billion dollars, that would be great. So I called Bob Dole, our Senate majority leader, whom I knew because of the Poland work that I was doing. And he invited me immediately into his office. And he said, come back in an hour.

So I came back in an hour. This was September 1989. And who was sitting there? General Brent Scowcroft. Okay, he was the general who was our national security advisor. I was a kid. So it was a little bit interesting moment. And he, Senator Dole said to me, explain to General Scowcroft your idea. So I handed him the paper. This is how you do financial stabilization.

So I came back in an hour. This was September 1989. And who was sitting there? General Brent Scowcroft. Okay, he was the general who was our national security advisor. I was a kid. So it was a little bit interesting moment. And he, Senator Dole said to me, explain to General Scowcroft your idea. So I handed him the paper. This is how you do financial stabilization.

So I came back in an hour. This was September 1989. And who was sitting there? General Brent Scowcroft. Okay, he was the general who was our national security advisor. I was a kid. So it was a little bit interesting moment. And he, Senator Dole said to me, explain to General Scowcroft your idea. So I handed him the paper. This is how you do financial stabilization.

And here's how you stabilize the currency. And Scowcroft looked at it and said, well, will this work? And I said, General, this will work. And Dole led me out of the office and said, call me back later in the day. So at 5 p.m. I called and Dole said, the White House has called. You have, tell your friends you have the one billion. So I raised a billion dollars that day. It was good.