Jennifer Burns

So he's in this kind of really open space where the institutional economics of the 1920s has failed to predict, which was focused on business cycles. This is the irony. Their big thing was charting and understanding business cycles. And then we have the biggest business cycle of all time and they haven't seen it coming and they don't have a good explanation for it.

So he's in this kind of really open space where the institutional economics of the 1920s has failed to predict, which was focused on business cycles. This is the irony. Their big thing was charting and understanding business cycles. And then we have the biggest business cycle of all time and they haven't seen it coming and they don't have a good explanation for it.

And what he will get at Chicago is, is the remnants of a monetary understanding of the economy. And so his teachers, they don't know exactly what's going on, but they look first to the banking crisis. They look first to the, in 1933, it's, you know, bank runs, failures of, maybe it's up to a third of American banks. It's huge. Thousands of banks are failing per week. So they're focused on that.

And what he will get at Chicago is, is the remnants of a monetary understanding of the economy. And so his teachers, they don't know exactly what's going on, but they look first to the banking crisis. They look first to the, in 1933, it's, you know, bank runs, failures of, maybe it's up to a third of American banks. It's huge. Thousands of banks are failing per week. So they're focused on that.

And what he will get at Chicago is, is the remnants of a monetary understanding of the economy. And so his teachers, they don't know exactly what's going on, but they look first to the banking crisis. They look first to the, in 1933, it's, you know, bank runs, failures of, maybe it's up to a third of American banks. It's huge. Thousands of banks are failing per week. So they're focused on that.

So that's the first kind of imprint he will have. The Great Depression has something to do with a The second imprint he will have is that all of his professors are profoundly concerned about the social crisis. They want relief programs. They want them now. They want bank regulation and financial reform. They're very active. This is not laissez-faire by any stretch of the imagination.

So that's the first kind of imprint he will have. The Great Depression has something to do with a The second imprint he will have is that all of his professors are profoundly concerned about the social crisis. They want relief programs. They want them now. They want bank regulation and financial reform. They're very active. This is not laissez-faire by any stretch of the imagination.

So that's the first kind of imprint he will have. The Great Depression has something to do with a The second imprint he will have is that all of his professors are profoundly concerned about the social crisis. They want relief programs. They want them now. They want bank regulation and financial reform. They're very active. This is not laissez-faire by any stretch of the imagination.

So Friedman has that imprinting. And then about—so that's—he gets there in 1932. 36, 37, the ideas of John Maynard Keynes from Britain, which has a different explanation. Keynes has a different explanation. The Great Depression will kind of make landfall in American economics and be very profoundly influential on most American economists. But Friedman already, it's too late for Friedman.

So Friedman has that imprinting. And then about—so that's—he gets there in 1932. 36, 37, the ideas of John Maynard Keynes from Britain, which has a different explanation. Keynes has a different explanation. The Great Depression will kind of make landfall in American economics and be very profoundly influential on most American economists. But Friedman already, it's too late for Friedman.

So Friedman has that imprinting. And then about—so that's—he gets there in 1932. 36, 37, the ideas of John Maynard Keynes from Britain, which has a different explanation. Keynes has a different explanation. The Great Depression will kind of make landfall in American economics and be very profoundly influential on most American economists. But Friedman already, it's too late for Friedman.

He already has a different perspective. So Keynesianism unfolds. I can say more about that. But it basically leads to more active federal government participation in the economy. And what underlies a lot of that, its adaptation in America particularly, is the idea that capitalism has failed. Capitalism has revealed itself to have a profound flaw.

He already has a different perspective. So Keynesianism unfolds. I can say more about that. But it basically leads to more active federal government participation in the economy. And what underlies a lot of that, its adaptation in America particularly, is the idea that capitalism has failed. Capitalism has revealed itself to have a profound flaw.

He already has a different perspective. So Keynesianism unfolds. I can say more about that. But it basically leads to more active federal government participation in the economy. And what underlies a lot of that, its adaptation in America particularly, is the idea that capitalism has failed. Capitalism has revealed itself to have a profound flaw.

in that its cycles of boom and bust create social instability, chaos. It needs to be tamed. It needs to be regulated. And so that becomes the kind of baseline of politics in the United States, the understanding of the New Deal, the understanding of the Democratic Party, even to some extent, the understanding of the Republican Party. And Friedman never quite Now, we're quite sure about that.

in that its cycles of boom and bust create social instability, chaos. It needs to be tamed. It needs to be regulated. And so that becomes the kind of baseline of politics in the United States, the understanding of the New Deal, the understanding of the Democratic Party, even to some extent, the understanding of the Republican Party. And Friedman never quite Now, we're quite sure about that.

in that its cycles of boom and bust create social instability, chaos. It needs to be tamed. It needs to be regulated. And so that becomes the kind of baseline of politics in the United States, the understanding of the New Deal, the understanding of the Democratic Party, even to some extent, the understanding of the Republican Party. And Friedman never quite Now, we're quite sure about that.

He has a hunch that there's something else going on, and he does not buy that capitalism has sort of ground to a halt, or the other idea is that capitalism has gone through some sort of phase transition. And it worked great maybe while we had a frontier. This is a very serious argument that people are making. The United States used to have a frontier, a place where Europeans hadn't fully settled.

He has a hunch that there's something else going on, and he does not buy that capitalism has sort of ground to a halt, or the other idea is that capitalism has gone through some sort of phase transition. And it worked great maybe while we had a frontier. This is a very serious argument that people are making. The United States used to have a frontier, a place where Europeans hadn't fully settled.

He has a hunch that there's something else going on, and he does not buy that capitalism has sort of ground to a halt, or the other idea is that capitalism has gone through some sort of phase transition. And it worked great maybe while we had a frontier. This is a very serious argument that people are making. The United States used to have a frontier, a place where Europeans hadn't fully settled.