Jeffrey Sachs

either had the clarity or the guts to see it, except the person that preceded me in this seat, Prime Minister Orban, because he was completely clear about this from the first day. Now others are starting, but even till today, the Europeans can't get it because they're so deeply invested in something that makes no sense. They should have said, Russia's big. It lives near us. Let's cooperate.

either had the clarity or the guts to see it, except the person that preceded me in this seat, Prime Minister Orban, because he was completely clear about this from the first day. Now others are starting, but even till today, the Europeans can't get it because they're so deeply invested in something that makes no sense. They should have said, Russia's big. It lives near us. Let's cooperate.

either had the clarity or the guts to see it, except the person that preceded me in this seat, Prime Minister Orban, because he was completely clear about this from the first day. Now others are starting, but even till today, the Europeans can't get it because they're so deeply invested in something that makes no sense. They should have said, Russia's big. It lives near us. Let's cooperate.

That's how you do it.

That's how you do it.

That's how you do it.

You know, we've talked – about I think an uncle of yours, who's one of my favorite politicians of American history, J. William Fulbright. And he wrote a book in the 1960s called The Arrogance of Power. And I was a kid then, and I read that book like it was the coolest thing imaginable. This was the chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee saying, we're too arrogant to think clearly.

You know, we've talked – about I think an uncle of yours, who's one of my favorite politicians of American history, J. William Fulbright. And he wrote a book in the 1960s called The Arrogance of Power. And I was a kid then, and I read that book like it was the coolest thing imaginable. This was the chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee saying, we're too arrogant to think clearly.

You know, we've talked – about I think an uncle of yours, who's one of my favorite politicians of American history, J. William Fulbright. And he wrote a book in the 1960s called The Arrogance of Power. And I was a kid then, and I read that book like it was the coolest thing imaginable. This was the chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee saying, we're too arrogant to think clearly.

That was amazing. He was an amazing person. Now, I think that's the fundamental problem. I'm not sure we're properly over it, but I have to say that in 1990-91, we had the chance for global peace, really for global peace. That doomsday clock of the atomic scientists, which I...

That was amazing. He was an amazing person. Now, I think that's the fundamental problem. I'm not sure we're properly over it, but I have to say that in 1990-91, we had the chance for global peace, really for global peace. That doomsday clock of the atomic scientists, which I...

That was amazing. He was an amazing person. Now, I think that's the fundamental problem. I'm not sure we're properly over it, but I have to say that in 1990-91, we had the chance for global peace, really for global peace. That doomsday clock of the atomic scientists, which I...

like to refer to so much, which measures how close or far are we from nuclear war, was the farthest away it was ever in its history because the Cold War had ended. So I was there as a young economist who actually knew something about economic stabilization. And I made proposals. And interestingly, just as a footnote, I advised the Polish government in 1989.

like to refer to so much, which measures how close or far are we from nuclear war, was the farthest away it was ever in its history because the Cold War had ended. So I was there as a young economist who actually knew something about economic stabilization. And I made proposals. And interestingly, just as a footnote, I advised the Polish government in 1989.

like to refer to so much, which measures how close or far are we from nuclear war, was the farthest away it was ever in its history because the Cold War had ended. So I was there as a young economist who actually knew something about economic stabilization. And I made proposals. And interestingly, just as a footnote, I advised the Polish government in 1989.

I just, long story, but suddenly as a kid, I happened to be there and I helped write their plan. And I, everything I recommended, for Poland was immediately accepted by the White House. It's a very odd thing. In fact, I went one day, I had an idea of mobilizing some finance to help Poland stabilize, and I

I just, long story, but suddenly as a kid, I happened to be there and I helped write their plan. And I, everything I recommended, for Poland was immediately accepted by the White House. It's a very odd thing. In fact, I went one day, I had an idea of mobilizing some finance to help Poland stabilize, and I

I just, long story, but suddenly as a kid, I happened to be there and I helped write their plan. And I, everything I recommended, for Poland was immediately accepted by the White House. It's a very odd thing. In fact, I went one day, I had an idea of mobilizing some finance to help Poland stabilize, and I

Called the Polish finance minister, said, do you mind if I try to raise a billion dollars for you today? Which was a lot of money in those days. And he said, if you raise a billion dollars, that would be great. So I called Bob Dole, our Senate majority leader, whom I knew because of the Poland work that I was doing. And he invited me immediately into his office. And he said, come back in an hour.

Called the Polish finance minister, said, do you mind if I try to raise a billion dollars for you today? Which was a lot of money in those days. And he said, if you raise a billion dollars, that would be great. So I called Bob Dole, our Senate majority leader, whom I knew because of the Poland work that I was doing. And he invited me immediately into his office. And he said, come back in an hour.