Jeffrey Sachs

And here's how you stabilize the currency. And Scowcroft looked at it and said, well, will this work? And I said, General, this will work. And Dole led me out of the office and said, call me back later in the day. So at 5 p.m. I called and Dole said, the White House has called. You have, tell your friends you have the one billion. So I raised a billion dollars that day. It was good.

So, no, no, it had nothing to do with me because it was the right idea. The Polish Zloty stabilized. I did a good thing. I was a technically equipped, sophisticated manager of a financial stabilization, or not manager, but advisor on the financial stabilization. Okay, then in 1991, I recommended The same thing for Gorbachev and for this creaking, collapsing Soviet Union.

So, no, no, it had nothing to do with me because it was the right idea. The Polish Zloty stabilized. I did a good thing. I was a technically equipped, sophisticated manager of a financial stabilization, or not manager, but advisor on the financial stabilization. Okay, then in 1991, I recommended The same thing for Gorbachev and for this creaking, collapsing Soviet Union.

So, no, no, it had nothing to do with me because it was the right idea. The Polish Zloty stabilized. I did a good thing. I was a technically equipped, sophisticated manager of a financial stabilization, or not manager, but advisor on the financial stabilization. Okay, then in 1991, I recommended The same thing for Gorbachev and for this creaking, collapsing Soviet Union.

Gorbachev wanted to have elections in all of the republics and he wanted to democratize and stabilize. OK, I know something about that, Mr. President. And so we met in the Harvard Kennedy School and there were one, two, three, four, five of us, a little team. One of them was the chief economic advisor of Gorbachev. Gregory Yavlinsky. One was the dean of the Kennedy School.

Gorbachev wanted to have elections in all of the republics and he wanted to democratize and stabilize. OK, I know something about that, Mr. President. And so we met in the Harvard Kennedy School and there were one, two, three, four, five of us, a little team. One of them was the chief economic advisor of Gorbachev. Gregory Yavlinsky. One was the dean of the Kennedy School.

Gorbachev wanted to have elections in all of the republics and he wanted to democratize and stabilize. OK, I know something about that, Mr. President. And so we met in the Harvard Kennedy School and there were one, two, three, four, five of us, a little team. One of them was the chief economic advisor of Gorbachev. Gregory Yavlinsky. One was the dean of the Kennedy School.

One became a very senior diplomat, Bob Blackwell, that I deal with. One was a very senior economist at MIT, Stanley Fisher. We wrote a plan for how the Soviet Union could stabilize, and I did the chapter on the financing. Basically the same thing that I had said for Poland. Okay. It was completely rejected within about 12 hours in Washington. Okay.

One became a very senior diplomat, Bob Blackwell, that I deal with. One was a very senior economist at MIT, Stanley Fisher. We wrote a plan for how the Soviet Union could stabilize, and I did the chapter on the financing. Basically the same thing that I had said for Poland. Okay. It was completely rejected within about 12 hours in Washington. Okay.

One became a very senior diplomat, Bob Blackwell, that I deal with. One was a very senior economist at MIT, Stanley Fisher. We wrote a plan for how the Soviet Union could stabilize, and I did the chapter on the financing. Basically the same thing that I had said for Poland. Okay. It was completely rejected within about 12 hours in Washington. Okay.

I hated this for the next 30 years, I have to tell you, because we just could not take yes for an answer. A couple of months ago, someone sent me from the archives, the first time that I'd ever seen it, the National Security Council minutes rejecting the proposal. Fascinating to read, because that's your life before your eyes, watching this.

I hated this for the next 30 years, I have to tell you, because we just could not take yes for an answer. A couple of months ago, someone sent me from the archives, the first time that I'd ever seen it, the National Security Council minutes rejecting the proposal. Fascinating to read, because that's your life before your eyes, watching this.

I hated this for the next 30 years, I have to tell you, because we just could not take yes for an answer. A couple of months ago, someone sent me from the archives, the first time that I'd ever seen it, the National Security Council minutes rejecting the proposal. Fascinating to read, because that's your life before your eyes, watching this.

There was a guy named Dick Darman who was a former colleague of mine. The technical term, I don't think I can say it in mixed company, actually. So I won't say what I would say about him. But it's an unpleasant English word. It's really nasty. Too nasty for polite company. He says in this thing, we should do the minimum job. necessary so that there's not a collapse but nothing more.

There was a guy named Dick Darman who was a former colleague of mine. The technical term, I don't think I can say it in mixed company, actually. So I won't say what I would say about him. But it's an unpleasant English word. It's really nasty. Too nasty for polite company. He says in this thing, we should do the minimum job. necessary so that there's not a collapse but nothing more.

There was a guy named Dick Darman who was a former colleague of mine. The technical term, I don't think I can say it in mixed company, actually. So I won't say what I would say about him. But it's an unpleasant English word. It's really nasty. Too nasty for polite company. He says in this thing, we should do the minimum job. necessary so that there's not a collapse but nothing more.

And he quotes Machiavelli and we're not interested and we're not gonna do this. And it's really watching stupid people taking important stupid decisions, fools. By the way, they never called to say, can we discuss stabilization? This guy knew nothing. They don't understand anything. They don't care. So what were they doing? They actually reached a conclusion at the end of the meeting.

And he quotes Machiavelli and we're not interested and we're not gonna do this. And it's really watching stupid people taking important stupid decisions, fools. By the way, they never called to say, can we discuss stabilization? This guy knew nothing. They don't understand anything. They don't care. So what were they doing? They actually reached a conclusion at the end of the meeting.

And he quotes Machiavelli and we're not interested and we're not gonna do this. And it's really watching stupid people taking important stupid decisions, fools. By the way, they never called to say, can we discuss stabilization? This guy knew nothing. They don't understand anything. They don't care. So what were they doing? They actually reached a conclusion at the end of the meeting.

We're going to do the minimum possible. I mean, minimum, minimum. It's not our business to help. We're not going to do any of that. That's arrogance of power. We don't have to do anything. Why? We're the United States. We don't have to do anything. They didn't even... Look, the stakes for the world were very high. You could have a 30-minute phone call to understand financial stabilization.